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PREFACE
Little did I know what I was embarking on when I fired off that email to Guszti Eiben,
professor of story-writing, suggesting to use evolutionary artificial societies to study eco-
nomic processes. Not only did he want to do exactly that, but his colleague Jeroen van
denBergh, professor of scientific debate, had already secured funding for a PhDposition
and, surprise, was willing to take me as a student, despite my ignorance of economic
theory. Soon I was running agent-based simulations right and left, leaving far behind
what was considered the state of the art in general equilibrium theory. My hard disk was
filling with gigabytes of exciting data. Only that theymade no sense. The artificial agents
were dying. Or their technology went through the roof. Or their welfare exploded. We
used different parameters. Different methods. Different ideas. To no avail.
If mainstream economists frown upon evolutionary agent-based simulations, here I
am, shaking their hand and hugging their shoulder: they have every reason to do so.
These beasts are unruly, unpredictable, incomprehensible, nasty, and mean. Only a
madman can believe in them. Or visionaries like Guszti and Jeroen. Imyself threw in the
towel not only once but twice! Then I had the good fortune tomeet Sorin Solomon, pro-
fessor of good hope, and David Bree, professor of the high seas, who together pulled me
back on the firm grounds of wonder and astonishment. You can’t really control what you
get out of a complex system by what you are putting in. Thats why its called complex.
There is some break of causality.
Still, there is no denying it: real economic phenomena emerge from the complex
interaction of opinionated and irresolute human beings like me, while the super-hero
of rational choice theory really belongs to the comic book. The little headway I could
make in taming this raging madness, nothing but charts of shallow waters around an
abysmal depth of mystery, is contained within this thesis. I hope that it will be useful to
you, reader, if only by warning you of obstacles that lie ahead.
This thesis would not be complete without a word on interdisciplinary research. By
this wemean a holistic and systematic research plan that requires scientific advances in
unrelated disciplines. I think Sorin has formulated it well: this is where things really get
interesting; but unless one enjoys the luxury of a four year PhD contract, it can hardly be
done. By and large, research gets funded if it can be published in high ranking journals.
Differences in culture, language, style, methods, and expectations make it extremely
difficult to write articles that will be accepted by high ranking journals of more than
one discipline. From the point of view of academic career building, this cancels the
added value of interdisciplinary research. If this is your choice, be prepared for painful
misunderstandings, and make sure you can afford to fail.
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OVERVIEW
1.1 Background andmotivation
Human society is arguably themost complex and fascinating system that can be studied
with scientific methods. Composed of intelligent beings with a free will andmind, there
seems to be no limit to the ways it can organize itself. From the grassroots democracy of
a Swiss canton to the gun culture of a Brazilian shanty town, there are tight networks of
personal ties and social interaction through which beliefs are propagated, trust is built,
and culture is formed. They deeply embed decision makers at all levels of society, from
the director of a primary school to the executive boards and inner circles of large corpo-
rations and ruling parties. They certainly reign over the world of academic and religious
institutions. No consensus is reached and no rule is established if not through the rele-
vant network.
Social networks are neither regular nor random. They are the result of a development
process steered by geographic proximity, shared history, ethnic and religious affiliation,
common economic interests, and much else. Yet despite its preeminence and domi-
nance in human society, the scientific study of social networks is relatively young. An
early contribution was certainly the “six degrees of separation” by Milgram (1967), but
it took another 30 years until the complex nature of social networks came to full atten-
tion (Albert and Barabási, 2002; Dorogovtsev and Mendes, 2002), in the sense that the
collective behavior of agents in the network is fundamentally different from the average
behavior of the individuals that compose it.
A recurrent question in the study of social networks is how they help a society to
process information that allows them to react and adapt to a changing environment.
Understanding this adaptive learning process is of great economic importance, as it can
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help a government to prepare for environmental change, and to correctly anticipate the
consequences of public intervention. For example, an appropriate response to climate
change and associated problems like flooding and desertification might then be devel-
oped, and, if the climate change is caused by human behavior, it might even be curbed.
But as promising as this type of research is, it breaks with important traditional eco-
nomic assumptions, and requires a new type of economic modeling. Mainstream eco-
nomic theory, in particular the neoclassical school, is based on two abstractions: the
rational agent and the representative agent. The first abstraction is based on the idea
that themathematical concept of a rational strategy approximates real human strategies
without significant bias and with an acceptable level of inaccuracy. Provided that this
rational strategy exists and that it can be computed, it avoids the uncertainty and am-
biguity that is inherent to any cognitive model of human decision making. The second
abstraction removes the diversity and social interdependence of a multi-agent systems,
either by aggregating all group attributes and projecting them onto a single representa-
tive agent, or by observing the emergent behavior of the society and projecting it onto a
single representative agent.
The representative agent is in fact required for the rational strategy to be a well de-
finedmathematical object, as the equilibria of even trivially simplemulti-agent systems
are often not computable, if they exist at all. Together, these abstractions allow for exact
solutions in those systems where the dominant strategies can be computed, and their
analytic treatment can be used to extrapolate the behavior of a society under given tech-
nological or environmental change, as well as the regulative power of a public policy.
But as Kirman (1992) has pointed out, “the reaction of a rational representative agent
to change need not reflect how the rational individual would respond to change, and
the preferences of a representative agent over choices may be diametrically opposed to
those of society as a whole.” Furthermore, the idea that rational strategies constitute an
unbiased approximation of real human strategies is refuted by a growing andwidely rec-
ognized body of scientific (experimental and empirical) evidence (e.g., Kahneman et al.,
1982; Camerer et al., 2003).
Real collective behavior depends on how information is processed in the social net-
work and how individual beliefs and strategies are adapted over time, yet a policy de-
signed for a rational and representative agent cannot account for the fact that informa-
tion is not the same for all agents, and is oblivious to the speed and cost of changing
a strategy. A policy that is designed with the rational and representative agent in mind
cannot be expected to have the intended effects when applied to a real economy (Weg-
ner and Pelikan, 2003). But not only do neoclassical economicmodels lead to unrealistic
conclusions on policies that they can study, they also exclude an entire class of public
policies from the analysis, namely those policies that explicitly target the diversity of
strategies and social structure. Exemplary reward and punishment of single individu-
als, as well as the forming and breaking of personal ties between decision makers, such
policies have been found to be highly effective policy instruments since the dawn of hu-
man statehood. Yet they are inaccessible to neoclassical economic theory. One simply
cannot target individual behavior if there is no heterogeneity in the model.
One important aspect of human decision making that cannot be modeled by the
representative agent is the evolution of a behavior or strategy as it is passed from agent
to agent by way of imitation (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Hof-
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bauer and Sigmund, 2003). Being able to observe different agents and to imitate the
strategy of one of them allows an agent to extend its empirical horizon and to draw on
the collective experience of the group. An agent may have no information on the world
it lives in, ormay not understand it, but if it can imitate the strategy of another agent that
fares well it can still be expected to fare likewise. For an agent that has the information
and capability to develop a rational strategy, the time and effort needed to do so does
not necessarily pay off when a strategy that can readily be imitated achieves the same
results. Even the most rational of agents will evolve their strategies by imitation when
the utility of an action can only be established empirically through testing, as in such
cases an evolutionary approach that varies and recombines a set of candidate solutions
often produces the best results.
1.2 Research objectives
Here we investigate the impact of environmental dynamics on social systems with be-
havioral interactions by means of evolutionary computational experiments. We will
study how to model the evolution of investment behavior by imitation in a social net-
work, and we will use the resulting model to generate general insights and methods for
the design and evaluation of public policies in an environment that is dynamic. The dy-
namics can be resource related, ecological, or technological, in which case a policy can
guide the process of adaptation. The dynamics can also be policy related, in which case
an evolutionary agent-based analysis can help to understand the temporal effects of in-
troducing a policy. The research is fundamental in that it explores the general difficulties
and opportunities that arise from applying the methods of evolutionary computation
and agent-based modeling to evolutionary and behavioral economics.
Just as the individual agent can be expected to reason in a way that is in its best
interest, so a group of agents can be expected to interact in a way that is in their best
interest. However, while the individual agent is free to develop a new and elaborate
strategy for every situation, the rules by which a group of agents interact can neither
change too fast nor can they be too complicated in order to be agreed upon. In fact,
the greater the group, the more simple and static the rules need to be in order to be
commonly accepted. This implies that while a multi-agent model of social interaction
and imitation needs to allow the agents to achieve realistic income growth rates in a
wide array of economic situations, it has to be simple and needs to be evaluated against
the amount of information that it requires the agents to hold. To quote Einstein, the
model we are looking for has to be as simple as possible, but not simpler.
Our first objective is therefore to design a simple and robust agent-based model of
imitation in a social network that can be used for an evolutionary policy analysis by
numerical simulation. To this end we will try to identify the essential components of
an evolutionary algorithm in general, and of evolution by imitation in particular. Our
second objective is to use the agent-based model to study how the imitated strategies
evolves under different environmental dynamics—perhaps a public policy can use such
understanding to optimize the evolutionary mechanism to a particular environmental
dynamic. For example, desertification is typically a slowprocesswith long lasting conse-
quences, while a pest can disappear as sudden as it appeared, and eachmight require its
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own mode of adaptation from an agricultural community. Our third and final objective
is to study whether a simple and robust evolutionary agent-based model can be used
to design and evaluate a new type of public policy that explicitly takes the evolutionary
aspects of imitation into account.
1.3 Methods
Whether a good strategy is available for imitation depends on how diversity of strate-
gies is maintained in the population and on how information flows through the social
network. The survival probability of entities that proliferate by an autocatalytic process,
which includes the spread of economic strategies by imitation, depends crucially on the
discrete nature of the quantities involved (Shnerb et al., 2000), as well as on the spatial
structure of their hosting environment (Lieberman et al., 2005; Louzoun et al., 2007).
Evolution of strategies by imitation is therefore best studied in agent-based simulations
that pays proper attention to the discrete nature of strategies and agents, as well as the
social structure.
According to Lehtinen and Kuorikoski (2007), a major hurdle in introducing agent-
based simulations tomainstream economics is the fact that they yieldmessy data of un-
clear dependence. While it is possible in principle to assess the importance of any given
parameter of a simulation model by running different simulations with one parameter
fixed at a time, this is usually impractical because of the amount of computation re-
quired, the volume of the resulting data, and interaction between different parameter
values. There is a lack of efficient statistical tools that can tell whether parameter values
and simulation details are crucial for the results.
This problem is certainly true for a model where economic behavior evolves by im-
itation in a social network. Evolutionary algorithms form a rich familily of stochastic
search methods that use the Darwinian principles of variation and selection to incre-
mentally improve a set of candidate solutions. Originally developed to solve computa-
tionally hard optimization problems, they can also be used to model real world phe-
nomenon like the evolution of economic strategies. As has first been recognized by
Grefenstette (1986), the design of an evolutionary algorithm for a specific application
is itself a hard optimization problem that requires its own methodology and tools. This
is visualized in the hierarchy of Figure 1.1, where a design tool tunes an evolutionary
algorithm, which in turn solves the application problem. In our case the evolutionary
algorithm is a model of evolution by imitation, and the application problem is an eco-
nomic problem like finding an investment strategy that leads to high individual welfare
under given technological or environmental dynamics.
Since almost all existing design tools are meant to maximize the performance of an
evolutionary algorithm, when it comes to design goals like robustness and simplicity
our options are rather limited. Robustness can be achieved by defining a reasonably
wide array of application problems, and tuning the evolutionary algorithm such that
the agents can adapt, i.e., evolve, reasonably well to all of them. We will frequently use
this method. Simplicity is a more challenging design objective. The scientific literature
on the design of evolutionary algorithms does not address it, and neither does the litera-
ture on the design of experiments. Only in the field of statistical inference has amethod-
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Figure 1.1: Design hierarchy of an evolutionary algorithm
Design tool
tunes
??
Evolutionary algorithm
solves
??
Application problem
ological framework developed, the Minimum Description Length principle (Grünwald,
2007). This methodology uses information theory tomeasure the simplicity of a statisti-
cal hypothesis. We will take a similar approach and use information theory to measure
the simplicity of an evolutionary mechanism.
As for the application level of Figure 1.1, we will try to strike a balance between the
need for a well defined application problem that poses a sufficiently realistic challenge
to the agents, and our overall goal to achieve some general understanding on evolution-
ary agent-based policy analysis in dynamic environments. Global warming is widely
considered to be the most acute dynamic economic problem today, and it combines
many issues that are difficult if not impossible to address by a neoclassical economic
model: it is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and disagreement with re-
gard to both the cause and the consequences of global warming; the distribution of re-
sponsibility (in terms of greenhouse gas emissions) and vulnerability is highly skewed;
decision makers are entrenched in established procedures and beliefs; finally, there is
no central authority that can punish free-riders. We base the definition of our applica-
tion problem—that is, of the technological and environmental dynamics that the agents
have to adapt to—on the influential work of W. D. Nordhaus who published a series of
general-equilibrium economic models of climate policy and global warming, starting
with the DICE model (Nordhaus, 1992). For the sake of analytic clarity we remove or
simplify those elements of his model that are not essential to our current study.
Unlike Nordhaus, we consider the rationality of all agents to be bounded, and their
information to be limited. They can only compare some properties of their fellow agents
and use this information to imitate a strategy. Consider a population of several hundred
agents, a number that is sufficiently large to allow for a rich social structure and diversity
in strategies, income, and wealth. The agents allocate their respective income over a fi-
nite number of n investment sectors. Mathematically, such allocations have the precise
definition of points in the n-dimensional simplex, and allow for a straightforward for-
mulation of operators for variation and recombination. Standard economic growth and
production functions describe how capital accumulates in each sector and contributes
to income. These functions are not aggregated: growth and returns are calculated inde-
pendently for each agent and two agentswith different investment strategies can experi-
ence very different growth rates and income levels. A non-aggregatemodel preserves the
functional relationship between individual investment strategies and the corresponding
economic performance and allows us to model the evolution of strategies by imitation:
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an agent can select another agent based on a property that is indicative of its current
or future economic performance (the phenotype) and imitate its investment strategy
(the genotype), thereby increasing the frequency of the imitated strategy, or at least its
proportional input to new strategies if imitation is implemented as recombination of
existing strategies.
Whenworkingwith numericalmethods, we have to account for a number of compli-
cating factors that make it difficult to obtain clear and useful results. These include the
non-deterministic nature of the evolutionary process, the autocatalytic character of the
imitation dynamics, and the large number of free and unspecified parameters. Rather
than closely calibrating those parameters that affect our results on a specific set of em-
pirical data, we define broad parameter ranges and collect statistical information over a
representative sample of possible economies that fall within these ranges. For example,
in order to obtain results that are valid for the general class of scale-free social networks
with a high cluster coefficient, we run each computer simulation with a different in-
stance of such a network, and aggregate the statistical data. Likewise, environmental
dynamics can be typed among others by how sudden and how frequently the environ-
mental conditions change, and results for specific types of environmental dynamics are
based on repeated computer simulations, eachwith a different realization of the specific
type of environmental dynamics. The number of simulations needed to obtain reliable
statistical results are determined by standard methods of variance reduction.
The computer programs that simulate our economicmodels are simple—a fewdozen
lines of Matlab code that describe basic matrix operations and a simple for-loop. The
various growth and production equations that we will use to describe the economic
models can each be expressed by a single line of Matlab code. The imitation process,
which depends on the local neighborhood structure of the social network, never re-
quires more than a dozen lines of code, even in its most complicated form in Chap-
ter 4. The number of code lines needed to collect and analyze data from the simula-
tions is about ten times more than what is needed to actually run the simulation. The
bulk of the coding effort however is not spent on running and analyzing the simulations,
but on tuning their free parameters, which in this case has culminated in an indepen-
dent software solution. All code, together with graphs and annotations, is available at
http://volker.nannen.com/phd-thesis.
1.4 Thesis outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces Relevance
Estimation and Value Calibration (REVAC), a numeric method that measures howmuch
the performance of an evolutionary algorithmdepends on the correct tuning of its oper-
ators and parameters, independent of the actual tuning method. The rationale behind
the method is that if parameter values are taken from a probability distribution, the av-
erage performance of the resulting evolutionary algorithms can be evaluated against the
amount of information—measured in Shannon entropy—that this distribution provides
on its randomvalues. To verify the reliability and computational efficiency of REVAC, we
test it empirically on abstract objective functions, a simple and well studied genetic al-
gorithm, and an agent-based simulation of our evolutionary economic model.
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Chapter 3 uses REVAC to study how the performance of a typical evolutionary algo-
rithm depends on the choice and tuning of its components. This is a novelty in evolu-
tionary computing, where the cost of tuning is normally ignored. We tune a large array
of common evolutionary algorithms to optimize four classes of objective function and
compare the performance of different evolutionary algorithms before and after tuning,
and how this improvement in performance depends on the tuning of a particular com-
ponent. It turns out that the choice of operator for the selection mechanism typically
has the greatest impact on performance, while the tuning of its parameters is of little
consequence. Mutation on the other hand depends primarily on tuning, regardless of
the operator.
After this preliminary work, Chapter 4 completes our work on the first objective and
uses REVAC to develop a simple and robust model of selective imitation in a social net-
work. According to the hypothesis that, by adding extra detail to the imitation mecha-
nism, its adaptive powerwill either stay the sameor increase, two imitationmechanisms
are designed. One is rather simple, with free parameters for the selection, recombina-
tion, and mutation of strategies, as well as one parameter for the connectivity of the
social network. The second model extends the first by using two distinct sets of free
parameters for selection, recombination and mutation, one set to define the imitation
behavior of rich agents, and one set to define the imitation behavior of poor agents.
Both mechanisms are evaluated on an array of different economic environments with
non-linear dynamics. REVAC disproves the above hypothesis by showing that for equal
amounts of tuning the simpler mechanism consistently outperforms the extended one.
As in the previous chapter, the correct tuning of themutation operator, whichmaintains
diversity in the pool of strategies, emerges as having the biggest impact on the simula-
tion results.
Chapter 5 turns to our second objective. We design a minimal evolutionary mecha-
nism with only one free parameter for the amount of diversity in the pool of strategies
and use it to study how the evolutionary system reacts to different environmental dy-
namics. The analysis of a Cobb-Douglas type economy shows that from an evolution-
ary perspective only those environmental dynamics matter that affect the production
coefficients. We define a number of basic environmental dynamics by varying these
coefficients and formulate policy advise for policy makers with different types of risk
preference regarding the socially optimal level of diversity.
Our third objective, the design and evaluation of policies that explicitly take the evo-
lution of strategies into account, is addressed in Chapter 6. We use the same evolution-
arymechanismas inChapter 5 to build a simplemodel of globalwarmingwhere the goal
of the policy maker is to replace a resource with a negative impact on social welfare—
fossil energy—by a neutral yet potentially less cost efficient alternative, namely renew-
able energy. We proceed to formulate two evolutionary policies—prizes and advertise-
ment—that selectively increase the probability of an agent with a desirable strategies
to be imitated, one by increasing the welfare of such an agent, the other by increas-
ing its visibility in the social network. Numerical simulations are used to evaluate their
effectiveness over a wide range of values for the additional cost of renewable energy,
compared to a standard emission tax.
Chapter 7 concludes. For convenience, a list of all symbolic variables can be found
in the appendix.
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RELEVANCE ESTIMATION AND VALUE CALIBRATION
OF EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHM PARAMETERS
Abstract
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) form a rich class of stochastic search methods
that use the Darwinian principles of variation and selection to incrementally im-
prove a set of candidate solutions (Eiben and Smith, 2003; Jong, 2006). Both princi-
ples can be implemented from a wide variety of components and operators, many
with parameters that need to be tuned if the EA is to perform as intended. Tuning
however requires effort, both in terms of time and computing facilities.
When resources are limited we are interested to know how much tuning an EA
requires to reach an intended performance, andwhich parameters aremost relevant
in the sense that tuning them has the biggest impact on EA performance. Likewise,
when designing an EA to simulate a real evolutionary process we would like to min-
imize the dependency of our simulation results on specific parameter values. In this
case the amount of tuning required until the simulation behaves as intended indi-
cates how plausible and realistic the simulation really is.
To measure the amount of tuning that is needed in order to reach a given per-
formance, we introduce the REVACmethod for Relevance Estimation and Value Cal-
ibration. While tuning the EA parameters in an automated and systematic manner,
the method provides an information-theoretic measure on howmuch the tuning of
each parameter contributes to overall EA performance. We evaluate its reliability
and efficiency empirically on a number of test cases that reflect the typical prop-
erties of EA parameter spaces, as well as on evolutionary agent-based simulations.
Finally we compare it to another tuning method, meta-GA.
Parts of this chapter have been published in Nannen and Eiben (2007b,a); de Landgraaf et al. (2007).
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2.1 Background
One of the big challenges in evolutionary computing is the design and control of evolu-
tionary algorithm (EA) parameters (Eiben et al., 1999). Without exaggeration, one could
state that one of the canonical design problems is how to chose the operators for an evo-
lutionary algorithm to ensure good performance. For instance, the question whether
crossover is a relevant operator is still open, or rather, the answer depends on the ap-
plication at hand (Eiben and Smith, 2003). A related issue is the relevance of free EA
parameters. Depending on the EA and the problem it is applied to, tournament size can
be a highly relevant parameter whose value must be chosen well for good performance,
while mutation rate could be less relevant in the sense that its values do not affect EA
performance toomuch. When designing an evolutionary algorithm tomodel a real evo-
lutionary system, for example in evolutionary economics, one often has to deal with
non-standard evolutionary mechanisms. These can include domain specific features of
which it is altogether unknown whether the system behavior depends on their correct
parameterization.
While the tuning of relevant evolutionary algorithm (EA) parameters is essential to
good EA performance, current practice in EA tuning is based on ill-justified conventions
and ad hoc methods. In particular, studies on confidence intervals for good parameter
values and sensitivity analyzes for parameter robustness are allmost non-existent. Part
of the problem lies in the fact thatmost EAs are non-deterministic and path-dependent,
in the sense that small changes to the initial conditions can lead to highly divergent re-
sults. This makes it difficult to obtain a reliable estimate of EA performance on a given
problem. The standard statisticalmethod to reduce variance and improvemeasurement
reliability is measurement replication. With measurement replication, a set of param-
eter values is chosen, the EA is executed several times with these values on the same
problem, and an aggregate performance measure is taken. A classical example of this
approach is Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), which provides a clear set of rules how to op-
timally combine a number of carefully chosen parameter values, how to calculate the
number of replications needed to decide whether one combination of values has a sig-
nificantly better performance than another, and how to infer parameter interaction. An
exhaustive overview of how to use ANOVA to tune an EA is given by Czarn et al. (2004).
This approach has a number of disadvantages, particularly when it is applied to an
EA with several sensitive parameters. First, the choice of parameter values for the anal-
ysis is far from trivial and experiments in this vain often allow for no other conclusion
than that a given choice was wrong. Second, the variance of an EA can easily be so high
and its distribution so bad-behaved that the number of replications needed to produce
significant results is not feasible. Third, there is disagreement in the statistical commu-
nity on how to treat non-numerical results, for example when an EA does not find an
acceptable solution within given computational constraints. Fourth, replications divert
computational resources that could otherwise be used to obtain a better cover of the
parameter space. This is a serious drawback, since it is virtually impossible to infer from
a small number of measurements in a multi-dimensional search space, reliable as they
might be, important measures of robustness like sensitivity to small changes and the
range of values for which a certain EA performance can be achieved.
Here we propose to use an Estimation of Distribution Algorithm (EDA) to control
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the parameters of an evolutionary algorithm: REVAC, which stands for Relevance Esti-
mation and Value Calibration. REVAC is designed to a) tune or calibrate the parameters
of an EA in a robust way and b) quantify the minimum amount of information that is
needed to tune each parameter. Like a meta-GA (Grefenstette, 1986), it is an evolution-
ary method, a meta-EDA, that explores the parameter space of an evolutionary algo-
rithm dynamically. Unlike meta-GA, it tunes an evolutionary algorithm on the basis of
probability density functions over parameter values, rather than individual parameter
values. Starting from a wide distribution over all possible parameter values, REVAC iter-
atively evaluates and improves the distribution such that it increases the probability of
those parameter values that result in good EA performance. To avoid the pitfalls of bad-
behaved distributions and non-numerical results, REVAC only uses rank based statistics
to decide where to zoom in. Also, instead of investing valuable computational resources
in measurement replications, REVAC uses them to get a better cover of the parameter
space.
The estimated distributions over each parameter can be used to estimate the rel-
evance of that parameter in an intuitive way. Broadly speaking, a distribution with a
narrow peak indicates a highly relevant parameter whose values largely influence EA
performance, while a broad plateau belongs to a less relevant parameter whose values
do not matter too much. In terms of information theory, the Shannon entropy of a dis-
tribution expresses the average amount of information that is needed to specify a value
that was drawn from the distribution Shannon (1948). The sharper the peaks of a con-
tinuous probability density function, the lower its Shannon entropy, and the less infor-
mation is needed to specify the values drawn from the distribution. If a distribution over
parameter values has maximum entropy for a given level of expected EA performance,
then this maximum entropy can be used to calculate the minimum amount of informa-
tion that is needed to achieve that performance. REVAC forces the distribution it finds
to approximate the maximum entropy distribution for a given level of performance by
continuously smoothing them between updates, so that their Shannon entropy can be
used to estimate theminimum amount of information needed to reach this level of per-
formance. In these terms the objectives of REVAC can be formulated as follows:
• The Shannon entropy of the distribution is as high as possible for a given level of
performance,
• The expected performance of the EA in question is as high as possible for a given
level of Shannon entropy.
Relatedwork includesmeta-GA as an early attempt to automate the tuning of genetic
algorithms (Grefenstette, 1986), and Eiben et al. (1999) who established parameter con-
trol in EAs as one of the big challenges in evolutionary computing. Czarn et al. (2004)
discuss current problems in EA design and use polynomial models of a performance
curve to estimate confidence interval for parameter values. François andLavergne (2001)
estimate performance curves for EAs across multiple test cases to measure generaliz-
ability. Bartz-Beielstein et al. (2005) uses a Gaussian correlation function to dynamically
build a polynomial regression model of the response curve.
The groundwork of statistical experimental design was laid by R. A. Fisher in the
1920s and 1930s. The use of sequential sampling to search for optimal parameter val-
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ues were introduced by Box and Wilson (1951). A paradigm shift that emphasizes the
robustness of a solution is due to Taguchi and Wu (1980). Estimation of Distribution
Algorithms, in particular those based on univariate marginal distributions, to which the
present type belongs, were pioneered by Mühlenbein (1997). The relationship between
Shannon entropy and EDAs is discussed extensively in Mühlenbein and Höns (2005).
A detailed description of REVAC is given in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3 we use ab-
stract objective functions and a simple genetic algorithm (GA) to verify that REVAC can
indeed estimate how much tuning the parameters of an EA need. Section 2.4 uses the
same simple GA to evaluate whether REVAC uses the available evaluations of candidate
solutions efficiently, without the need for measurement replication. The same section
also tests REVAC on an agent-based simulation from evolutionary economy. Section 2.5
compares REVAC to other tuning methods, namely hand tuning and meta-GA. A sum-
mary and conclusions can be found in Section 2.6.
2.2 The algorithm
2.2.1 Approaching themaximum entropy distribution
Formally, the tuning of EA parameters to a specific application is itself an optimization
problemwhere the value of an objective function r = f (~x) is maximized. The domain of
this objective function are the possible combinations of parameter values ~x for the EA.
Its value r , which is also called the response, is the expected performance of the EA on
the application problem when executed with these parameter values.
Since the domain of many EA parameters is continuous, the choice of suitable EDAs
to tune them is limited. The present algorithm is a steady state variant of the Univari-
ate Marginal Distribution Algorithm (Mühlenbein, 1997). For efficiency, only a single
parameter vector is evaluated between every update of the distributions. Given an EA
with k parameters, REVAC defines a joint distribution D(~x) over the space of possible
parameter vectors~x = {x1, . . . ,xk }. This joint distribution is composed from a set of inde-
pendent marginal density functions D(~x)= 〈D(x1) . . .D(xk )〉 over each parameter. Their
Shannon entropy can be used to estimate howmuch information is needed per param-
eter to achieve the expected performance of the joint distribution. Let a probability
density function D be defined over a continuous interval [a,b]. Its differential Shannon
entropy h can be calculated as
h(D[a,b])=−
∫b
a
D(x) log2D(x)dx. (2.1)
In order to compare the entropy of distributions that are defined over different parame-
ter intervals in a meaningful way, we normalize all parameter intervals to the unit inter-
val [0,1] before calculating the Shannon entropy. In this way the uniform distribution
has a Shannon entropy of zero, and any other distribution has a negative Shannon en-
tropy h(D[0,1])< 0.
Starting with the uniform distribution, REVAC iteratively refines the distribution by
drawing random vectors of parameter values from it, measuring the performance of the
EA with these parameter values, and increasing the probability of those regions of the
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Table 2.1: Two views on a table of parameter vectors
D(x1) · · · D(xi ) · · · D(xk )
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j
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k
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. . .
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~xn {xn1 · · · x
n
i
· · · xn
k
}
parameter space where a higher EA performance is measured. In this way, new distri-
butions are built on estimates of the response surface that were sampled with previous
distributions, each iteration increasing the expected performance of parameter vectors
that are drawn from the distribution. To reduce the variance of stochastic measure-
ments and to prevent premature convergence, REVAC continuously smoothes the dis-
tribution. It is the unique combination of these two operators, increasing the probability
of regions with high performance and smoothing out the resulting probability function,
that allows REVAC to approach themaximumentropy distribution for a given level of EA
performance.
2.2.2 Algorithm implementation
At each step in the tuning process, REVAC maintains a pool of m vectors of parameter
values. From this pool the n <m vectors with the highest measured performance are
selected to define the current distribution and to create a single new parameter vector.
The new parameter vector always replaces the oldest one in the pool. For a good un-
derstanding of how this is done it is helpful to distinguish two views on the n selected
parameter vectors as shown in Table 2.1. Taking a horizontal view on the table, a row
is a vector of parameter values and we can see the table as n of such vectors. Taking a
vertical view on the table, the i th column shows n values from the domain of parame-
ter i . Each column of Table 2.1 defines a marginal density function and the whole table
defines the joint density function.
As can be seen in the diagram of Figure 2.1, REVAC initializes the table of parameter
vectors by drawing k vectors from the uniform distribution over the space of possible
parameter values. The update process that creates a new table of parameter vectors
consists of three basic steps: evaluating parameter vectors: Given a vector of parameter
values, we can evaluate it by executing the EA with these parameter values and mea-
suring its performance; updating the probabilities: Given a set of evaluated parameter
vectors, we can calculate the probability that some regions of the parameter space have
a higher expected performance than others; generating parameter vectors: Given a prob-
ability density function over the parameter space, we can draw new parameter vectors
proportional to those probabilities.
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Figure 2.1: Diagram of the update process
Initialize: drawm parameter vectors from the uniform D0
Step 1: measure the performance for each new vector
Step 2: choose the n best vectors to define the new Di+1
Step 3: replace the oldest vector by a new drawing from Di+1
?
?
?
?
Step one is straightforward. As for step two and three, they can be described from
both the horizontal and the vertical perspective of Table 2.1. Looking from the horizon-
tal perspective, REVAC can be described as a population based evolutionary algorithm
with operators for selection, recombination and mutation. This description of REVAC
must not be confused with the EA we are tuning. The population consists ofm param-
eter vectors. It is updated by selecting n <m parent vectors from the old population,
which are then recombined andmutated to obtain exactly one child vector every gener-
ation. The child vector always replaces the oldest vector in the population.
REVAC uses a deterministic choice for parent selection as well as for survivor selec-
tion. The n vectors of the population that have the highest measured performance are
selected to become the parents of the new child vector. Recombination is performed
by a multi-parent crossover operator, uniform scanning, that creates one child from n
parents, cf. Eiben and Smith (2003). The mutation operator—applied to the offspring
created by recombination—is rather complicated. It works independently on each pa-
rameter i in two steps. First, a mutation interval [xia ,x
i
b
] is calculated, then a random
value is chosen uniformly from this interval. To define the mutation interval for mutat-
ing a given x
j
i
all other values x1
i
, . . . ,xn
i
for this parameter in the selected parents are
also taken into account. After sorting them in increasing order, the begin point of the
mutation interval or window can be specified as the w-th lower neighbor of x
j
i
, while
the end point of the interval is the w-th upper neighbor of x
j
i
. The new value is drawn
from this interval with a uniform distribution. As there are no neighbors beyond the up-
per and lower limits of the domain, we extend it by mirroring the parent values as well
as the mutated values at the limits, similar to what is done in Fourier transformations.
From the vertical perspective we consider step two and three as constructing k mar-
ginal probability density functions from the columns of Table 2.1 and then drawing a
new parameter vector from these distributions. To define a marginal density function
D(xi ), the n values of column i are sorted and arranged such that together with the
limits 0 and 1 (the domain of each parameter is scaled to the unit interval) they form
n+1 non-overlapping intervals that cover the entire domain. The density over any such
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interval [xa
i
,xb
i
] can be defined as
D(xi )=
1
(m+1)(x b
i
−x a
i
)
, (2.2)
which satisfies
∫1
0 D(xi )dxi = 1. This definition of a density function can be extended
to allow intervals to overlap, for example by defining intervals between values that are
separated by one or two other values. To overcome the problem of missing neighbors
at the limits we again mirror all defining parameter values as well as the chosen values
at the limits. The further the values that define an interval are separated, the higher the
Shannon entropy of the resulting distribution.
In this context, the rationale behind the complicated mutation operator of the hor-
izontal view is that it heavily smoothes the density functions of equation 2.2. Like all
evolutionary algorithms, an EDA is susceptible for converging on a local maximum. By
continuously smoothing the probability density functions we force them to converge
on a maximum of the response surface that lies on a broad hill, yielding robust solu-
tions with broad confidence intervals. But smoothing does more: it allows REVAC to
operate under very noisy conditions, it allows it to readjust and relax marginal distribu-
tions when parameters are interacting and the response surface has curved ridges, and
it maximizes the entropy of the constructed distribution. Smoothing is achieved by tak-
ing not the nearest neighbor but the w-th neighbors of x
j
i
when defining the mutation
interval. Choosing a good value forw is an important aspect when using REVAC. A large
w value can slow down convergence to the point of stagnation. A small w value can
produce unreliable results. Based on our experience so far, we prefer w ≈n/10.
2.2.3 Interpreting themeasurements
REVAC, like any EDA, is a random process. The final result is different with every run
or tuning session of REVAC. Independently of whether REVAC uses measurement repli-
cation, REVAC results can be made more reliable by tuning an EA more than once, and
by either choosing the tuned parameter values that resulted in the highest EA perfor-
mance, or by averaging over the tuned parameter values of several runs of REVAC, as
will be explained below. This is indeed a replication of measurements at a higher level.
But unlike ordinarymeasurement replication, which can be too expensive to extract any
useful information, REVAC can always provide a first approximation, which can then be
refined by repeating the tuning process.
Because REVAC produces a sequence of distributions with slowly decreasing Shan-
non entropy we use the Shannon entropy of these distributions to estimate the mini-
mum amount of information needed to reach a target performance level. This can be
used in several ways. First, it can be used to choose between different sets of EA oper-
ators. A set of operators that needs less information to reach a given level of EA perfor-
mance is easier to tune, more fault tolerant in the implementation, and robuster against
changes to the problem definition. Second, it can be used to identify the critical compo-
nents of an EA. A highly sensitive parameter typically has a sharp peak in the distribution
and a low Shannon entropy. When an EA needs to be adjusted to a new problem, sensi-
tive parameters need the most attention, and with this knowledge the practitioner can
30 2. Relevance Estimation and Value Calibration of EA parameters
concentrate on the critical components straight away. Third, it can be used to suggest
values and confidence intervals for the best parameter values. Given a distribution that
peaks out in a region of high probability (except for the early stage of the algorithms the
marginal distributions have only one peak), we take the 50th percentile (the median)
to be the best tuned parameter values, and use the 25th and the 75th percentile of the
distribution as confidence interval. That is, every value from this range leads to a high
expected performance, under the condition that the other parameters are also chosen
from their respective confidence interval. This confidence interval is also useful when
we average over several runs of REVAC. As we only want to average over those runs that
converged on the same optimum in the parameter space, we take the average of only
those REVAC distributions where all medians lie within the 25th and 75th percentiles of
the respective distributions of the REVAC run that achieved the best EA performance.
REVAC runs that converged on values beyond these intervals are discarded.
Throughout the rest of this doctoral thesis REVAC will use a population of m = 100
parameter vectors, from which the best n = 50 are selected for being a parent. We
smooth by extending the mutation interval over the w = 5 upper and lower neighbors.
In each run or tuning session REVAC is allowed to evaluate 1,000 parameter vectors.
2.3 Assessing the reliability of REVAC estimates
A real in vivo assessment of REVAC requires that we tune an EA on a set of application
problems where the objective function is known, and use this to evaluate the results ob-
tained by REVAC. It is however not feasible to accurately model the response surface of
an EA on any non-trivial application problem. According to Czarn et al. (2004), even
when working with rather simple application problems and a simple genetic algorithm
with only two free parameters, it is difficult to fit anything more sophisticated than a
cubic curve to themeasured performance. This leaves us with two alternatives: we eval-
uate REVAC on abstract objective functions with a predefined response surface that is
representative for EA tuning problems. This has the added advantage that by abstract-
ing both the application and the algorithm layer the run time of the tuning process is
reduced enormously, and that the assessment of REVAC can be based on a large num-
ber ofmeasurements. The second alternative is to use anEA and an application problem
that have been studied in the literature and to evaluate the REVAC relevance estimates
against existing results on the relevance of the EA parameters.
2.3.1 Assessing REVAC reliability on abstract objective functions
In general, we distinguish 3 layers in designing an EA, as shown in Table 1.1 on page 19.
For the present assessment, these layers are implemented as follows:
Experimental setup of Section 2.3.1
design tool REVAC
evolutionary algorithm abstract
application problem abstract
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To define abstract response surfaces that resemble the response surface of a typical
EA we identify five essential properties: 1) Low dimensionality: typically not more than
ten parameters need to be tuned. 2) Non-linearity (epistasis, cross-coupling): parame-
ters interact in non-linear ways, which implies that the response curves are non-sep-
arable, and that values for one parameter depend on the values of other parameters.
3) Smoothness: small changes in parameter values lead to small changes in EA perfor-
mance. 4) Low multi-modality (moderate ruggedness): the objective function has only
one or few significant local optima, i.e., few regions of the parameter space have high
EA performance. 5) Noise: depending on the application, the performance of an EA can
be highly variable and can follow a distribution that is significantly different from the
normal distribution.
We present three experiments: two on the accuracy of the relevance estimates (with-
out noise) and one on the resistance of the estimates to noise. In all experiments the
abstract objective function simulates the performance of an EA with k = 10 parameters,
each of which can take values from the range [0,1].
Experiment 1: hierarchical dependencies. In our first experiment we hardcode pre-
defined dependencies between parameters, such that the optimal value of parameter i
depends on the current value of i −1 and the utility of tuning parameter i depends on
howwell parameter i −1 is tuned. The abstract objective function r = f (~x), is defined as
the sum
r =
10∑
i=1
ri (2.3)
over ten partial response values r1, . . . ,r10, one for each of the ten parameters. These
are calculated as follows. Before a tuning session is started, a single target value t is
chosen at random from the range [0,1] and kept constant throughout the tuning session.
When evaluating a parameter vector ~x = {x1, . . . ,xk }, the partial response r1 of the first
parameter value x1 is one minus the distance to the target value,
r1 = 1−|x1− t |. (2.4)
The partial response ri of each consecutive parameter value depends on how close the
value xi is to that of parameter i −1,
ri = ri−1(1−|xi −xi−1|). (2.5)
We have x1− t ≤ 1 and xi − xi−1 ≤ 1 for any i . Because ri−1 is a factor in the calculation
of ri , the inequality ri > ri+1 always holds, with the effect that the first parameter needs
more tuning than the second one, and so forth.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 shows typical results when using REVAC to tune the 10 parame-
ters to this abstract objective function. Results are from a single run of REVAC. The bar
diagram in Figure 2.2 shows the final Shannon entropy per parameter after evaluating
1,000 parameter vectors. The precoded liner relationship in the need for tuning is well
approximated. In particular, the order of the first five parameters, which need the most
tuning, is correctly identified. The upper left graph of figure 2.3 shows how the mea-
sured Shannon entropy of the REVAC distributions over parameter 1, 4, and 7 changes
during the tuning session. The other three graphs of the figure show how the 25th , 50th
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Figure 2.2: Final Shannon entropy per parameter
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Figure 2.3: Shannon entropy and the percentiles of the REVAC distributions of parame-
ter 1, 3, and 7 during tuning.
and 75th percentile of the same distributions change during tuning. Note that the dis-
tance between the 25th and 75th percentile of the distributions behaves similar to the
entropy of the same distribution.
Experiment 2: predefined relevance distribution. In this experiment we are inter-
ested to see whether REVAC can reveal arbitrary distributions over parameter relevance.
To this end we create an abstract objective function with one peak which is placed at
random in the 10-dimensional unit space. Again, total response is the sum of the partial
response per parameter. This is calculated as one minus the distance of a parameter
value xi to the corresponding peak value ti , weighted by a predefined vector of target
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weights w = 〈w1, . . . ,w10〉,
r =
10∑
i=1
wi [1− (xi − ti )] . (2.6)
In this way, tuning a parameter with a target weight close to zero has no impact on over-
all response, while tuning a parameter with a large target weight has a significant impact
on the response. We use three sets of target weights to specify three elementary distribu-
tions over parameter relevance. The first distribution has two outliers of exceptionally
low relevance, while the remaining target weights are equal (normalize w , with w1 = 0,
w2 = 1, and w3, . . . ,w10 = 10). The weights of the second distribution increase linearly
over the parameters (normalize w , with wi = i ). The weights of the third distribution
increase exponentially such that there are outliers with a high relevance (normalize w ,
withwi = i10). This last distribution represents what is known as sparcity of effects in the
design of experiments and is the most typical situation when tuning a real EA.
Figure 2.4 shows the target weights (the black columns) together with what REVAC
has estimated after 1,000 evaluated parameter vectors (the white columns). Results are
from a single run of REVAC. To estimate how relevance is distributed over the param-
eters we normalize the Shannon entropy of the marginal REVAC distributions, which
results in positive values that sum to one. As can be seen, REVAC approximately repro-
duces the hardcoded order of relevance, in particular with regard to the outliers, but has
difficulties when the weights are too similar. When averaging over several REVAC runs
(not shown here), the order of the estimated relevance per parameter converges to the
order of the predefined target weights.
Experiment 3: measurement noise. In this experiment we study how the reliability of
a relevance estimate changes with additive noise of increasing variance. For the abstract
objective function we add a noise term η to the objective function 2.6 of experiment 2,
r =
10∑
i=1
wi [1− (xi − ti )]+η. (2.7)
To simulate sparcity of effects, the weights w1, . . . ,w10 increase exponentially from pa-
rameter to parameter, cf. the bottom graph of Figure 2.4. Values for the noise term η are
independent and identically distributed. They are drawn from a Pareto distribution
P (X > x)= cx−γ, x > logγ c (2.8)
with exponent γ= 2.3. The value c controls the varianceσ2 of the noise. Such a distribu-
tion is also called a power law distribution and can be found inmany physical and social
systems. It has frequent outliers, its variance converges rather slowly, and it is generally
incompatible with statistical methods that require a normal distribution.
To measure the error of the REVAC estimates we use the mean squared distance be-
tween target weights and the corresponding normalized Shannon entropy after evaluat-
ing 1,000 parameter vectors. With s1, . . . , s10 the normalized Shannon entropy, the error
can be calculated as
er ror =
1
10
10∑
i=1
(si −wi )
2 . (2.9)
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Figure 2.4: Comparing the normalized Shannon entropy per parameter as estimated by
REVAC to the target weights of the abstract objective function.
Figure 2.5 plots themeasured error for a single run of REVAC against the variance σ2
of the noise. The mean squared error of the REVAC estimate increases roughly linearly
with the variance. Note that the highest value for σ2 is five, while the objective function
itself only takes values from the range [0,1]. The mean squared error hardly exceeds
the value 0.1. To compare, the mean squared error between the target weights and a
10-dimensional normalized random vector is 0.29.
The variance of independent and identically distributed noise can be reduced by
measurement replication. As seen in Figure 2.6, REVAC estimates can also be improved
by taking the average of several REVAC runs that were obtained without measurement
replication. Both graphs compare the estimatednormalized Shannon entropy after 1,000
evaluated parameter vectors (white columns) to the target weights (black columns). The
variance of the noise is σ2 = 5. The upper graph is based on a single run of REVAC and
the lower graph on 10 runs. Themean squared error of the relevance estimate is 0.022 in
the upper graph and 0.011 in the lower graph. This means that under noisy conditions a
single run of REVAC without measurement replication can give a quick first approxima-
tion that can be refined by further runs if resources permit.
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Figure 2.5: Impact of noise on the mean squared error of the normalized Shannon en-
tropy after 1,000 evaluated parameter vectors. The graph is smoothed for readability.
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Figure 2.6: Relevance estimates with noise of variance σ2 = 5. The upper graph shows a
typical estimate from a single run. The lower graph shows the average of 10 typical runs.
2.3.2 Assessing REVAC reliability on a simple genetic algorithm
Experimental setup of Section 2.3.2
design tool REVAC
evolutionary algorithm simple genetic algorithm
application problem standard numerical optimization problems
Here we present the results of tuning an EA on application problems that have been
previously studied in the literature, as discussed at the beginning of this Section 2.3.
For both the EA and the objective function we rely on Czarn et al. (2004), who use rig-
orous statistical exploratory analysis to tune a simple genetic algorithm and who com-
pare their results to those of Jong (1975), Schaffer et al. (1989), Grefenstette (1986), and
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Table 2.2: REVAC results after 1,000 evaluations
Function & Optimum Confidence interval Shannon Normalized
parameters value (25th and 75th pctl.) entropy Shannon entropy
f1
pm 0.012 0.011 – 0.013 -8.6 0.82
pc 0.90 0.77 – 0.96 -1.9 0.18
f2
pm 0.0146 0.0143 – 0.0148 -9.4 0.82
pc 0.82 0.77 – 0.86 -2.1 0.18
f3
pm 0.0338 0.0334 – 0.0342 -9.0 0.72
pc 0.98 0.82 – 0.99 -3.5 0.28
f6
pm 0.0604 0.0635 – 0.0641 -6.9 0.86
pc 0.60 0.48 – 0.68 -1.1 0.14
Freisleben and Hartfelder (1993). Specifically, they study the effect of tuning the muta-
tion parameter pm ∈ [0,1] and the crossover parameter pc ∈ [0,1] of a generational ge-
netic algorithm (GA) with 22 bits per variable, Gray coding, probabilistic ranked-based
selection, bit flipmutation, single point crossover, and a population of 50 chromosomes.
The 4 objective functions for the application layer are standard benchmark problems
from Jong (1975) and Schaffer et al. (1989): sphere ( f1), saddle ( f2), step ( f3), Schaffer’s
f6. Their definitions are given in equation 2.10—2.13,
f1(x)=
∑3
i=1 x
2
i
, −5.12≤ xi ≤ 5.12, (2.10)
f2(x)= 100(x2−x21)
2+ (1−x1)2, −2.048≤ xi ≤ 2.048, (2.11)
f3(x)=
∑5
i=1⌊xi ⌋, −5.12≤ xi ≤ 5.12, (2.12)
f6(x)= 0.5+
(sin
√
x21+x
2
2 )
2−0.5
(1+0.0001(x21+x
2
2 ))
2 , −100≤ xi ≤ 100. (2.13)
Table 2.2 shows the results per objective function after evaluating 1,000 parameter
vectors. Figure 2.7 shows the Shannon entropy during tuning and the final distributions
after tuning for Shaffer’s f6. The upper graph shows the Shannon entropy of pm and pc
during tuning. Only the entropy of pm decreases significantly, indicating its relevance.
The two lower graphs show the final probability density function over the parameter
values after evaluating 1,000 parameter vectors. Note the extremely sharp needle for
pm .
These results can be considered from two perspectives, compared with the “usual”
GA settings, andwith thework of Czarn et al. As Table 2.2 shows, the values found by RE-
VAC are consistent with the conventions in evolutionary computing: pm between 0.01
and 0.1, and pc between 0.6 and 1.0. On the other hand, a direct comparison with Czarn
et al. (2004) is difficult because of the different types of outcomes. As for the method,
Czarn et al. use screening experiments to narrow down the space of feasible parame-
ter settings, partition this space into equally spaced discrete levels, repeatedly measure
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Figure 2.7: Tuning Schaffer’s f6
the performance for each level and use ANOVA to calculate the significance of muta-
tion and crossover rates. Then they procede to approximate the response curve for both
parameters by fitting low order polynomials to the performance measures, suggesting
to calculate confidence intervals from these approximations. As a main result, Czarn
et al. find that the marginal response curves for crossover and mutation are linear and
quadratic and thatmutation ismore significant than crossover. By contrast, REVAC uses
no screening and does not partition the parameter space into discrete levels. It studies
the complete and continuous parameter space. It can narrow the solution space to any
arbitrarily small subspace and can directly read off confidence intervals for any given
level of performance. Our global outcomes, however, are in line with those in Czarn
et al. (2004): pm is muchmore peaked and relevant than pc .
2.4 Assessing the algorithmic efficiency of REVAC
To reduce the variance in themeasured performance of an EA, statistical methods com-
monly rely on measurement replication. Until some confidence is achieved as to which
vectors lead to a higher EA performance, these methods invest valuable computational
resources in evaluating the same vectors of parameter values over and over. By contrast,
REVAC reduces the variance in the measured performance implicitly through extensive
sampling and smoothing. An increase of the pool size m and the number of selected
vectors n means that estimated densities are based on a larger and more reliable num-
ber of evaluated parameter vectors. An increase of the smoothing parameter w means
that the densities are averaged over a larger number of adjacent parameter intervals.
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By using sufficiently large numbers form, n, and w , REVAC aims to both correct for
the variance in themeasured performance as well as to get a better cover of the parame-
ter space. Here we address the question whether this is indeed achieved, or, conversely,
whether measurement replication will improve the quality of REVAC estimates or re-
duce the computational cost of obtaining them. This question is particularly pressing
since REVAC is intended to tune EAs under conditions where established methods like
ANOVA are inefficient, and where a maximum of information has to be extracted from
every availablemeasurement. We formulate two research questions: First, how does the
replication of measurements affect the quality of REVAC estimates? And second, how
does the replication of measurements affect the computational efficiency of the REVAC
search process?
In order to study themerits ofmeasurement replication for REVAC, a new parameter
r for the number ofmeasurement replications is added to step 1 of the REVAC algorithm,
cf. Figure 2.1. Upon drawing a new parameter vector~x from the joint distribution D(x),
it is evaluated r times, and the average result is recorded. We use our standard REVAC
implementation with m = 100, n = 50, w = 5. Two sets of experiments are reported:
tuning a simple genetic algorithm (GA) on standard numerical optimization problems
and the tuning evolutionarymechanism of a complex simulation as part of our research
on evolutionary agent-based economics.
2.4.1 Assessing algorithmic efficiency on a simple genetic algorithm
Like in section 2.3.2 we rely on Czarn et al. (2004) for the GA and the objective functions
sphere ( f1), saddle ( f2), step ( f3), and Schaffer’s f6 of equations 2.10—2.13. In addition
to the two parameters tuned there, mutation pm ∈ [0,1] and crossover pc ∈ [0,1], we also
tune the population size of n ∈ [10,200] chromosomes, a total of 3 parameters. Figure
2.8 demonstrates how the Shannon entropy and the percentiles of the marginal distri-
butions change during a typical tuning session without measurement replication. Here
the step function ( f3) is used. The upper left graph shows the Shannon entropy of all
three GA parameters. The other three graphs show the median and the 25th and 75th
percentiles per parameter.
Experimental setup of Section 2.4.1
design tool REVAC
evolutionary algorithm simple genetic algorithm
application problem standard numerical optimization problems
The performance measure of the GA that we wish to optimize is the computational
cost ofmaximizing the objective function towhich it is applied. This computational cost
is the number of fitness evaluations, which in this case is calculated as the population
size of the GA times the number of generations that are needed to maximize the ob-
jective function. The performance of the GA is maximized when the cost is minimized.
When a GA needs 100 generations of 100 individuals or 200 generations of 50 individu-
als, we will say that it has a cost of 10,000 fitness evaluations. An objective function is
considered maximized as soon as one individual of the population encodes a value that
is within certain bounds of the best feasible solution. These bounds are chosen such
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Figure 2.8: Shannon entropy and percentiles of the marginal distributions over 3 GA
parameters during a typical tuning session.
that a well tuned algorithm can solve each objective function with a cost of between
5,000 and 10,000 fitness evaluations. If the algorithm does not solve the objective func-
tion with a cost of less than 25,000 fitness evaluations (e.g., in 1,000 generations if the
population size is 25), execution is aborted and a cost of 25,000 fitness evaluations is
recorded. We assess 5 different levels of measurement replication, r ∈ {1,2,3,5,10}. For
each level of r and each objective function we run REVAC ten times, each run consti-
tuting and independent tuning session of the GA, and we report the average of the ten
estimates.
In order to assess the quality of REVAC relevance estimates for each level r we need
a reliable target value to compare to. Section 2.3.1 has shown that the average of re-
peated REVAC estimates without replication converges on the predefined distribution
of parameter relevance. Section 2.3.1 has shown that REVAC can tune the simple GA to
the four numerical optimization problems and give reasonable relevance estimates. We
assume that the average relevance estimate of multiple REVAC runs converges on the
correct values and we use these convergent values as the target values. For this reason
our target value for each parameter on each objective function is the average Shannon
entropy at the end of all REVAC runs with all levels of replications, 50 runs for each ob-
jective function. The exact values can be seen in Table 2.3. To assess the quality of the
estimates obtained with a given number of measurement replications we use the error
ormean squared distance to this target value, cf. equation 2.9. We consider the following
four quantities:
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• the number of different parameter vectors that REVAC needs to evaluate in order
to reach an error < 0.1 with regard to the target values,
• the total number ofmeasurements that are needed to reach an error< 0.1 (i.e., the
number of parameter vectors times the number of measurement replications),
• the error after evaluating 1,000 vectors, regardless of the total number ofmeasure-
ments, and
• the error after a total number of 1,000 measurements.
Table 2.4 shows the recorded values for each level of measurement replication. Re-
sults are averaged over all objective function. The table clearly shows that a higher num-
ber of replications comes with a heavy computational penalty, without leading to a sig-
nificant improvement in the quality of the relevance estimates. To be precise, there is
no observable trend in the error after 1,000 evaluated parameter vectors for r > 1, while
at this point it is still significantly higher for r = 1. As Figure 2.9 indicates, this is can
be due to the fact that with fewer overall measurements, after 1,000 evaluated parame-
ter vectors REVAC with r = 1 is still converging on the final value. The graph plots the
error against the number of evaluated parameter vectors for r ∈ {1,2,10}, and indeed,
only after evaluating about 800 parameter vectors does REVAC with r = 2 and r = 10—
which makes 1,600 and 10,000 measurements—reach an error that is visibly lower than
the final error of REVAC r = 1. We conclude that while the evidence regarding r = 1 and
r = 2 is inconclusive, there is no evidence that a number of replication ofmeasurements
greater than 2 leads to a significant improvement of the estimate.
Table 2.3: Average Shannon entropy of the 3 free GA parameters
Sphere ( f1) Saddle ( f2) Step ( f3) Schaffer’s f6
Mutation -11.1 -11.3 -10.9 -9.6
Crossover -1.7 -3.5 -2.2 -0.9
Population size -5.9 -4.5 -6.2 -1.0
Table 2.4: Quality of the relevance estimate for different numbers ofmeasurement repli-
cation. Results are averaged over all objective function.
Number of Number of Number of mea- Error at Error at
measurement vectors until surements until 1,000 1,000 mea-
replications error < 0.1 error < 0.1 vectors surements
1 404 404 0.08 0.09
2 413 826 0.04 0.07
3 741 2,223 0.05 0.23
5 844 4,220 0.04 0.35
10 236 2,360 0.06 0.37
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Figure 2.9: Error of relevance estimate for three levels of measurement replication, aver-
aged over all 4 objective function. The lines are smoothed for readability. Note that the
x-axis shows the number of evaluated parameter vectors, not the computational cost,
which is measured in the total number of measurements.
Table 2.5: Best performance for each objective function, measured as number of fitness
evaluations to solution. A lower value is better.
Sphere Saddle Step Schaffer’s f6
Optimum performance 3,786 2,770 2,107 3,260
To compare the quality of parameter values that REVAC has tuned we need an indi-
cation of howwell a simpleGA can performon each objective function if properly tuned,
i.e., the minimum amount of fitness evaluations that is needed to maximize the objec-
tive function. For this purpose we choose from among the 50 REVAC runs per objective
function the parameter vector that achieved the best GA performance, and record the
average number of fitness evaluations that the GA with this parameter vector needs to
maximize the respective objective function. These best performances are shown in Ta-
ble 2.5. We again consider four quantities:
• the number of parameter vectors that REVAC needs to evaluate in order to bring
the computational cost of the GA down to no more than twice the computational
cost of the best performance (i.e., 10,000 fitness evaluations if the best GA perfor-
mance is 5,000 fitness evaluations),
• the number of measurements REVAC needs to perform in order to achieve the
same as above,
• the average GA performance after REVAC has evaluating 1,000 parameter vectors,
regardless of the number of measurements involved, and
• the average GA performance after REVAC has performed 1,000 measurements.
Table 2.6 and Figure 2.10 show the results. As Figure 2.10 reveals, the performance
of the tuned GA on these problems is rather independent from the number of mea-
surement replications employed by REVAC and depends primarily on the number of
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Table 2.6: Quality of the tuned parameter values for different levels of measurement
replication. Performance is measured in number of fitness evaluations. Results are av-
eraged over all objective functions.
Number of Number of Number of mea- Cost at Cost at
measurement vectors until surements until 1,000 1,000 mea-
replications cost < 2∗best cost < 2∗best vectors surements
1 411 411 9,954 9,789
2 397 795 6,326 7,250
3 241 722 4,783 4,877
5 380 1,901 10,576 10,424
10 277 2,772 9,006 9,072
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Figure 2.10: EA performance during tuning for three different levels of replications. Per-
formance is calculated as the average number of fitness evaluations of the GA when
parameter vectors are drawn from the respective REVAC distributions. The x-axis is
counting from top to bottom, so that a higher performance is indeed on top. Graphs
are smoothed for readability.
parameter vectors that REVAC has evaluated so far. Note in particular how performance
is maximized around parameter vector 400 for all numbers of measurement replication.
While measurement replication does not improve the absolute capability of REVAC to
tune the parameter values, the performance penalty is huge. The amount of computa-
tion needed to reach an arbitrary level of performance increases almost linearly with the
level of replication
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2.4.2 Assessing algorithmic efficiency on an economicmodeling problem
Here we test REVAC as part of our research in evolutionary agent-based economics. The
use of evolutionary algorithm to model an economic system comes with a number of
unique requirements that warrant a separate verification of whether REVAC can be ap-
plied to suchmodeling problems. These include, but are not limit to, non-standard evo-
lutionarymechanisms, non-linear autocatalytic dynamics, and the need to create stable
and realistic system behavior on the population level rather than to find a single opti-
mal solution. Also, economic modeling can force an evolutionary algorithm to include
domain specific features of which it is altogether unknownwhether the system behavior
depends on their correct parameterization.
Experimental setup of Section 2.4.2
design tool REVAC
evolutionary algorithm selective imitation in a social network
application problem dynamic growth and production functions
To describe the experimental setup in a nutshell: 200 agents evolve their investment
strategies over a period of 500 time intervals. In each interval each agent invests its
current income in a number of economic sectors. The agent’s income of the next inter-
val is then calculated according to some production function. The production function
changes dynamically, so that the same investment strategy will lead to different growth
rates at different points in time. Agents adapt their investment strategies through ran-
dom mutation and selective imitation in a complex social network. Mutation here is a
random change to the way the investment is distributed over the economic sectors. For
imitation an agent compares its own economic growth rate to that of its peers in the so-
cial network. If a peer has a higher growth rate than that of the comparing agent, the
comparing agent can copy the strategy of that peer, wholly or in part, akin to crossover.
The evolutionarymechanismwill be discussed in detail in Section 4, while Section 5 will
elaborate on the growth and production functions that are used here, as well as on the
dynamic changes that the agents have to adapt to.
The performance measure of the EA that REVAC has to maximize is the mean log
income of all economic agents at the end of a simulation, corresponding to what an
economic agent with constant relative risk aversion prefers. Figure 2.11 shows a typ-
ical histogram of the performance measure, based on 1,000 runs with identical tuned
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Figure 2.11: Histogram of EA performance, based on 1,000 runs.
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Figure 2.12: Distribution of the performance after tuning. The y-axis shows the average
performance after tuning. The x-axes shows howmany REVAC runs resulted in an aver-
age performance of that level or lower. Note that the median is similar in each graph.
parameter values. The distribution is skewed and has a flat tail, limiting the value of
measurement replication. The distribution is not lognormal, but the estimated mean
of the logarithmic performance seems to converge faster than the estimated mean of
the performance itself and is a more reliable statistic. For this reason we average over
the logarithm of the performancemeasure when we report the performance reached by
different sets of tuned parameter values, even though the tuning is done in the original
domain.
The algorithm layer has 6 parameters that need to be tuned, corresponding to the
simplified evolutionary mechanism at the end of Section 4: mutation probability, mu-
tation variance, imitation probability, imitation ratio (howmuch of the original strategy
is perserved), imitated fraction (the fraction ofwell performing peers that are considered
for imitation), and the connectivity of the social network. For the application layer we
consider four different dynamic economic environments: changes occur sudden and
with high frequency, sudden and with low frequency, gradual and with high frequency,
and gradual and with low frequency.
We use REVAC with one, three and ten replications of measurements to tune the al-
gorithm layer to each of the four economic environments. All other REVAC parameters
are as described before. To improve the reliability of the tuning, we also look into the op-
tion of tuning the parameter values several times, choosing those tunings that achieved
the highest performance, and averaging over the results. Due to limited computational
resources we used different numbers of tunings for each replication scheme: 30 for 1
replication, 10 for 3 replications and 3 for 10 replications.
Figure 2.12 shows the average (log) performance that each tuning achieved during
the last 10% of itsmeasurements. Results are sorted per replication scheme to showhow
the tuned parameter values vary. With only 3 tunings in the case of 10 measurement
replications no clear conclusion is possible, but a general trend is visible: the distri-
bution of tuned parameter values is similar for all numbers of replication, with similar
mean and variance. The same can be observed for each relevance estimate and each
tuned parameter value: all tuning results follow a similar distribution, regardless of the
number of measurement replications.
Since not all tuning sessions of REVAC achieve the same level of performance, we
decide to take only the better 50% and average over the result. To compare REVAC with
1 measurement replication and with 3 measurement replications we start by randomly
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Table 2.7: REVAC estimates. Average values in bold, followed by the measured variance.
1 replication 3 replications 10 replications
Relevance estimate (absolute entropy)
Mutation probability 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.2
Mutation variance 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.2 0.3
Imitation probability 0.9 0.3 1.2 0.3 1.1 0.4
Imitation ratio 1.2 0.5 1.8 1.0 1.8 1.0
Imitation fraction 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.9 0.5
Connectivity 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
All parameters 3.9 1.0 4.6 1.7 5.3 0.3
Suggested parameter values
Mutation probability 0.20 0.03 0.21 0.02 0.45 0.09
Mutation variance 0.28 0.02 0.30 0.03 0.15 0.01
Imitation probability 0.83 0.01 0.86 0.00 0.85 0.01
Imitation ratio 0.90 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.93 0.00
Imitation fraction 0.85 0.01 0.77 0.01 0.83 0.01
Connectivity 0.54 0.04 0.58 0.05 0.51 0.01
selecting 10 out of the 30 runs of REVAC with 1 measurement replication. Of these we
take the better 5 and compare their average results to those of the better 5 from the
implementation with 3 measurement replications. From the implementation with 10
measurement replications we only use the better 2 tunings. Table 2.7 shows the av-
erage relevance estimate (in absolute entropy) for every parameter, and the suggested
value for each parameter (the median of the distribution) for one economic environ-
ment (sudden, low frequency). Average tuned values for each parameter are shown in
bold, followed by the measured variance. Note how the measured variances for the dif-
ferent measurement replications are all of the same order.
To see if eachREVAC implementation correctly differentiates betweendifferent prob-
lems in the application layer we apply each of the four tuned EAs a thousand time to
each economic environment and average over the logarithm of the measured perfor-
mance. This is done separately for each replication scheme. Table 2.8 shows the results.
Each row stands for one economic environment and has four entries, showing the re-
sults when applying its own set of tuned parameter values and the other three sets of
tuned parameter values to that environment. The bold values show the highest value
for each row. With correct differentiation we expect to see the highest value for each
economic environment when parameters are used that were tuned to that environment.
As can be seen, this is almost always the case. The variance of the measured means is
below 0.001 and therefore insignificant.
In general one can conclude that there is no significant difference in results obtained
with 1, 3, or 10 measurement replication, even though in the case of 1 replication the
total number of measurements is significantly smaller. With the exception of one en-
vironment, the tuned parameter values perform best on the application to which they
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Table 2.8: Performance of the tuned simulation. Each row shows four sets of tuned pa-
rameter values applied to the same dynamic environment.
Gradual, low Gradual, high Sudden, low Sudden, high
frequency frequency frequency frequency
1 measurement replication, 10 runs of REVAC
Gradual, low freq. 2.628 2.619 2.603 2.582
Gradual, high freq. 2.269 2.539 2.524 2.511
Sudden, low freq. 2.686 2.713 2.724 2.727
Sudden, high freq. 2.089 2.233 2.226 2.256
3 measurement replications, 10 runs of REVAC
Gradual, low freq. 2.610 2.591 2.597 2.584
Gradual, high freq. 2.375 2.531 2.520 2.512
Sudden, low freq. 2.710 2.716 2.733 2.704
Sudden, high freq. 2.102 2.247 2.230 2.258
10 measurement replications, 3 runs of REVAC
Gradual, low freq. 2.625 2.589 2.595 2.577
Gradual, high freq. 2.202 2.540 2.521 2.502
Sudden, low freq. 2.691 2.712 2.710 2.713
Sudden, high freq. 2.024 2.243 2.202 2.261
were optimized, indicating that REVAC is indeed able to tune parameter values to the
problem at hand. One of the design goals of REVAC is to tune parameter values in a ro-
bust way so that they work well on problems that are similar to the problem they were
tuned on. And indeed, all tuned parameter values achieve good results on all economic
environments. To compare, without tuning, the system has a mean logarithmic perfor-
mance of between 1.7 and 2, depending on the economic environment.
2.5 Comparing REVAC to other tuningmethods
In this section we compare the EA parameter values tuned by REVAC to those found by
hand-tuning and meta-GA. By hand tuning we mean that the practitioner chooses one
or more vectors of parameter values for the EA, evaluates them, and uses the obtained
information either to decide on the final parameterization, or to continue and evaluate
more vectors of parameter values. This is arguably the most common tuning method
even today. Despite the fact that hand tuning can be guided by common wisdom and
the extensive experience of a practitioner, it is not effective. Grefenstette (1986) clearly
showed that an EA that is tuned by a basic genetic algorithm (GA) outperforms all known
hand tuned versions of the EA. Meta-GA tunes an evolutionary algorithm by optimiz-
ing a population of parameter vectors through selection, mutation, and recombination.
Parent selection is fitness proportional, where the fitness of a vector of parameter values
is the mean best fitness returned by the EA of the application layer when executed with
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these values. Survival selection is generational, and a population size of 100 parame-
ter vectors is used. To create offspring, one-point crossover is applied with a crossover
rate of .5, and thereafter bit-flip mutation with a mutation rate of .001. We use a Gray
code to represent the parameter values. The best parameter values are provided by the
parameter vector of the last generation of the meta-GA that had the highest fitness.
Experimental setup of Section 2.5
design tool REVAC / meta-GA / hand tuning
evolutionary algorithm Simple GA
application problem Multi-modal problem generator
To compare REVAC results with those of meta-GA and hand tuning, we follow Eiben
et al. (2006) for the application and the algorithm layer. The authors tune a simple ge-
netic algorithm by hand to maximize instances of the multi-modal problem generator
(Spears, 2000). They also provide us with a benchmark performance of the hand-tuned
algorithm. While the multi-modal problem generator is generally not adequate for as-
sessing the performance of evolutionary algorithms (Lobo and Lima, 2006), Eiben et al.
use it specifically to study the effect of different degrees of multi-modality on the per-
formance of the simple GA.
The simple genetic algorithm of the algorithm layer uses a steady-state population
model, uniform crossover, bit-flip mutation, tournament parent selection, and delete-
worst survival selection. It terminates after 10,000 evaluations. The four free parameters
of the algorithm are the crossover rate, the mutation rate, the population size, and the
tournament size. The first two parameter values can take values between 0 and 1, en-
coded with 16 bits. The last two parameter values can take a value between 2 and 1025,
encoded in 10 bits.
The multi-modal problem generator works as follows: generate n binary strings of
length l to be the local optima. Different local optima are assigned different heights. A
point x in the l-dimensional search space is evaluated by first finding the local optimum
i with the lowestHamming distance, i.e., the local optimum thatmatches x in the largest
number of bits. The fitness of x is the fraction of matching bits scaled by the height of i .
In case of ambiguity, the highest possible fitness is chosen. Herewe use strings of l = 100
bits. Eiben et al. define ten different problem classes, each with a different number n of
local optima. Those numbers are {1,2,5,10,25,50,100,250,500,1,000}. The height of the
global optimum is 1.
To tune the simple genetic algorithm, both REVAC and meta-GA are allowed 3,000
measurements per tuning session. We run REVAC with 3 measurement replications, so
that it has performed 3,000 measurements by the time it has evaluated 1,000 parameter
vectors. Table 2.9 shows the best parameter values found by each tuning method. Note
thatmeta-GA andREVAC suggestmuch larger the values for population size and tourna-
ment size than the rather conventional values found by hand-tuning. For bothmeta-GA
andREVACwefind that in two thirds of all solutions the tournament size equals the pop-
ulation size, effectively cancelling tournament selection from the algorithm, something
a human designer is not likely to do.
To compare the performance of the best parameter vector of each tuning method,
the simple GA is executed 25 times with each best parameter vector on the problem it
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Table 2.9: Best parameter values found
Crossover rate Mutation rate Population size Tournament size
Hand tuned 0.5 0.01 100 2
Meta-GA 0.32 0.017 468 347
REVAC 0.41 0.0043 501 421
was tuned to, for each tuning method. The average performance in terms of mean best
fitness is shown in Table 2.10. The highest performance per problem class is printed in
bold. The observed differences have no statistical significance. No method performs
better than any other on any problem class, which is nicely reflected by the random
scatter of bold values over the table.
In our final experiment we measure how robust the tuned parameter vectors are
against changes to the problem definition, which in this case amounts to changing the
number of local optima. To do so we take a GA with parameter values that are tuned
to a problem class with n = x local optima, apply it to a problem class with n = y local
optima, and record the mean best fitness. Results are shown in Table 2.11. The average
REVAC performance (0.993) seems to be better than that of meta-GA (0.991), but the
difference does not have statistical significance.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we introduced and evaluated a customized Estimation of Distribution
Algorithm that uses differential Shannon entropy to estimate the relevance of EA pa-
rameters. The method searches for high-entropy distributions over the EA parameters
that give high probability to parameter values with a high EA performance. Unlike most
statistical optimizationmethods it does not depend onmeasurement replications to re-
duce variance. Instead, it reduces variance implicitly by averaging over adjacent vectors
of parameter values. This allows it to get a good cover of the search space and to extract
a high amount of information out of the available measurements. In terms of concrete
parameter values, themedian of these distributions provides a robust optimum, and the
25th and 75th percentile the confidence interval. The Shannon entropy of these distri-
butions can be used to estimate how much tuning each parameter needs in order to to
reach a given level of EA performance, independent of the actual tuning method.
The method proves to be able to reproduce the predefined relevance levels of ab-
stract tuning problems to a satisfactory degree, even under high levels of measurement
noise from a distribution with far outliers. REVAC results on a simple GA and standard
numerical optimization problems are in linewithwhat is reported in the literature. Tests
on agent-based simulations of different dynamic economy-environments show that RE-
VAC optimizes a 6-parameter evolutionary algorithm such that each vector of tuned pa-
rameter values performs best on the economy-environment it was tuned to, despite a
high level of non-Gaussian system noise in the dynamic system. With regard to other
tuning methods, we found that the performance of an algorithm tuned by REVAC is
roughly comparable to the performance of the same algorithm when tuned by meta-
GA.
2.6. Conclusions 49
Table 2.10: Average mean best fitness of the GA tuned with each method
Number of peaks of the problem class
1 2 5 10 25 50 100 250 500 1,000
Hand-tuned 1 1 1 .996 .989 .988 .985 .985 .987 .989
Meta-GA 1 1 .988 .993 .994 .994 .983 .992 .989 .987
REVAC 1 1 1 1 .991 .995 .989 .966 .970 .985
Table 2.11: Mean best fitness when cross-validating the tuned parameter values
Number of local optima the tuned parameters are applied to
1 2 5 10 25 50 100 250 500 1,000 mean
meta-GA
1 1 1 1 1 .994 1 .999 .986 .986 .988 .995
2 1 1 1 1 1 .980 .977 .981 .991 .998 .993
5 .977 .980 1 .966 .987 .987 .959 .958 .963 .958 .974
10 1 1 1 1 .970 .980 .975 .992 .988 .995 .990
25 1 1 1 1 .994 .983 .989 .986 .994 .987 .993
50 1 1 1 1 1 1 .994 .985 .997 .982 .996
100 1 1 1 1 1 .997 .985 .974 .992 .997 .994
250 1 1 1 1 .987 .997 .995 .970 .986 .970 .990
500 1 1 1 1 .987 .987 .992 .990 .993 .990 .994
1000 1 1 1 .982 1 .980 .985 .995 .992 .982 .992
mean .998 .998 1 .995 .992 .989 .985 .982 .988 .985 .991
REVAC
1 1 1 1 1 .990 .990 .998 .990 .994 .991 .995
2 1 1 1 1 .985 .983 .985 .988 .997 .989 .993
5 1 1 1 1 .974 .983 .990 .988 .971 .971 .988
10 1 1 1 1 1 .995 .974 .989 .993 .995 .995
25 1 1 1 1 .990 .998 .994 .994 .988 .996 .996
50 1 1 1 1 1 .975 .990 .991 .993 .995 .994
100 1 1 1 1 .995 .993 .980 .986 .980 .992 .993
250 1 1 1 1 .990 .985 .975 .987 .990 .988 .992
500 1 1 1 .987 .995 .975 .980 .992 .999 .968 .990
1000 1 1 1 1 1 .988 .994 .996 .975 .970 .992
mean 1 1 1 .999 .992 .986 .986 .990 .988 .986 .993
Notes. Rows show the problem class to which the parameters are tuned (labeled by the
number of local optima n), columns show the problem class to which the parameters
are applied (labeled by the number of local optima n).
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A STUDY OF PARAMETER RELEVANCE IN
EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHMS
Abstract
We present an empirical study on the impact of different design choices on the
performance of an evolutionary algorithm (EA). Four EA components are consi-
dered—parent selection, survivor selection, recombination and mutation—and for
each component we study the impact of choosing the right operator and of tuning
its free parameter(s). We tune 174 different combinations of EA operators to 4 dif-
ferent classes of fitness landscapes and measure the cost of tuning. We find that
components differ greatly in importance. Typically the choice of operator for parent
selection has the greatest impact, and mutation needs the most tuning. Regarding
individual EAs however, the impact of design choices for one component depends
on the choices for other components, as well as on the available amount of resources
for tuning.
3.1 Introduction
Evolutionary Algorithms (EA) form a class of searchmethods that work by incrementally
improving the quality of a set of candidate solutions by variation and selection (Eiben
and Smith, 2003). The most important components of EAs are thus recombination and
mutation (umbrella term: variation), parent selection, and survivor selection. To ob-
tain a working EA, each component needs to be instantiated by a specific operator, e.g.,
the one-point crossover operator for the recombination component. Furthermore, an
EA has parameters that need to be instantiated by a specific parameter value, e.g., 0.5
This chapter is an extension of Nannen et al. (2008a).
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for the crossover rate. In this paper we maintain the distinction between components
and parameters and say that the instantiation of EA components by concrete operators
specifies a particular EA, e.g., uniform crossover, bit-flip mutation, random parent se-
lection and k-tournament survivor selection. Further details regarding the parameters
do not lead to a different EA, only to variants of the one defined by the operators.1 A
complete EA design includes the definition of an EA (operators for its components) and
the specification of a particular variant of it (values for its parameters).
Setting EA parameters is commonly divided into two cases, parameter tuning and
parameter control (Eiben et al., 1999, 2007). In case of parameter control the parameter
values are changing during an EA run. This requires initial parameter values and suit-
able control strategies, which in turn can be deterministic, adaptive or self-adaptive.
The problem of parameter tuning is hard because for any given application there is a
large number of options, but only little knowledge about the effect of EA parameters on
EA performance. EA users mostly rely on conventions (mutation rate should be low),
ad hoc choices (why not use uniform crossover), and experimental comparisons on a
limited scale (testing combinations of three different crossover rates and three different
mutation rates). Here we address the problem of parameter tuning. Our main research
questions are:
1. How does the choice of operator for each component contribute to EA perfor-
mance? To this endwe compare the absolute performance achievedwith different
combinations of operators.
2. The parameters of which EA component need the most tuning? For this question
we measure the amount of information needed to tune the free parameter(s) of
each operator (e.g., crossover rate or tournament size).
For a systematic exploration of the space of EA configurations we use exhaustive
search for the combination of operators and Relevance Estimation and Value Calibra-
tion (REVAC) to tune the free (numeric) parameters. REVAC is an Estimation of Distribu-
tion Algorithm (Mühlenbein and Höns, 2005) that tunes an EA by optimizing marginal
probability distributions over the free parameters, see Section 2. Starting from a set of
uniform distributions and an initial drawing of 100 vectors of randomparameter values,
REVAC iteratively generates new marginal distributions of increasing expected EA per-
formance by drawing a new vector of parameter values from the current distributions,
evaluating the vector by measuring the performance of the EA with these values, up-
dating all marginal distributions based on this evaluation, and smoothing the updated
distributions. Smoothing is a unique feature of REVAC that forces all marginal distri-
butions to approach the maximum Shannon entropy distribution for a given EA perfor-
mance. This maximized Shannon entropy is independent from the computational cost
of any particular tuningmethod and can be used as a general estimator of theminimum
amount of information required to reach a certain level of EAperformance. Hence, it can
be regarded as a general indicator of how difficult it is to tune a certain EA parameter,
and how relevant it is to overall EA performance.
1Alternatively, components & operators could also be called symbolic parameters & values, and we could
say these values only define different EA variants.
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Relatedwork includes the general discussion of EAdesign (Czarn et al., 2004) andpa-
rameter setting (Lobo et al., 2007), in particular within parameter tuning as defined by
Eiben et al. (1999), Birattari (2004), and Eiben et al. (2007). Throughout the relevant lit-
erature we find that the cost of tuning parameters is largely ignored. Notable exceptions
are the theoretical considerations of Oliver et al. (1987) and Goldberg (1989), as well
as the systematic parameter sweeps of Jong (1975), Schaffer et al. (1989), and Samples
et al. (2007) and the statistical analysis of parameters by François and Lavergne (2001).
In the general field of experimental design, a paradigm shift that emphasizes a low cost
of tuning over the performance of optimal parameter values was due to Taguchi andWu
(1980). In our field, Freisleben and Hartfelder (1993) propose a meta-GA approach in
which both EA components and EA parameters are tuned and shows the importance of
the right choice for the GA operators. Samples et al. (2007) show how parameter sweeps
can be used for robustness and correlation analysis.
3.2 Experimental setup
For a clear discussion we distinguish three different layers in the analysis of an EA:
the problem/application (here: fitness landscapes created by a generator), the prob-
lem solver (here: an EA), and the method for tuning the problem solver (here: REVAC).
For an unbiased studywe use independent software implementations for each layer and
combine them through simple interfaces. For the problem layer we use a generator of
real-valued fitness landscapes that are formed by themax-set of Gaussian curves in high
dimensional Cartesian spaces (Gallagher and Yuan, 2006). Where a Gaussian mixture
model takes the average of several Gaussians, a max-set takes their enveloping maxi-
mum, giving full control over the location and height of all maxima. For the implemen-
tation we followed Rudolph (1992) on rotated high dimensional Gaussians, and used 10
dimensions, 100 Gaussians, and the same distributions over height, location, and rota-
tion of these Gaussians as specified in the exemplary problem sets 1–4 of Gallagher and
Yuan (2006). These sets offer an increasing amount of exploitable structure to the EA. Set
1 has the least structure, with peaks of different height scattered at random, while set 4 is
themost structured, with peaks that get higher the closer they get to the origin. For each
set, different landscapes are created by passing a different random seed to the genera-
tor. Initialization of all EA populations is uniform random in the domain of the fitness
landscapes. The optimal fitness value is 1 on each problem instance and the condition
for successful termination is defined as “fitness > 0.9999 or 10,000 fitness evaluations".
For the EAs we use the Evolutionary Computation toolkit in Java (ECJ) (Luke), which
allows the specification of a fully implemented EA through a simple parameter file, in-
cluding the choice of operator for each component and the values for the free param-
eters. The ECJ offers several operators for each EA component, cf. Table 3.1. For any
given EA, the population size parameter is always present. Most operators have zero or
one free parameter. One operator has 2 free parameters—Gaussian(σ,p) with param-
eters σ for step size and p for mutation probability, which takes the value 1 in case of
Gaussian(σ,1). Due to technical details of the ECJ, not all combinations of operators are
possible. For example, neither fitness proportional nor best selection as parent selec-
tion can be combined with tournament selection as survivor selection. In total we have
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Table 3.1: EA components, operators, and parameters used in this study
Component Operator Parameter(s)
population size µ
parent tournament parent tournament size
selection best selection number n of best
fitness proportional -
random -
survivor generational -
selection tournament survivor tournament size
(µ,λ) λ
(µ+λ) λ
random -
recombination none -
one-point crossover probability
two-point crossover probability
uniform crossover probability
mutation reset (random uniform) mutation probability
Gaussian(σ,1) step size
Gaussian(σ,p) step size, mutation probability
Notes. We follow the naming convention of the ECJ. Arguably, (µ,λ) and (µ+λ) define
both parent and survivor selection. Here we classify them under survivor selection be-
cause that is what the parameter λ influences.
174 combinations of operators, of which 6 with 2, 33 with 3, 65 with 4, 55 with 5, and 15
with 6 free parameters.
The performance of an EA with a given set of parameter values is measured in three
different ways: SR (Success Rate, percentage of runs with fitness > 0.9999), MBF (Mean
Best Fitness of all runs), and AES (Average number of Evaluations to Solution of success-
ful runs; undefined when SR = 0). Each EA is tuned 5 times on each of the 4 problem
sets. During each tuning session on a given set REVAC generates 1,000 different vec-
tors of parameter values. Each vector of values is written to the ECJ configuration file,
together with the specification of the operators and the problem generator. The result-
ing EA is evaluated on 10 different instances of the problem set, generated by different
random seeds.
For each REVAC tuning session and each EA, the best performance after n evalua-
tions is the best performance measured after evaluating n vectors of parameter values.
The average best performance after n evaluations is averaged over multiple tuning ses-
sions on the same EA. We define near best performance as the average best performance
after 1,000 evaluations minus 5%2. If n is the lowest number of vectors for which the av-
erage best performance after n evaluations exceeds this value, then we say that REVAC
2In case of MBF this is calculated after subtracting a performance level of .5, a level that is reached by any
reasonably sized population upon random uniform initialization. The maximum possible near best MBF is
therefore .975
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needs n evaluations to tune the EA to near best performance. Section 3.3 uses this to
study the impact of choosing an operator for each component.
In Section 3.4 we analyze the cost and benefits of tuning per EA component. REVAC
continuously maximizes the Shannon entropy of the marginal distributions that it op-
timizes during a tuning session. This maximized Shannon entropy provides a generic
information-theoretic measure of theminimum amount of information needed per pa-
rameter to reach a given performance level. The differential Shannon entropy h of a
probability density function D over the continuous interval [a,b] is commonly defined
as
h(D[a,b])=−
∫b
a
D(x) log2D(x)dx. (3.1)
The sharper the peaks of a probability density function, the lower its Shannon entropy.
In order to compare the entropy of distributions that are defined over different param-
eter intervals in a meaningful way, we normalize all parameter intervals to the interval
[0,1] before calculating the Shannon entropy. In this way the initial uniform distribu-
tion has a Shannon entropy of zero, and any other distribution has a negative Shannon
entropy h(D[0,1])< 0.
3.3 How does the choice of operator per component contribute to
performance?
Figure 3.1–3.8 on page 56–61 show the average near best fitness in AES andMBF and the
tuning cost in number of evaluations of REVAC needed to reach this fitness. Results in
AES are based on those EAs with SR> 0 for which the AES could be calculated. Depend-
ing on the problem set, 60–70 EAs could be tuned to terminate with success. Results on
the MBF are based on all 174 EAs. Each figure contains four scatter plots that show the
performance in AES or MBF after tuning, and the cost of tuning, averaged over 5 tuning
sessions per EA. The y-axes show the near best performance in AES. The x-axes show
the number of REVAC evaluations needed to tune the EA to this performance. Each of
the four plots of a figure shows the same EAs but labels them according to the opera-
tor choice for a different component. To read the full specification of an EA, one needs
to look at the same location in all four plots. Under each AES figure a table (i.e., Table
3.2–3.5) shows the average performance on the same set that was achieved with each
operator of each component. The table reports the average success rate, the near best
performance, and the cost of finding it, for AES and for MBF respectively. Each value is
averaged over all those EAs that use this operator and, in case of AES, terminated with
success.
The choice of operator for the parent selection component has the strongest effect
on EA performance. The 16 EAs that are clustered together in the lower left of each plot
of Figure 3.1–3.4 display the best performance and the lowest number of evaluations
needed to reach this performance. These EAs all use tournament selection for parent se-
lection, either tournament selection or random selection for survivor selection, any re-
combination operator, and either Gaussian(σ,p) or Gaussian(σ,1) for mutation. On the
other hand, those EAs that have the never terminate with success and generally reach
only a minimumMBF (see Figure 3.5–3.8) share one common feature, namely a lack of
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Figure 3.1: Near best performance in AES on set 1 against cost of tuning
Table 3.2: Average near best performance on set 1, per operator
Component Operator Success rate AES Cost MBF Cost
parent tournament 1 3484 344 0.87 281
selection best select. 1 5782 556 0.89 279
fitness pro. 0.64 6582 532 0.87 219
random 0.54 5611 517 0.77 388
survivor generational 0.5 4224 426 0.8 367
selection tournament 1 3320 318 0.87 324
(µ , λ) 0.97 6259 546 0.89 209
(µ+λ) 0.97 6072 550 0.9 210
random 0.5 2175 244 0.74 444
recombi- none 0.67 4798 343 0.82 328
nation one-point 0.79 5549 548 0.84 289
two-point 0.81 4727 412 0.85 273
uniform 0.81 4732 479 0.85 324
mutation reset 0.78 7168 729 0.83 309
Gauss.(σ,1) 0.78 5001 368 0.85 306
Gauss.(σ,p) 0.79 2785 285 0.85 287
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Figure 3.2: Near best performance in AES on set 2 against cost of tuning
Table 3.3: Average near best performance on set 2, per operator
Component Operator Success rate AES Cost MBF Cost
parent tournament 1 3559 325 0.91 265
selection best select. 1 5870 654 0.92 157
fitness pro. 0.61 6042 590 0.91 162
random 0.54 5357 479 0.8 324
survivor generational 0.5 4708 427 0.83 248
selection tournament 1 3524 181 0.92 255
(µ , λ) 0.92 5792 595 0.93 201
(µ+λ) 1 5643 663 0.93 157
random 0.5 2529 185 0.77 431
recombi- none 0.67 5046 322 0.85 275
nation one-point 0.77 5251 523 0.88 245
two-point 0.81 4705 515 0.89 232
uniform 0.81 4559 468 0.89 233
mutation reset 0.76 7259 689 0.87 239
Gauss.(σ,1) 0.78 4620 430 0.88 232
Gauss.(σ,p) 0.79 2810 313 0.88 260
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Figure 3.3: Near best performance in AES on set 3 against cost of tuning
Table 3.4: Average near best performance on set 3, per operator
Component Operator Success rate AES Cost MBF Cost
parent tournament 1 3526 365 0.92 253
selection best select. 1 5636 593 0.93 203
fitness pro. 0.64 6085 560 0.91 192
random 0.54 5329 529 0.8 325
survivor generational 0.5 4622 397 0.84 263
selection tournament 1 3395 266 0.93 242
(µ , λ) 0.95 5856 612 0.94 225
(µ+λ) 1 5525 621 0.94 176
random 0.5 2451 250 0.77 424
recombi- none 0.7 5149 342 0.85 323
nation one-point 0.77 5233 522 0.89 245
two-point 0.81 4590 502 0.89 237
uniform 0.81 4442 504 0.89 238
mutation reset 0.76 7283 656 0.87 253
Gauss.(σ,1) 0.79 4532 493 0.89 260
Gauss.(σ,p) 0.79 2719 309 0.89 250
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Figure 3.4: Near best performance in AES on set 4 against cost of tuning
Table 3.5: Average near best performance on set 4, per operator
Component Operator Success rate AES Cost MBF Cost
parent tournament 0.96 5078 408 0.89 319
selection best select. 0.8 6782 649 0.89 249
fitness pro. 0.47 6778 643 0.88 266
random 0.43 6872 480 0.77 398
survivor generational 0.5 6554 493 0.8 353
selection tournament 0.92 5370 298 0.9 313
(µ , λ) 0.74 6660 631 0.9 265
(µ+λ) 0.74 6321 663 0.9 271
random 0.5 4019 235 0.73 434
recombi- none 0.6 6446 375 0.81 390
nation one-point 0.65 6535 490 0.85 311
two-point 0.69 5601 545 0.86 283
uniform 0.71 5785 554 0.86 325
mutation reset 0.45 9250 630 0.84 323
Gauss.(σ,1) 0.76 5890 514 0.86 301
Gauss.(σ,p) 0.79 4358 430 0.86 338
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Figure 3.5: Near best performance in AES on set 1 against cost of tuning
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Figure 3.6: Near best performance in AES on set 2 against cost of tuning
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Figure 3.7: Near best performance in AES on set 3 against cost of tuning
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Figure 3.8: Near best performance in AES on set 4 against cost of tuning
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Figure 3.9: Impact of recombination operators on AES and cost of tuning
selection pressure. In particular, EAs with random or fitness proportional selection for
parent selection do not terminate with success unless combined with strong survivor
selection pressure.
Of the two variation components, the choice of mutation operator has the stronger
effect on EA performance, as can be seen from the differences in Table 3.2–3.5. On
all our problem sets reset mutation is the worst mutation operator, and non-standard
Gaussian(σ,p) mutation is superior to Gaussian(σ,1) both in terms of performance and
in terms of cost of tuning. The latter may come as a surprise, since the additional free
parameter for mutation probability increases the parameter search space. We conclude
that the tuning cost of different operators is not additive, and that the tuning cost of an
operator can only be evaluated in the context of the overall EA composition.
While choosing the recombination operator has the least effect on EA performance,
it demonstrates how the choice of operator can depend on the available resources for
tuning. Figure 3.9 enlarges the lower left corner of Figure 3.4c, overlaid by four graphs
that show the evolution of the average performance of 4 EAs with tournament selec-
tion for both parent and survivor selection, Gaussian(σ,p) mutation, and four different
recombination operators. 20 tuning sessions were used for each graph. While the tun-
able recombination operator eventually outperform no recombination, an EA with no
recombination consistently outperforms EAs with tunable recombination after about
30–40 parameter vectors have been evaluated, and it has at least average performance
for anything under 100 evaluated parameter vectors. We observed this phenomenon
over a wide range of operator choices for the other components and over all 4 prob-
lem sets. All in all, for recombination, the choice of operator can clearly depend on the
amount of effort that can be invested in tuning.
3.4 Which EA component needs themost tuning?
The previous section related the performance of the near best parameter vector to the
number of REVAC evaluations needed to find this vector and to achieve this perfor-
mance. This section takes a rather unconventional approach based on the expected
performance when parameter values are drawn from a probability distribution, namely
those created byREVACafter 500 evaluations. To calculate the performance gain achieved
by tuning, this expected performance is compared to the expected EA performance
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Figure 3.11: Correlation between performance gain and the sumof the Shannon entropy
of all marginal distributions
when parameter values are drawn from the uniform distribution. All results are aver-
aged over 5 REVAC tuning sessions of an EA on each of the 4 problem sets, 20 tuning
sessions per EA. In order to extend our analysis to all 174 EAs, we use the Mean Best
Fitness that an EA achieves at termination (successful or not), rather than the AES.
Shannon entropy measures the amount of information that a probability distribu-
tion provides on its random values. By definition, the lower the Shannon entropy of the
maximumentropy distribution that achieves a given expected EAperformance, the finer
the parameter value has to be tuned in order to achieve that expected performance. This
is demonstrated in Figure 3.10. The scatter plot shows the correlation between the Shan-
non entropy of themarginal distribution over themutation probability and the standard
deviation of the best found parameter values. The x-axis shows the Shannon entropy as
estimated by REVAC. The y-axis shows the average (over 4 sets) of the standard deviation
of the 5 best values found during the 5 REVAC tuning sessions on each set. The corre-
lation coefficient is 0.9 and the p-value (the probability to observe this or a stronger
correlation when the true coefficient is zero) virtually zero. The point here is that if the
maximum entropy distribution has a higher Shannon entropy, there is less certainty on
the precise parameter value, something that can otherwise be expensive to assess.
Figure 3.11 shows a clear correlation between a gain in expectedMBF and the Shan-
non entropy of the maximum entropy distributions that REVAC has estimated after 500
evaluations. The x-axis shows the average performance gain in percent. The y-axis
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Table 3.6: Entropy per EA component, averaged over all EAs
Component & population size Correlation with MBF gain Shannon entropy
correlation p-value max mean min
1) population size -0.4 0 0 -0.9 -1.7
2) parent selection 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -3.3
3) survivor selection -0.1 0.3 0 -0.7 -1.4
4) recombination -0.4 0 0 -0.2 -1.2
5) mutation -0.6 0 -0.1 -1.2 -4.5
Entire EA -0.8 0 -0.2 -2.9 -5.1
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Figure 3.12: Mean Shannon entropy per component & population size
shows the Shannon entropy of the estimated distributions, summed over all tuneable
parameters of the EA. Note that no EA lies above the main diagonal, which shows that
there is a minimum information cost for every percent point of gain in expected perfor-
mance, regardless of the EA specifications. Of those EAs that lie significantly below the
diagonal, most use tournament selection for both parent and survivor selection. By 500
REVAC evaluations, their MBF had long beenmaximized. Further tuning only improved
their AES, distorting their performance gain to entropy ratio.
Does the strong correlation between total Shannon entropy and the gain in expected
performance carry over to individual EA components? The first two numeric columns
of Table 3.6 show the correlation coefficient for each component and its p-value, i.e., the
probability to observe this or a stronger correlation coefficient if the true coefficient is
zero. Only EAs with a tunable operator were considered for the respective component.
The correlation is generally weak, in particular for selection. In other words, the ques-
tionwhich component needs tuning in order to improve the performance of a particular
EA depends much on the EA in question.
With respect to the average Shannon entropy per component, we see that not all
components require the same amount of tuning. The right numeric columns inTable 3.6
show the maximum, mean, and minimum Shannon entropy that we observed for each
component (and the population size) when instantiated with an operator that needs
tuning. The bar diagram of Figure 3.12 allows a visual comparison of this average mean
Shannon entropy. Such a skewed distribution of a need for tuning is commonly known
as sparcity of effects.
Typically, mutation requires the highest amount of tuning, and recombination the
least. This rule has many exceptions, as can be concluded from the low correlation co-
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efficients. While the relative order of Shannon entropy per component depends much
on the EA in question, consistent patterns can be detected for small groups of EAs. Take
for example the two EAs with tournament selection for both parent and survivor selec-
tion, Gaussian(σ,1) mutation and either one-point, two-point or uniform crossover. We
find that the Shannon entropy for mutation has the unusually high Shannon entropy
of around -.2, while the parent selection operator has a low Shannon entropy below -3.
When combining the same selection operators with other recombination or mutation
operators, we find that the Shannon entropy for parent selection is back to normal lev-
els, while it is still comparatively high for mutation. Another example is recombination,
which only exhibits a low Shannon entropy for uniform crossover in combination with
either (µ+λ), or (µ,λ). Such irregular patterns are consistent over different problem sets
and seem to be inherent to specific combinations of EA components.
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter introduces a novel approach to EA design that emphasizes the cost of tun-
ing. To understand how this cost depends on the choice of operator per EA component,
we combined exhaustive search over operators with REVAC for tuning their parameters.
Our experiments revealed a number of notable insights.
Our tests confirmed the common wisdom that the choice of operator for one EA
component depends on the choice of operator for the other components. Of all compo-
nents, the choice of operator for parent selection has the biggest impact on EA perfor-
mance. Furthermore, EAs differ greatly in the amount of tuning needed to reach a given
performance, and this tuning cost depends on the overall setup of the EA, rather than
the number of free parameters. With regard to recombination, we found that the best
EA setup depends on the time and effort one can permit to tune the EA.
To measure the need for tuning per component we use the Shannon entropy of
maximum entropy distributions as estimated by REVAC, which expresses the minimum
amount of information that is needed to achieve a given expected EA performance. It
is a generic information-theoretic measure that is independent of any particular tuning
algorithm. Inspired by theoretical considerations, it was validated by a strong correla-
tionwith the standard deviation of best solutions foundduringmultiple tuning sessions.
Based on this measure we observed that the need for tuning follows a skewed distribu-
tion, and that while total Shannon entropy is strongly correlates with performance gain,
the correlation per component is weak. The question which component needs themost
tuning depends on the precise composition of an EA and can not be answered on a gen-
eral level. It needs to be addressed by the operational analysis of individual EAs. We
recommend that a scientific discussion of individual operators addresses their effect on
the overall tunability of an EA and on the need for tuning per component.
Regarding the scope of our results, an empirical study can only use a limited set of
test problems, and strictly speaking our findings are only proven for our test problems.
However, we consider it unlikely that the complex picture that has emerged here is an
artefact of the test problems. What remains to be studied is whether the way in which
the need for tuning per component depends on the choice of operator for other compo-
nents is different on other complex fitness functions.
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HOW TO EVOLVE STRATEGIES IN COMPLEX
ECONOMY-ENVIRONMENT SYSTEMS
Abstract
An evolutionary model of economic behavior is not plausible if its parameters
need excessive tuning. Here we illustrate how Relevance Estimation and Value Cali-
bration (REVAC) can help to find a simple and robust model of an evolutionary sys-
tem that allows the agents to adapt well to complex environmental dynamics. We
apply REVAC to tune two versions of an evolutionary agent-based economic simu-
lation, one where agent behavior is parameterized differently based on relative wel-
fare, and one where there is no such distinction. We find that for equal levels of per-
formance of the evolutionary model, the extra features of the first model increase
the overall need for tuning. They should therefore be discarded. We find further that
tuning those parameters that control the diversity of strategies is most relevant to
the adaptive capabilities of the agents.
4.1 Introduction
One of the canonical challenges in evolutionary computing is to select and tune param-
eters of an evolutionary algorithm (EA) (Eiben et al., 1999; Eiben and Smith, 2003), i.e.,
parameters that regulate variation (mutation and recombination), selection, population
size, and so on. Often these parameters need to be optimized such that the EA delivers
good and robust solutions for a whole family of similar problems. This is true for “tradi-
tional” optimization and design applications. For instance, when solving a scheduling
This chapter is an extended version of Nannen and Eiben (2006), which has won a best paper award at
the Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference 2006 in Seattle.
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task with a genetic algorithm, it can be hard to establish good values for the mutation
rate, crossover rate, tournament size and population size that give good solutions for
all possible problem instances. The problem intensifies in more complex applications
like agent-based simulations in the fields of artificial life, artificial societies and evolu-
tionary economics. In such applications evolution is not only the “problem solver” that
is expected to lead to “optimality” in some application specific sense. It has to fit in
with the general system description and provide a better understanding of the general
dynamics of the evolutionary system under investigation.
When used to model real life phenomena, the evolutionary algorithm can include
domain specific features that are deemed essential to the simulated evolutionary pro-
cess. For instance, mating selection can depend on past interactions between individu-
als, andmutation can be sensitive to environmental factors. When asking whether such
features do indeed benefit the evolutionary process in a robust way—e.g., without the
need for excessive tuning—common EA wisdom (heuristics and conventions learned
over the decades) regarding EA setup is hardly applicable, since this wisdom is mainly
based on the traditional task of finding optimal parameter values. In contrast, REVAC
provides an information-theoretic measure on howmuch tuning each parameters of an
EA needs so that the EA reaches a given performance, independent of the actual tuning
method. This can be used to evaluate the benefits a domain specific feature, as well as
to choose between different possible sets of features, from the point of view of robust
performance.
We illustrate this robustness test by applying REVAC to the evolution of investment
strategies in an economic simulation. We provide a summary of the agent-based appli-
cation, the non-linear systemdynamics that the agents have to adapt to, and the specific
evolutionary algorithm which consists of randommutation and selective imitation (re-
combination) of investment strategies in a social peer network. We describe our initial
evolutionary algorithm of 13 parameters, reflecting our best intuitions on the evolution-
ary dynamics in the given context. Next we describe how REVAC effectively disproves
our initial intuitions and leads us to a simplified evolutionary algorithm of 6 parameters
that allows the evolutionary agents to reach the same level of aggregate welfare. Because
the simpler evolutionarymodel needs less tuning to achieve the same aggregate welfare,
we conclude that its predictive power and general validity have improved.
Some fundamental insights by A. Kolmogorov on the relation between individual
data and (probabilistic) sets that contain themwhere published only recently (Vereshcha-
gin and Vitányi, 2002). Early attempts to relate the generalization power of a statistical
model to some practical estimate of algorithmic complexity were based on the number
and precision of the parameters involved: first the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
(Akaike, 1973) and then the Minimum Description Length (MDL) principle (Rissanen,
1978). Later, J. Rissanen, A. Barron and B. Yu developed a version of MDL based on
parametric complexity (Barron et al., 1998). All thesemethods are based on a functional
analysis of the statistical model in question. This is not possible here, simply because
no analytic tool can tell us how many previously unsolvable problems can be solved by
adding feature x to an EA. REVAC is intended to fill this gap by numerical estimation.
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4.2 The economicmodel
4.2.1 General features of themodel
The agent-based application treatedhere is concernedwith a finite number of economic
agents which may be interpreted as national or regional authorities in charge of do-
mestic energy policy. The agents are challenged to adapt their investment strategies to
resource constraints and technological change. The investment strategy of each agent
specifies how it allocates its investment over these sectors. Initially all agents use fos-
sil fuel for their energy needs, which has finite supply. In order to sustain economic
growth, the agents need to identify a viable source of renewable energy from among
a number of nonviable alternatives. Invested capital is non-malleable: once invested
it cannot be transferred between sectors. Standard economic growth and production
functions describe how capital accumulates in each sector and contributes to income.
These functions are not aggregated: growth and returns are calculated independently
for each agent. Two agents with different investment strategies can experience very dif-
ferent growth rates and income levels.
The numerical simulations are based on a discrete synchronous time model where
the income and strategy of each agent is updated in parallel at fixed time intervals. Each
simulation step is divided into two separate update operations: updating the economy—
each agent invests its income according to its own investment strategy and the individ-
ual incomes and growth are calculated by the non-aggregate growth and production and
growth functions—and updating the strategies, when all agents compare their growth
rate with that of their peer group, and when those agents that decide to imitate change
their respective strategies simultaneously. Each computer simulation is divided into an
initialization phase of 50 time steps during which all strategies are fixed, and a main
experimental phase of 500 time steps during which all agents are free to change their
strategy. The initialization phase is needed to avoid influencing the simulation results
by the choice of initial values. During initialization the simulated economy stabilizes
and a “natural” distribution of strategies and growth emerges. All initial strategies are
drawn independently at random from the space of possible strategies.
4.2.2 Strategies, investment, and production
The economy has n =m+4 investment sectors: consumptionC , general capitalK , fossil
energy F , one viable renewable energy source R0 and m nonviable alternative energy
sources R1, . . . ,Rm . The number m of nonviable alternatives controls the difficulty of
finding the viable source of renewable energy. Formally, an investment strategy sa(t ) of
agent a at time t is an n-dimensional vector that specifies what fraction of income the
agent invests in the respective sectors,
sa(t )= [0,1]
n ,
∑
i
si a(t )= 1. (4.1)
The first fraction s1a(t ) = sC ,a(t ) specifies the fraction of income that is consumed; the
second fraction s2a(t ) = sK ,a(t ) specifies the fraction of income that is invested in gen-
eral capital; the third fraction s3a(t ) = sF,a(t ) specifies the fraction of income that is in-
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vested in fossil energy; and the remaining fractions specify what is invested in the m
renewable energy sectors.
Growth in each sector except consumption depends on investment, the learning
factor L that reflects the state of technology in that sector and a deprecation which is
constant and equal for all sectors and agents. The availability of fossil fuel is physically
limited and divided among the agents according to their relative investment. Growth in
this sector is therefore at a disadvantage when compared to renewable energy sectors.
We use a deprecation δ of .05. The growth functions are
∆Ka(t ) = sKa(t )Ya(t )LK −δKa(t ), (4.2)
∆Fa(t ) =
sFa(t )Ya(t )LF∑
b∈P sF,b(t )Yb(t )
−δFa(t ), (4.3)
∆Ri a(t ) = sRi a (t )Ya(t )LRi −δRi a(t ) for each Ri . (4.4)
The learning factor L grows endogenously with the log cumulative investment of all
agents in that sector, multiplied by sector specific learning rate zi (for a discussion of the
learning function see Nordhaus (2002)). For convenience we use the same deprecation
for technology as for capital, δ = .05, implicating that half of all technological achieve-
ments become outdated or otherwise irrelevant after 13 to 14 time steps.
∆Li (t ) = zi log(1+
∑
a
si a(t ))−δLi (t ) for all i . (4.5)
The learning rate z determines how fast a technology develops with investment. To
allow a stable economic growth of 2–3% per time step of the simulation we use zK = .01.
Given the resource constraint on fossil fuels we need a high zF = 1 so that fossil fuel
supplies can initially satisfy rising demand. To make one renewable energy a viable al-
ternative to fossil energy we give it the same learning rate zR0 = .01 as general capital.
The learning rate of all other renewable energy technologies is so low that any invest-
ment in them has no long term effect. zR1 , . . . ,zRm = .0001
The domestic income Ya(t ) of agent a at time t is calculated by a Cobb-Douglas type
production function with constant returns to scale. In this function fossil energy and
renewable energy are perfect substitutes—one can completely replace the other. Gen-
eral capital and the energies are imperfect substitutes—investing everything or nothing
in energy will ruin the economy, and the best distribution of investment over general
capital and energy depends on the production coefficient α. We set this coefficient to
α= .9, so that agents have to invest about 10% of their total income in energy in order to
achieve healthy growth rates. The production function is
Ya(t )=Ka(t )
α
(
Fa(t )+
m∑
i=0
Ri a(t )
)1−α
. (4.6)
The welfare of an individual agent a at time step t is measured by its individual invest-
ment in consumptionCa(t ), which is calculated as
Ca(t )= sCa(t )Ya(t ). (4.7)
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The aggregate welfare W (t ) at the population level is calculated from the discounted
mean of the logarithm of individual welfare,
W (t )=
d t
|P |
∑
a∈P
logCa(t ), (4.8)
where |P | is the size of the population and where d is the rate at which future welfare is
discounted. We use a discount rate of d = .97.
4.2.3 The social network
As has been extensively discussed by Wilhite (2006), agent-based simulation of eco-
nomic processes needs to give proper attention to the social network. We use a generic
class of social networks that reproduce a number of stylized facts commonly found in
real social networks, namely small world networks (Erdo˝s and Rényi, 1959) that have a
scale-free degree distribution generated by a stochastic growth process with preferen-
tial attachment (Barabási and Albert, 1999) and that have a high clustering coefficientC
(Watts and Strogatz, 1998).1 According to Tomassini (2005), an evolutionary algorithm
with spatial structure is of advantage when dealing with dynamics problems. Lieber-
man et al. (2005) have shown that spatial structures like scale-free networks are a potent
selection amplifier for mildly advantageous mutants.
Before the start of each simulation we use a stochastic process to generate a new bi-
directional network where the nodes are agents and the edges are communication links.
The process assigns to each agent a a set of peers Na that does not change during the
course of the simulation. If agent a is a peer of agent b, then a will consider the income
growth rate and the investment strategy of bwhen choosing an agent for imitation, while
b will consider the income growth rate and the investment strategy of a. On the other
hand, if a and b are not peers, they will not consider each other for the purpose of imi-
tation. The generating process starts from a circular network where each agent has two
neighbors—i.e., average connectivity k =2—and iteratively adds new edges to the net-
work until the desired average connectivity k is reached. The agents for the next new
edge are chosen at random with a probability that is proportional to their connectivity
(hence the term “preferential attachment”) and their proximity in the network, i.e., the
inverse of the minimum number of links to traverse from one agent to the other.
The random way in which the network is created guarantees that the average dis-
tance between any two agents is very short, significantly shorter for example than in a
regular grid. The preferential attachment leads to a very skewed distribution of peers
per agent, with some agents having several times the median connectivity. These well
connected agents act as information hubs and dominate the flow of information. A high
clustering coefficient implies that if two agents are peers of the same agent, the prob-
ability that they are also peers of each other is significantly higher than the probability
that two randomly chosen agents are peers. This leads to the emergence of blockswithin
the social network that exhibit a high level of local interconnectivity.
1In their seminal paper Watts and Strogatz (1998) define the clustering coefficient Ci of a node i as the
number of all direct links between the immediate neighbors of i divided by the maximum number of links
that could possibly exist between them. They define the clustering coefficient C of the entire network as the
average clustering coefficient of the nodes of the network.
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Figure 4.1: Network statistics
Figure 4.1 shows some key statistics collected from 10.000 networks of 200 agents
that were created with an average connectivity of k = 10. The graphs show a normalized
histogram of the clustering coefficient of each network (average .66), a normalized his-
togram of the distance between any two agents in each network, the probability density
function (PDF), and the cumulative density function (CDF) of the number of neighbors
per agent in each network. Note the relatively high probability of having 20 or more
neighbors when the average connectivity is 10 neighbors. Such significant numbers of
highly connected agents do not exist in regular grid networks or random networks of
the Erdo˝s-Rényi type, yet their existence in real social networks is well established. They
generally act as information or transportation hubs and accelerate the dissemination of
goods, viruses and ideas.
4.2.4 The evolutionarymechanism
It is important to note that in this EA agents and strategies are not the same. An agent
carries or maintains a strategy, but it can change its strategy and we still consider it as
the same agent. This dichotomy is necessary so that we can maintain a social network
among the agents, while evolving, i.e., changing, the strategies. Because every agent
has exactly one strategy at a time, the active number of active strategies is constant and
equals the number of agents.
The first step in determining the selection probabilities is to rank all agents and their
peers according to their respective welfare asmeasured by consumption. LetNa denote
the peers of agent a. The normalized rank ra(b) ∈ (01] is the position of agent b among
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the group consistent of a and the peers of a, divided by the size of this group,
ra(b)=
∣∣{c |c ∈Na ∪ {a}, Cc (t )≤Cb(t )}∣∣
|Na |+1
. (4.9)
If Cc (t ) = Cb(t ), agents b and c are assigned the same rank. The best agent of a group
of peers always has rank 1 while the worst one has rank (|Na |+1)−1, which is close to
zero. The special case ra(a) is important as it describes how an agent perceives its own
economic performance relative to that of its peers. Note that this value does not need to
be distributed uniformly over (01]—the fact that the size of Na is different for different
agents leads to a bell shaped distribution, which is skewed when there is correlation
between welfare and the size of Na .
We introduce twoprobabilistic selectionmechanisms, one to decidewhether a given
strategy will be changed by mutation and one to decide whether it will be changed by
selective imitation of a peer in the social network. In terms of traditional evolutionary
computing (Eiben and Smith, 2003), imitation corresponds to recombination. However,
there is an important difference between imitation as used here and usual recombi-
nation in traditional evolutionary computing, where the two recombinants have a sym-
metrical role: both receive (genetic) information from each other and incorporate it into
the offspring. In our imitation mechanism the roles are asymmetrical. One agent imi-
tates the other by receiving its strategy and recombining it with its own. The imitating
agent changes its strategy, while the strategy of the imitated agent does not change.
Reflecting our best knowledge and intuition on social systems, we assume that these
selection mechanisms depend on relative welfare. They should work differently for
agents that have high ra(a) perceive themselves as rich and for agents that have a low
ra(a) and perceive themselves as poor. We define two different sets of parameters for
the selection mechanisms, one for agents with a high self-perception, which we mark
with a subscript r for rich, and one for agents with a low self-perception, which wemark
with a subscript p for poor. We also introduce two threshold parameters ρ f and ρg to
specify whether an agent perceives itself as rich relative to its peers. If ra(a) > ρ f , an
agent perceives itself as rich with regard to mutation. If ra(a) > ρg , an agent perceives
itself as rich with regard to imitation.
Mutation in our simulation is implemented by Gaussian mutation. That is, an agent
mutates its strategy vector by adding a random value drawn from a Gaussian distribu-
tion with zero mean. This implies that small mutations are more likely than large ones.
The parameters fp and fr (for poor and rich agents respectively) specify the probability
that an agent will mutate its strategy at each time step of the simulation,
P [a mutates its strategy]=
{
fp if ra(a)≤ ρ f ,
fr if ra(a)> ρ f .
(4.10)
The parameters σp and σr specify the standard deviation of the random value that
is added to a mutated strategy. The exact formula for changing the strategy vector s(t )
into s′(t +1) is
s′a(t +1)= sa(t )+
{
N(0,σp ) if ra(a)≤ ρ f ,
N(0,σr ) if ra(a)> ρ f ,
(4.11)
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where N(0,σ) denotes a normally distributed random vector with zero mean and stan-
dard deviation σ. In order to avoid negative investments we add the additional con-
straint that sa(t )+N(0,σ) is non-negative.
Imitation is performed by combining two strategies through linear combination.
The resulting vector replaces the strategy of the imitating agent, while the strategy of
the imitated agent remains the same. The parameters gp and gr specify the probability
that an agent will imitate at each time step of the simulation,
P [a imitates]=
{
gp if ra(a)≤ ρg ,
gr if ra(a)> ρg .
(4.12)
In the event that agent a does imitate it needs to choose one of its richer peers to imi-
tate. The parameters hr and hp specify the fraction of rich peers from which the agent
chooses a randompeer to imitate. That is, a poor agentwith ra(a)≤ ρg chooses an agent
to imitate according to
P [a imitates b]=


0 if ra(b)≤ hp ,⌈(
1−hp
)
×|Na |
⌉−1
if ra(b)> hp ,
(4.13)
and a rich agent with ra(a)> ρg chooses an agent to imitate according to
P [a imitates b]=


0 if ra(b)≤ hr ,⌈
(1−hr )×|Na |
⌉−1
if ra(b)> hr .
(4.14)
If a imitates b, then the strategy sa(t ) is linearly combined with sb(t ) into s
′
a(t +1) ac-
cording to
s′a(t +1)=
{
(1−wp ) sa(t )+wp sb(t ) if ra(a)≤ ρg ,
(1−wr ) sa(t )+wr sb(t ) if ra(a)> ρg ,
(4.15)
where wp and wr is the weight that is given to the imitated strategy by poor and rich
agents respectively. Since the investment fractions are constrained to sum to one, the
resulting strategy is normalized,
sa(t +1)=
s′a(t +1)
|s′a(t +1)|
. (4.16)
The average connectivity k is the only free parameter of the social network and we
will test values of k between 2 and 30. The resulting 13 parameters (1 parameter for aver-
age connectivity, 5 for mutation, and 7 for imitation) are shown in the first two columns
of Table 4.1. On top of the “traditional” task of finding good values for these parame-
ters we want to know if they are 1) indeed relevant for the evolutionary algorithm and
2) sufficient to tune the system. Here we call a parameter relevant if the aggregate agent
welfare depends on the correct tuning of the parameter. Irrelevant parameters should
be removed from the model for the sake of analytic clarity and computational stability.
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Table 4.1: The 13 parameters of the initial evolutionary model
Parameter Shannon entropy Standard deviation
k average connectivity -0.1 0.2
ρ f threshold rank for mutation -0.3 0.4
fp P [poor agent mutates its strategy] -1.0 0.7
fr P [rich agent mutates its strategy] -3.9 1.4
σp mutation variance of poor agent -1.8 1.4
σr mutation variance of rich agent -2.2 1.4
ρg threshold rank for imitation -0.1 0.1
gp P [poor agent imitates] -0.5 0.3
gr P [rich agent imitates] -0.3 0.3
wp imitation weight of poor agent - 0.3 0.3
wr imitation weight of rich agent -0.2 0.2
hp imitated neighbors of poor agent -0.2 0.2
hr imitated neighbors of rich agent -0.6 0.7
4.3 Experiments
4.3.1 Evaluating the initial evolutionarymodel
In the present application we want the economic agents to achieve a high aggregate
welfare in a broad set of simulated economic environments. We add three scaling pa-
rameters to the agent-based application described in Section 4.2 to define a total of 18
different economic environments. They are
• The number of agents (200 or 2,000).
• The number of investment sectors with nonviable renewable energy technologies
(2, 20, or 200). In all cases the simulation has exactly one investment sector with
a viable technology and the number of nonviable technologies controls the diffi-
culty of finding this viable technology.
• The vulnerability (“low”, “moderate”, or “high”) of the agent economies to climatic
change. Exactly one investment sector leads to climatic change and the agents
have to avoid investing in this sector.
Starting with the initial parameter set of 13 parameters we search for a distribution
over parameter values with a good tradeoff in aggregate welfare and tuning cost for each
of the 18 environments. As REVAC updates the marginal distributions over the param-
eter values, the expected aggregate welfare increases and the Shannon entropy of the
marginal distributions decreases almost monotonically. Figure 4.2 illustrates this with
graphs from three experiments with 200 agents, low vulnerability and three different
numbers of nonviable technologies. The increase in aggregate welfare is greatest at the
beginning of a REVAC tuning session, then slows down and comes to a halt after evalu-
ating between 160 and 190 parameter vectors. On the other hand, the Shannon entropy
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Figure 4.2: Aggregate welfare and Shannon entropy of the initial model of 13 parameters
during a REVAC tuning session.
of the joint distribution that REVAC has estimated decreases linearly until about 200 pa-
rameter vectors are evaluated. Inmost simulated environments it continues to decrease
even after that. Visual inspection of the results of all experiments leads us to conclude
that the tradeoff between aggregatewelfare and Shannon entropy is best after evaluating
between 175 and 185 parameter vectors.
Table 4.1 shows the average Shannon entropy per parameter in bits together with
the standard deviation. The results are averaged over all 18 simulated environments
and over the marginal distributions obtained after evaluating 175–185 parameter vec-
tors. Only 4 parameters show a Shannon entropy of 1 bit or more, which means that
the performance of the evolutionary algorithm depends heavily on the correct tuning
of these parameters. On the other hand, tuning of the other parameters seems largely
irrelevant to aggregate welfare and their number should be reduced. The 4 relevant pa-
rameters define the probabilities to mutate a strategy ( fp , fr ) for poor and rich agents
and the mutation variance (σp , σr ) for poor and rich agents. REVAC tunes these pairs
of parameters to similar values (not shown in the table) and we concluded that they can
be combined into one parameter each. These results thoroughly falsify our original hy-
pothesis that agent behavior should depend on relative welfare and that it needs to be
tuned by different sets of parameters.
4.3.2 Evaluating a simplified evolutionarymodel
To verify these conclusions we simplify the evolutionary model by removing all behav-
ioral differences between agents that perceive themselves as rich and agents that per-
ceive themselves as poor. This leaves us with the six parameters shown in Table 4.2:
connectivity k, probability to mutate f , mutation variance σ, probability to imitate g ,
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Table 4.2: The 6 parameters of the simplified evolutionary model
Parameter
Shannon Standard 25th and 75th
entropy deviation percentiles
k average connectivity -0.1 0.2 5.8–18.2
f P [a mutates its strategy] -3.2 1.2 0.01–0.07
σ mutation variance -3.3 1.3 0.02–0.07
g P [a imitates] -0.5 0.4 0.54–0.88
w imitation weight -0.3 0.3 0.41–0.88
h threshold rank imitated -1.0 0.6 0.69–0.93
Notes. Results are averaged over the marginal distributions obtained after evaluating
175–185 parameter vectors. Initial parameter ranges are 0–1, except for connectivity,
which has 2–30.
imitationweightw and threshold rank h of rich agents that are considered for imitation.
Figure 4.3 shows the aggregate welfare and Shannon entropy of the simplifiedmodel
during tuning. Comparing the data visually we find that the best payoff between welfare
and Shannon entropy is again achieved after evaluating about 180 parameter vectors.
For each parameter of the simplified model Table 4.2 shows the average Shannon en-
tropy of each marginal distribution, its standard deviation, and the 25th and 75th per-
centile of the marginal distribution at this point in the tuning process—results are av-
eraged over all tested environments and over the marginal distributions obtained after
evaluating 175-185 parameter vectors. As with the initial set of parameters, mutation
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Figure 4.3: Aggregate welfare and Shannon entropy of the simplified model of 6 param-
eters during a REVAC tuning session.
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Figure 4.4: Aggregate welfare as a function of Shannon entropy.
proves to be themost sensitive part of the simplified evolutionarymodel. Both the prob-
ability to mutate a strategy and the mutation variance have to be well tuned in order to
allow the agents to adapt to their environment. The tuning of h (the fraction of richer
neighbors to be imitated) also shows significant impact on aggregate welfare. The imi-
tation parameters and the average number of neighbors prove to be almost irrelevant.
Figure 4.5 shows howREVAC tunes the parameters of the simplifiedmodel, averaged
over the 18 simulated environments. Differences in the optimal parameter values (not
shown here) are small between environments. For example, an increase in the number
of nonviable technologies leads to lower values for themutation parameters, apparently
becausemutation becomes riskier. However, such differences show consistently only in
a later stage of a REVAC tuning session, typically after evaluating more than 200 pa-
rameter vectors. REVAC achieves the best tradeoff in expected aggregate welfare and
Shannon entropy after evaluating 180 parameter vectors, and at that point the optimal
parameter values are similar for all tested environments. This means that at least for
the simulated environments discussed here REVAC tunes the parameters in a stable and
consistent way and maximizes the performance of the evolutionary algorithm without
compromising general validity.
After tuning the simplified evolutionary model to all 18 simulated economic en-
vironments we find that with equal cost of tuning the simplified model consistently
achieves a higher aggregate welfare. To illustrate this, Figure 4.4 plots the aggregate wel-
fare against the Shannon entropy that REVAC has estimated for the two evolutionary
models. The x-axis shows the Shannon entropy of the joint distribution as it decreases
during a REVAC tuning session. The y-axis shows the average aggregate welfare of the
simulation when parameter values are drawn from REVAC distributions with the cor-
responding Shannon entropy. The graphs are based on simulations with 200 agents, 2
nonviable renewable energy technologies and low vulnerability to climatic change. The
right cut off of each linemarks the Shannon entropy after evaluating 300 parameter vec-
tors. While the aggregate welfare at these cut off points is comparable for the two mod-
els, the 13-parameter model needs a significantly larger amount of information to reach
it. In general, for each level of Shannon entropy, the aggregate welfare of the simplified
6-parameter model exceeds that of the initial 13-parameter model by about 10%. We
conclude that the tradeoff in aggregate welfare to tuning cost is better with the simpli-
fied set of evolutionary parameters.
4.4. Conclusions 79
100 150 200 250 300
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
 
 
80%
50%
a
ve
ra
g
e
d
eg
re
e
k
evaluated parameter vectors
100 150 200 250 300
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
 
80%
50%
m
u
ta
ti
o
n
p
ro
b
a
b
.
f
evaluated parameter vectors
100 150 200 250 300
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
 
80%
50%
m
u
ta
ti
o
n
va
ri
a
n
ce
σ
evaluated parameter vectors
100 150 200 250 300
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
 
80%
50%
im
it
a
ti
o
n
p
ro
b
a
b
.
g
evaluated parameter vectors
100 150 200 250 300
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
 
80%
50%
im
it
a
ti
o
n
w
ei
g
h
t
w
evaluated parameter vectors
100 150 200 250 300
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
 
80%
50%
im
it
a
ti
o
n
th
re
sh
o
ld
h
evaluated parameter vectors
Figure 4.5: Tuning the 6 parameters of the simplifiedmodel. 50%of the density is located
between the two solid lines, 80% between the dashed lines.
4.4 Conclusions
We illustrated howREVACcan supportmodeling activities: by showing the experimenter
whichmodel details can be considered as irrelevant—at least for the purpose of increas-
ing a particular performance indicator like aggregate welfare. The Shannon entropy of
the marginal distributions optimized by REVAC provides us with a useful measure of
tuning cost that is independent of the actual tuning method. When comparing the 13-
parameter model with the 6-parameter model we find that with equal tuning cost the
6-parameter model consistently outperforms the 13-parameter model by a significant
amount of aggregate welfare. We conclude that there is no evidence that agents should
condition their evolutionary behavior on relative welfare. Regarding individual param-
eters we find that the mutation parameters are the most relevant parameters in all ver-
sions of the evolutionary model in the sense that tuning them has the biggest effect on
aggregate welfare. Tuning the fraction of peers that can be imitated is also important.
The details of the social network, in particular the average connectivity, seem to be ir-
relevant, but warrant further research.
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IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL DYNAMICS ON
ECONOMIC EVOLUTION: UNCERTAINTY, RISK
AVERSION, AND POLICY
Abstract
The general question of how environmental dynamics affect the behavioral in-
teraction in an evolutionary economy is considered. To this end, a basic model of
a dynamic multi-sector economy is developed where the evolution of investment
strategies depends on the diversity of investment strategies, social connectivity and
relative contribution of sector specific investments to production. Four types of en-
vironmental dynamics are examined that differ in how gradual and how frequent
environmental change occurs. Numerical analysis shows how the socially optimal
level of diversity increases with the frequency and rapidity of the changes. When
there is uncertainty about which type of environmental dynamics will prevail, the
socially optimal level of diversity increases with the degree of risk aversion of the
policy maker or the society.
5.1 Introduction
Evolutionary reasoning and agent-based modeling are standard practice in various dis-
ciplines, including social sciences (e.g., Binmore, 1994; Galor and Moav, 2002; Tesfat-
sion and Judd, 2006; Mirowski, 2007). A typical evolutionary model uses a population of
entities that undergo selection and variation. Although specific domains ask for the de-
velopment of particular types of model, several common, general questions arise. Here
This chapter is also available as (Nannen et al., 2008b).
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we aim to address one such question, namely how does a dynamic environment influ-
ence the behavior of an evolutionary economic system consisting of multiple agents
employing different behavioral strategies. The relevance of this question is evident: few
economic environments are static.
Generally, one cannot expect evolution in a changing environment to approach a
steady state. What matters is not so much how well the agents adapt if given enough
time, but how fast they adapt to a new challenge. In a socio-economic context a wide
range of environmental variables can be identified: macroeconomic conditions, tech-
nological opportunities, policies and institutions, and natural resources. Most studies of
social behavior through evolutionary methods have been limited to constant environ-
ments, letting selection pressure depend on the population distribution. In part, this al-
lows for analytical treatments, as has been the common approach in evolutionary game
theory (both in biology and the social sciences). The addition of a dynamic environ-
ment requires a numerical or computational approach. As environmental economics
deals with the economic analysis of exploitation of natural resources, abatement of en-
vironmental pollution, and human-induced climate change, dynamic environments are
prevalent. The evolution of strategies is important when heterogeneous groups of users,
polluters, or harvesting strategies are involved (Ostrom, 2000; van den Bergh, 2007). Dy-
namic environments may cause certain strategies to become evolutionary stable and
others to become unstable. We will not only draw upon the social sciences but also
make use of certain insights from evolutionary biology. Evidently, many explicit and
implicit insights on the influence of environment on evolution are available here.
For our purpose a relevant distinction is between exogenous and endogenous en-
vironments. Whereas systems with only exogenous variables are relatively simple, en-
dogenous variables generate complex feedback systems. Unfortunately,most real-world
systems studied by biologists and social scientists are of the latter type. Resource dy-
namics (e.g., Sethi and Somanathan, 1996; Noailly et al., 2003) and dynamic control of a
pest population that evolves resistance to pesticides (Munro, 1997) are policy-relevant
examples. Another, general example is a coevolutionary system in which two heteroge-
neous populations cause selection pressure on one another (Epstein and Axtell, 1996).
This leads to very complex coevolutionary interactions because the environment of each
evolutionary (sub)system is evolving as well. Coevolution thus implies a particular type
of dynamic and endogenous environment (Noailly, 2007).
With regard to the evolutionary system, there is a range of theoretical starting points
and modeling approaches (Eiben and Smith, 2003; van den Bergh, 2004a). First of all,
one can choose to use very theoretical, abstract models of the evolutionary game type.
However, adding dynamic environments here will lead to systems that are no longer
amenable to analytic solutions. Numeric simulations of multi-agent systems form an
alternative to the analytic approach that offer much more flexibility in examining sys-
tem behavior. They allow a distinction between local and global environments, and
between stationary andmobile agents. They further allow to study the influence of pop-
ulation size, and the effects of dynamic environments on group and network formation
(Bergstrom, 2002; Henrich, 2002). In addition, different assumptions can be made re-
garding selection factors and innovation mechanisms (randommutations, determinis-
tic trends, recombination) and bounded rationality of agents (habits, imitation).
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In this chapter we investigate the impact of various types of general environmental
dynamics on the socially optimal type of behavioral interactions among the agents in
the population. We consider the general structure of a dynamic non-aggregate multi-
sector economy. Agents have individual investment strategies that specify how they in-
vest their respective income. Their objective is to maximize their individual welfare.
They prefer investment strategies which give high welfare. Their rational capabilities
are bounded and their information is limited. The only information available to the
agents is the investment strategies and the welfare of their fellow agents. The behavioral
interactions influence how the agents use this information to evolve their investment
strategies through imitation. Our framework postulates that the environmental dynam-
ics are beyond the control of the policy maker, while he or she can regulate (some as-
pects of) the agent interactions. Various types of government regulation, information
and education affect the search for and effectiveness of innovation by economic agents.
In particular, by regulating how accurately agents can imitate each other, a policymaker
can control the diversity of strategies within the population. Examples of policies that
influence diversity are patent and copyright laws, conditions for competition for public
R&D funds and subsidies, and the support or enforcement of industry standards.
We will study the effect of diversity on welfare numerically through computer sim-
ulations. We will address two research questions. The first is whether it is true that
different environmental dynamics require different degrees of diversity for the agents to
achieve a high welfare. The second question follows from the fact that environmental
dynamics are not only beyond the control of the policy maker, but that they are also
uncertain to him. This raises the issue of adequate policies under uncertainty: how do
agent interactions that work well for one type of environmental dynamics perform un-
der another environmental dynamics? Depending on the degree of risk aversion of the
policy maker or the society, different policies can be recommended.
As for the environmental dynamics, we focus on two general aspects of environ-
mental change: how gradually it occurs, and how often. Gradualness and frequency
of change are two aspects of an environmental dynamics that can relatively easily be
observed and recognized. Depletion of a mineral resource, for example, typically mani-
fests itself over an extended period of time, while a biotic resource like fish can disappear
literally overnight. Or a remote agricultural community is normally exposed to environ-
mental hazards less frequently than one surrounded by a heavily industrialized region.
If a policy maker can anticipate these aspects of environmental change, he or shemight
want to steer behavioral interaction such that economic agents can adapt well.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes produc-
tion and growth in an economy with a very general structure and presents the evolu-
tionary mechanism of behavioral interaction. In Section 5.3 the relation between an
investment strategy and the income growth rate is studied. Section 5.4 describes the
experimental setup. Section 5.5 provides simulation results and interpretations. Sec-
tion 5.6 concludes.
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5.2 The economicmodel
5.2.1 General features of themodel
Consider a population of agents with the objective to reach a high level of individual
welfare, which can only be achieved by a sustained high income growth rate. Each agent
can invest its respective income in a finite number of capital sectors. How it allocates
its investment over these sectors is expressed by its individual investment strategy. In-
vested capital is non-malleable: once invested it cannot be transferred between sectors.
Standard economic growth and production functions describe how the invested capi-
tal accumulates in each sector and contributes to income. These functions are not ag-
gregated: growth and returns are calculated independently for each agent. Two agents
with different investment strategies can experience different income growth rates and
income levels.
The agents understand that there is a causal link between an investment strategy
and economic performance as expressed by the income growth rate, but they cannot
use calculus to find an investment strategy that maximizes the income growth rate. In-
stead, the agents employ the smartest searchmethod that nature has in store, evolution,
and they evolve their investment strategies by imitationwith variation. Since they prefer
a high income growth rate over a low income growth rate, they imitate the investment
strategy of a fellow agent when that fellow agent realizes an income growth rate that is
high relative to their own income growth rate and that of their other fellow agents. Imita-
tion is not perfect. Changes that are introduced during imitation guarantee diversity in
the pool of strategies and keep the evolutionary search alive. In the terminology of evo-
lutionary theory an agent selects another agent based on a property (the phenotype) that
is indicative of its current economic performance and imitates its investment strategy
(the genotype) with variation.
5.2.2 Strategies, investment, and production
All variables and parameters of the economic model are summarized in Table 5.1. The
population approachmeans that accounting of capital investment, production, and in-
come takes place at the level of individual agents. Let Ya(t ) be the income of agent a at
time t and let n be the number of available investment sectors. Formally, the investment
strategy sa(t ) of an agent can be defined as an n-dimensional vector
sa(t )= [0,1]
n ,
∑
i
si a(t )= 1. (5.1)
The partial strategy si a(t )—which is the i th element of a strategy—determines the frac-
tion si a(t )Ya(t −1) of income that agent a invests in sector i at time t . Each agent must
invest its total income in one sector or another, so the partial strategies must be non-
negative and sum to one. The set of all possible investment strategies is an n−1 dimen-
sional simplex that is embedded in n-dimensional Euclidean space. We call this simplex
the strategy space.
Capital accumulation in each sector depends on the sector specific investment of
each agent and on the global deprecation rate δ. Deprecation is assumed to be equal for
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Table 5.1: Variables and parameters of the model
|P | population size
k average number of neighbors per agent
N neighbors of an agent
C clustering coefficient of the network
n number of investment sectors
β scaling factor of production
δ discount rate
σ diversity control parameter
Ki a capital that agent a has accumulated in investment sector i
pii production coefficient of investment sector i
si a fraction of income that agent a allocates to investment sector i
Ya net domestic income of agent a
γa income growth rate of agent a
all sectors and all agents. The dynamic equation for non-aggregate growth per sector is
Ki a(t )= si a(t )Ya(t −1)+ (1−δ)Ki a(t −1). (5.2)
An extended version of this equation that accounts for dynamic prices can be found in
the appendix. To calculate the income Ya(t ) from the capital that agent a has accumu-
lated per sector, we use an n-factor Cobb-Douglas production function with a constant
elasticity of substitution,
Ya(t )=β
∏
i
Ki a(t )
pii (t ), (5.3)
where β is a scaling factor that limits the maximum possible income growth rate. The
relative contribution of each sector to production is expressed by a dynamic vector of
non-negative production coefficientspi(t )= 〈pi1(t ) . . .pin(t )〉. To enforce constant returns
to scale, all production coefficients are constraint to add up to one,
pi(t )= [0,1]n ,
∑
i
pii (t )= 1. (5.4)
Similar to the strategy space, the set of all possible vectors of production coefficients is
an n−1 dimensional simplex that is embedded in n-dimensional Euclidean space.
Production coefficients can depend on an array of economic dynamics, like techno-
logical development and environmental dynamics. When the technology or the envi-
ronment changes, the production coefficients can change as well. Progressive desertifi-
cation of farm land for example increases the dependency of farmers on irrigation. This
can be interpreted as an increase of the production coefficient of irrigation, while some
or all of the other production coefficients of the agricultural production process would
decrease to compensate. Evolutionary economics raises the question of what happens
if the production coefficients change. For this reason we model the environmental dy-
namics as exogenously defined changes in pi(t ). This is a general approach that can also
be applied to other economic dynamics such as technological development. Section 5.4
describes how we implement these changes and how we test whether or not they have
an impact on behavioral interactions.
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To measure how well a population of agents is adapted to a certain economic envi-
ronment, we use the expected log income E[logY (t )] of all agents at time t . Expected
log income emphasizes an egalitarian distribution of income. Technically speaking, an
economic agent with constant relative risk aversion prefers a society with high expected
log growth and high expected log income. Let |P | be the total number of agents in the
population P . We calculate expected log growth as
E[logY (t )]=
1
|P |
∑
a
logYa(t ). (5.5)
The individual income growth rate γa(t ) is
γa(t )=
Ya(t )
Ya(t −1)
−1. (5.6)
Expected log income relates to expected log income growth as
E[logY (t )]=
t∑
i=1
E[log(γ(i )+1)]+E[logY (0)], (5.7)
where expected log income growth is defined as
E[log(γ(t )+1)]=
1
|P |
∑
a
log(γa(t )+1). (5.8)
5.2.3 The evolutionarymechanism of behavioral interactions
From the point of view of evolutionary modeling, agents and investment strategies are
not the same: an agent carries or maintains a strategy, but it can change its strategy
and we still consider it to be the same agent (Nowak, 2006). Because every agent has
exactly one strategy at a time, the number of active strategies is the same as the number
of agents.
To model which agents an agent can imitate we use a generic class of social net-
works that has been well studied and validated in network theory, namely those that
can be generated by a random process with preferential attachment and that have a
high clustering coefficient, see Section 4.2.3 on page 71 for details. Before the start of
each simulation a stochastic process assigns to each agent a a set of peers Na that does
not change during the course of the simulation. If agent a is a peer of agent b, then a
will consider the income growth rate and the investment strategy of b when choosing
an agent for imitation, while b will consider the income growth rate and the investment
strategy of a. On the other hand, if a and b are not peers, they will not consider each
other for the purpose of imitation.
At each time step t an agent may select one of its peers in the social network and
imitate its strategy. If that happens, the strategy of the imitating agent changes, while
the strategy of the agent that is imitated does not. The choice of which agent to imitate
is based on relative welfare as indicated by the current growth rate of income. The im-
itating agent always selects the peer with the highest current income growth rate. Only
if an agent has no peer with an income growth rate higher than its own, the agent does
not revise its strategy.
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If imitation were the only mechanism by which agents change their strategies, the
strategies of agents that form a connected networkmust converge on a strategy that was
present during the initial setup. However, real imitation is never without errors. Errors
are called mutations in evolutionary theory. They are fundamental to an evolutionary
process because they create and maintain the diversity on which selection can work.
In this model we implement mutation by adding some Gaussian noise to the imitation
process. That is, when an agent imitates a strategy, it adds some random noise drawn
from a Gaussian distribution with zero mean. This causes small mutations along each
partial strategy to be more likely than large ones. The exact formula by which agent a
imitates and then mutates the strategy of agent b is
sa(t )= sb(t −1)+N(0,σ), (5.9)
where N(0,σ) denotes a normally distributed n-dimensional random vector with zero
mean and standard deviation σ per dimension. Because partial investment strategies
have to sum to one, we have to enforce N(0,σ) = 0, for example by orthogonal projec-
tion of the Gaussian noise term onto the simplex, resulting in the loss of one degree
of freedom. The error term is further constraint to leave all partial strategies positive.
Needless to say that we do not imply that our boundedly rational agents engage con-
sciously in such mathematical exercise. Subjectively they merely allocate their income
such that none is left.
The sum of squares of the n partial errors, i.e., the square of the Euclidean distance
covered by the error, follows a chi-square distribution with n−1 degrees of freedom and
mean (n−1)∗σ2. In equilibrium, when all agents try to imitate the same perfect strategy,
the expected standard deviation of the partial strategies will in fact be σ. Since the pa-
rameter σ controls the diversity of the investment strategies, we will call it the diversity
control parameter, or simply diversity. It is the only free parameter of this evolutionary
mechanism and has potential policy implications.
5.3 The evolutionary dynamics
5.3.1 The growth rate of a strategy
If we want to understand the impact of environmental dynamics on how agents evolve
their strategies we need to understand if and how these environmental dynamics af-
fect which agents are imitated. Whether the strategy of an agent is imitated depends
on whether the agent has a higher income growth rate than those agents it is compared
with. We call the mapping from investment strategies to income growth rate the growth
function. The growth function calculates the equilibrium growth rate that an imitating
agent realizes if it holds on to a particular investment strategy. If the growth function
maps one strategy to a higher equilibrium growth rate than another strategy, then our
evolutionary agents will prefer this strategy over the other strategy and imitate it. In this
way the growth function indicates which of any two strategies will survive and prop-
agate. Since it depends only on the order of income growth rates—i.e., which of any
two agents has a higher income growth rate—whether an agent is imitated, the evolu-
tionary dynamics is invariant under any strictly increasing transformation of the growth
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function. Any two growth functions that are strictly increasing (or decreasing) transfor-
mations of each other lead to the same evolutionary dynamics.
Let us start the derivation of the growth function with an analysis of the equilibrium
ratio of sector specific capital to income, Ki a(t )/Ya(t ), that will be achieved if an agent
holds on to a particular strategy. The dynamic equation of this ratio is
Ki a(t )
Ya(t )
=
si a(t )Ya(t −1) + (1−δ)Ki a(t −1)
(γa(t )+1) Ya(t −1)
=
si a(t )
γa(t )+1
+
1−δ
γa(t )+1
Ki a(t −1)
Ya(t −1)
.
(5.10)
This equation is of the form
x(t )= a+bx(t −1), (5.11)
which under the condition 0≤b<1 converges monotonically to its unique stable equi-
librium at
lim
t→∞
x(t )=a/(1−b).
This condition is fulfilled here: investment is always non-negative and sector specific
capital cannot decrease faster than δ. With constant returns to scale, income cannot
decline faster than capital deprecation, and we have γa ≥−δ. For the moment, let us
exclude the special case γa=−δ. Then, considering that 0<δ≤1, we have the required
constraint
0≤
1−δ
γa(t )+1
< 1 (5.12)
and we conclude that the ratio of capital to income converges to
lim
t→∞
Ki a(t )
Ya(t )
= lim
t→∞
si a(t )
γa(t )+1
/
(
1−
1−δ
γa(t )+1
)
= lim
t→∞
si a(t )
γa(t )+δ
.
(5.13)
Equation 5.13 describes a unique stable equilibrium to which the economy of an agent
converges monotonically. We ignore the limit notation and combine equation 5.13 with
equation 5.3 to calculate income at equilibrium as
Ya(t )=β
∏
i
(
si a(t ) Ya(t )
γa(t )+δ
)pii (t )
=β
Ya(t )
γa(t )+δ
∏
i
si a(t )
pii (t ).
(5.14)
We can now solve for γa(t ) to derive the growth function
γa(t )=β
∏
i
si a(t )
pii (t )−δ. (5.15)
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Let us return to the special case γa = −δ. According to equation 5.2, capital per
sector decreases at the deprecation rate δ only when it receives zero investment, and
it cannot decrease faster. This implies that with constant elasticity of substitution, a
growth of γa = −δ is only possible if every sector with a positive production coefficient
receives zero investment. This implies si a(t )= 0 for at least one partial strategy, and so
equation 5.15 holds also for the special case γa =−δ.
5.3.2 Efficiency and level sets of investment strategies
How does the income growth rate of an imitating agent compare to the income growth
rate of a rational agent with perfect information? The term
∏
i si a(t )
pii (t ) has a single
optimum at sa(t )=pi(t ), allowing amaximum growth of γopt (t )=β
∏
i pii (t )
pii (t )−δ. This
is the income growth rate that a rational agent with perfect information would expect
to achieve. Its exact value depends on the location of the production coefficients in the
simplex. In an n-factor economy the term
∏
i pii (t )
pii (t ) varies between a value of 1/n
in the center of the simplex where all production coefficients are equal, and a value of
one in the corners of the simplex where one sector dominates. In order to remove this
variability from the growth function, and to allow an easy comparison with the income
growth rate of a rational agent with perfect information, we define the efficiency E (s, t )
of a strategy s(t ),
E (s, t )=
∏
i
(
si (t )
pii (t )
)pii (t )
. (5.16)
The efficiency of a strategymeasures the fraction γa(t )/γopt (t ) of optimal growth that an
agent achieves with this strategy on given production coefficients, assuming that δ= 0.
If one strategy leads to a higher equilibrium growth rate than another, it is also more
efficient. Efficiency is therefore a monotonous transformation of the growth function
that preserves all information on which agent imitates which other agent, removes the
variability due to the location of the optimumon the simplex, and allows us tomeasures
growth in terms of what a rational agent with perfect information would achieve.
Efficiency, like the equilibrium growth rate, is a monotonically decreasing function
of the Euclidean distance between the strategy and the production coefficients, |sa(t )−
pi(t )|. This function is not symmetric about the optimum but has different slopes in
different directions from the optimum. Figure 5.1 shows how the average efficiency of a
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Figure 5.1: Average efficiency as a function of Euclidean distance to the optimum. The
x-axis shows the Euclidean distance, the y-axis the corresponding average efficiency.
Note the convex shape around the optima.
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Figure 5.2: Probability of positive growth when the investment strategy and the produc-
tion coefficients are chosen independently and at random. The x-axis shows the ratio
δ/β. The y-axis shows the corresponding probability that the equilibrium growth rate is
positive.
strategy decreases as its Euclidean distance to the optimum increases, when strategies
and production coefficients are chosen at random from the simplex. Note the inverse
S-shape of the graphs. As the Euclidean distance tends to zero, the gradient approaches
zero. This implies that when an evolutionary population of agents converges on the
optimum, the differences in growth caused by a small amount of diversity σ around the
optimal strategy are negligible.
A set of strategies each with identical equilibrium growth rate, say γ′, is called a level
set and forms a contour hypersurface in the strategy simplex. All strategies that are en-
veloped by this hypersurface have an equilibrium growth rate that is higher than γ′. This
inner set is convex (for a related proof see Beer, 1980) and so from equation 5.15 satisfies
∏
i
si a(t )
pii (t ) ≥
γ′+δ
β
. (5.17)
An important level set is
∏
i si a(t )
pii (t ) > δ/β. This is the set of all strategies that have
a positive equilibrium growth rate. Its size is proportional toP [γ> 0 |pi(t )], the probabil-
ity that a random strategy has a positive equilibrium growth rate with given production
coefficients. Let P [γ> 0] denote the probability that the equilibrium growth rate is pos-
itive if both the strategy and the production coefficients are chosen independently at
random from the simplex. Figure 5.2 shows how P [γ > 0] decreases as δ/β increases,
for economies with respectively 2, 4, and 10 investment sectors. The probability tends
to zero as δ/β approaches 1. For given δ/β, the probability that the equilibrium growth
rate of a random strategy is positive decreases as the number of investment sectors in-
creases.
The parameters δ and β determine the equilibrium growth rate associated with a
given hypersurface, as well as theminimumandmaximumequilibrium growth rate that
can be achieved with given production coefficients. They do not affect the location of
the optimum nor the shape of level sets, both of which depend exclusively on the pro-
duction coefficients. In other words, δ and β definemonotonous transformations of the
growth function that are irrelevant to the order of equilibrium growth rates and to the
understanding of the evolutionary dynamics as a whole. Also, the rate of convergence in
equation 5.13 does not depend on the scaling factor β. We will make use of this fact later
on in the experimental designwherewe use a dynamicβ for normalization, significantly
reducing the variability of the numeric results.
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5.4 Experimental setup
5.4.1 The environmental dynamics
The growth function, up to a monotonous transformation, depends on the coefficients
of a Cobb-Douglas type production function. When the production coefficients change
with the environmental dynamics, strategies that have previously generated a positive
income growth rate can now generate a negative income growth rate. Agents that have
converged on a strategy that has previously resulted in a high income growth rate can
see their income decline and need to adapt their strategies to the new production co-
efficients. How does the magnitude and duration of this decline depend on the type
of environmental dynamics and on the behavioral interactions among the agents? To
answer these questions we model the environmental dynamics as exogenously defined
changes in pi(t ). That is, the environmental dynamics that change the production coef-
ficients are the independent variable that the policymaker responds to. The parameters
of the imitation mechanism are the dependent variables that the policy maker aims to
regulate.
We focus on two aspects of environmental dynamics: how gradual the environment
changes, and how frequently. In combination they define four types of environmental
dynamics: the production coefficients change gradually and with low frequency, gradu-
ally and with high frequency, suddenly and with low frequency, and suddenly and with
high frequency. We compare these with two control systems: one without imitation and
one with imitation and a static environment. Without imitation, with strategies that
are randomly distributed over the strategy space and that stay constant throughout the
simulation, the income growth rate of most agents is most likely negative, irrespective
of the environmental dynamics. Expected log income will decline and welfare at the
population level will be at its lowest. On the other hand, in a static environment where
strategies evolve they are expected to converge on the optimum strategy and welfare at
the population level will be at its highest.
We consider the general case where a change in the production coefficients is de-
fined as the replacement of one vector of production coefficients by another, with each
vector drawn independently and at random from the uniform distribution over the sim-
plex
∑
i pii (t ) = 1. Replacement is instant for a sudden change and by linear transition
for a slow change. A sudden change can be modeled by setting the production coeffi-
cients of a 2-factor economy to pi = 〈.1, .9〉 up until time t , and to pi = 〈.4, .6〉 from t +1
onwards. Such extreme changes are characteristic of industries that depend on unreli-
able resources, e.g., a biotic resource susceptible to climate change like forests or fish.
A gradual change can be modeled by changing pi from 〈.1, ,9〉 at time t to 〈.4, .6〉 at time
t +x linearly over x steps, such that
pi(t + j )=
(x− j )pi(t )+ jpi(t +x)
x
, 0≤ j ≤ x, (5.18)
where the conditions
∑
i pii = 1 and pii ≥ 0 for all i are fulfilled at all times. Such gradual
changes are characteristic of industries that depend on reliable resources, e.g., a min-
eral resource like iron or coal, where known reserves will typically last for decades if not
centuries.
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Table 5.2: The environmental dynamics
Environmental dynamics Observable Example
gradual, low frequency reliable resource, Kondrat. wave oil/gas reserves
sudden, low frequency unreliable resource, Kondrat. wave climate change
gradual, high frequency reliable resource, Juglar’s cycle tech. innovations
sudden, high frequency unreliable resource, Juglar’s cycle biotic resource
We model low frequency changes by starting the transition from one vector of pro-
duction coefficients to another vector every 50 years, reflecting a Kondratiev type of
wave (Kondratiev, 1925), characteristic of industries that are not a driving force of in-
novation and change only with the general shift in production methods, e.g., forestry.
To model high frequency changes the transition starts every 10 years, corresponding to
the fast business cycles observed by Clément Juglar (1863), characteristic of industries
that invest heavily in research and development. That is, while we acknowledge that
technological innovations are driven by research and development, we treat their effect
on the production coefficients as exogenous environmental dynamics that the agents of
an industry have to adapt to. Wedonot claim that the cycles observed byKondratiev and
Juglar are caused by this type of exogenous dynamics. Wemerely use their observations
as examples of frequency patterns that can indeed be detected when present.
We consider different sequences of production coefficients as different instances of
the same environmental dynamics as long as the individual vectors of production coeffi-
cients are replaced with the same gradualness and frequency. Table 5.2 summarizes the
environmental dynamics used for the experiments. Figure 5.3 gives graphic examples of
production coefficients that are drawn at random according to the specification of each
environmental dynamics. Each row of this figure shows five graphs: one each for the
time evolution of the four production coefficients of a 4-factor economy, and one area
plot that combines the other four graphs into a single graph, stacking the four individual
curves one on top of the other (the upper curve has constant value one), with a different
shade of grey for the area under each curve.
With regard to the dependent variable under control of the policy maker, the imi-
tation mechanism has one free parameter, diversity σ, and we specify the optimal be-
havioral interactions as the diversity σopt (d) that maximizes the expected log income of
each agent under given environmental dynamics d ,
σopt (d)= argmax
σ
E(logY (t ) |σ,d). (5.19)
In order to find this optimal value for different environmental dynamicswe use repeated
numerical simulations with different values of σ and measure the expected log income
at the end of each simulation, using standard statistical methods to reduce variance.
Having identified the value σopt (d) at which the expected log income is highest under
a given environmental dynamics, we proceed to formulate policy advise on the socially
optimal level of σ when there is uncertainty over the type of environmental dynamics.
To do so we measure the expected log income that an optimal value σopt (d) generates
on those environmental dynamics d ′ 6= d where it is not optimal. We then calculate the
value that policy makers with different degrees of risk aversion assign to each σopt (d).
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Figure 5.3: Environmental dynamics: changes in the production coefficients. Each row
illustrates a different type of environmental dynamics. The sequences of production co-
efficients are chosen at random. The x-axis shows the 500 time steps (initialization and
main experimental phase). The y-axis of the four graphs positioned at the left of each
row shows the value of one particular production coefficient in a 4-factor economy. The
single graphs at the right are area plots that stack the values of the same four production
coefficients one on top of the other, with a different shade of grey under each curve.
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5.4.2 Implementation details, model calibration, and scaling
The numerical simulations are based on a discrete synchronous time model where the
income and strategy of each agent is updated in parallel at fixed time intervals. We con-
sider each time step t to simulate one financial quarter. As no significant financial mar-
ket requires a publicly traded company to publish financial results more than 4 times a
year, we consider it the limit of feasibility to account for growth and to review an eco-
nomic strategy as often as 4 times a year. Most economic agents will alter their strategy
less often. Each simulation step is divided into two separate update operations: updat-
ing the economy—each agent invests its income according to its own investment strategy
and the individual incomes and growth are calculated by the non-aggregate growth and
production and growth functions—and updating the strategies, when all agents com-
pare their income growth rate with that of their peer group, and when those agents that
decide to imitate change their respective strategies simultaneously.
Each computer simulation spans 500 time steps, simulating 500 financial quarters
or 125 years. These are divided into an initialization phase of 100 time steps or 25 years,
and a main experimental phase of 400 time steps or 100 years. An initialization phase is
needed to avoid influencing the simulation results by an arbitrary choice of initial val-
ues. During initialization the simulated economy stabilizes and a “natural” distribution
of strategies and growth emerges. Initial conditions are always defined in the same way:
all strategies and the initial production coefficients are drawn independently at random
from the simplex. The production coefficients are kept static throughout the initial-
ization phase but the agents can imitate in the same way as they do during the main
experimental phase, with the same σ. During the 400 time steps (100 years) of the main
experimental phase the agents have to adapt to the dynamic changes in the production
coefficients. To avoid any initialization effect, the increase in log income is measured
from the beginning of the main experimental phase.
Numericalmethods are inherently constraint by the availability of computational re-
sources. The computational complexity of multi-agent systems typically scales at least
polynomially with system size. The accepted method is to extensively study a system
that is large enough to incorporate all the essential ingredients of themodel, and to only
increase the system size to test whether the obtained results are scalable. Here themain
experiments are based on an economy of 200 agents and a 4-factor economy. Sensitivity
and scalability are tested with 1,000 agents and with a 10-factor economy. To under-
stand whether the results depend on the specific implementation of the evolutionary
mechanism we also test more sophisticated implementations: one version where each
agent imitates with probability .1 at every step—as opposed to probability one in the
main experiment—and one version where imitation is partial, such that a new strategy
is a linear combination of the imitated strategy (with weight .1) and the strategy of the
imitating agent (with weight .9). As before, σ controls the standard deviation of the nor-
mally distributed errors per partial strategy.
Recall that the rate of capital deprecation δ (equation 5.2) and the scaling factor β
(equation 5.3) of the production function have no effect on the evolutionary dynamics
and the adaptive behavior of the agents. For the present model we set δ = .01 per time
step—about 4% per year—for all sectors. We use a dynamic β to reduce variability of
the numeric results. As seen in Section 5.3, different vectors of production coefficients
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Table 5.3: Values of economic parameters
population size |P | 200
investment sectors n 4
duration of the initialization phase 100 time steps
duration of the main experimental phase 400 time steps
capital deprecation δ .01
dynamically normalized scaling factor β(t ) .015
∏
i pii (t )
−pii (t )
average network connectivity 10
have different optimal equilibrium growth rates. To study how efficient the agents adapt
to different vectors of production coefficients, we correct for this variability in optimal
growth by dynamically normalizing the scaling factor β. To keep the optimal income
growth rate at a value of .005 (i.e., an income growth rate of about 2% per year), we let
the scaling factor β(t ) depend on the vector of production coefficients,
β(t )= .015
∏
i
pii (t )
−pii (t ). (5.20)
With this normalization the equilibrium growth rate of all strategies is constraint to the
range [−.01, .005], where the minimum of −.01 is realized when si a(t )=0 for some pos-
itive pii and where the maximum of .005 is realized when sa(t )=pi(t ). Numerical tests
show that with these parameter values the probability that a random strategy has a neg-
ative equilibrium growth rate on random production coefficients is about .65.
To model which agents an agent can imitate we use a generic class of social net-
works that has been well studied and validated in network theory, namely those that
can be generated by a randomprocesswith preferential attachment and that have a high
clustering coefficient, see Section 4.2.3 on page 71 for details. Here we use an average
connectivity of k = 10. In a population of 200 agents this value results in a highly con-
nected network—the average distance between any two agents in the network is 2.7—
while maintaining the overall qualities of a complex network.
To improve the general validity of our results we use large number of numerical sim-
ulations where—rather than closely calibrating those factors that affect the evolutionary
dynamics on a specific economy—we define broad parameter ranges and collect statis-
tical information over a representative sample of different possible economies that fall
within these ranges. For example, in order to obtain results that are valid for the gen-
eral class of scale-free social networks with a high cluster coefficient, each simulation
is based on an independent random instance of the social network. Likewise, in order
to obtain general results for specific environmental dynamics, each simulation uses an
independent random sequences of production coefficients, which are replaced accord-
ing to the gradualness and frequency of the respective environmental dynamics. The
number of simulations needed to obtain reliable statistical results are determined by
standard methods of variance reduction. The values of all economic parameters are
listed in Table 5.3.
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5.5 Results
5.5.1 Economic significance of diversity
Figure 5.4 shows the expected log income of an agent for different values of the diversity
control parameter σ, for the two control systems and the four types of environmental
dynamics. 50,000 simulations are used for each graph. 500 different values of σ from
the range [0, .5] are evaluated, and results are averaged over 100 simulations per value.
The plots are smoothed with a moving average with a window size of ten values.
In the first graph of Figure 5.4—the control system without imitation—expected log
income is uniformly negative for all levels of σ. This graph is based on a static envi-
ronment, but the same is observed for any environmental dynamics. All other graphs
of Figure 5.4 show systems with imitation and there is a clear functional relation be-
tween the value of σ and log income. For each system there is a single optimum σopt (d)
that maximizes log income under the given environmental dynamics d , exact values are
given in Table 5.4. The value ofσopt (d) is higher for more frequent changes than for less
frequent changes, and higher for sudden changes than for gradual changes. Its value is
lowest in the static environment. Further to this, the graphs show a clear pattern in the
relationship between σ and expected log income: the slope to the left of the optima, i.e.,
for small values of σ, is much steeper than to the right, where σ is large. We will revisit
this fact in our discussion of policy advise under uncertainty.
Our first research question can now be answered: almost any level of diversity σwill
allow the evolutionary agents to reach a positive log income under any environmental
dynamics, yet a unique optimumwhere log income is highest can be identified for each
environmental dynamics. So while it is not mandatory to define policies that effectσ, in
the sense that imitating agents can almost always return to positive growth, it is optimal
in the sense that there can be a significant gain in expected log income.
Control system, no imitation
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
-1
0
1
2
Control system, static
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
-1
0
1
2
Gradual, low frequency
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
-1
0
1
2
Gradual, high frequency
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
-1
0
1
2
Sudden, low frequency
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
-1
0
1
2
Sudden, high frequency
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
-1
0
1
2
Figure 5.4: Expected log income as a function of the diversity parameter σ. The x-axes
show the diversity σ, the y-axes the resulting log income.
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Table 5.4: Optimal level of diversity σ for each environmental dynamics
Environmental dynamics Optimal σ
static .005
gradual, low frequency .008
sudden, low frequency .046
gradual, high frequency .057
sudden, high frequency .123
5.5.2 Policy advise under uncertainty
When the type of environmental dynamics that affects an economy is unknown, the op-
timal diversity σ depends on the risk preference of the policy maker. We consider four
types of risk preference: extreme risk seeking (maxmax), modest risk seeking (max av-
erage), modest risk aversion (minimax regret), and extreme risk aversion (maxmin). We
calculate the optimal value for each preference from a generalization table where each
σ that is optimal under one environmental dynamics is applied to the other tested envi-
ronmental dynamics, including the static environment. The result is shown in Table 5.5.
Each row shows the expected log income for the same environmental dynamics but dif-
ferentσ, each column shows results for the sameσ but different environmental dynam-
ics. Each entry is averaged over 10,000 simulations (with different instances of the social
network and different random sequences of production coefficients). The values in the
diagonal are highest for each row, confirming that the optimal value is indeed the best
choice for a given environmental dynamics.
For each risk preference, each tested σ can now be associated with an expected
value, and the σ with the best such value is considered optimal for the type of risk pref-
erence. This is shown in Table 5.6. Each row shows the value associated with each σ
under a given risk adversity, with the optimal value in Italic type. A risk seeker looks
at the highest expected log income that each tested σ has achieved under the differ-
ent environmental dynamics, and chooses the highest of these. Risk neutrality means
choosing the σ that maximizes the average expected log income over all environmental
dynamics. Under minimal regret the σ is chosen that minimizes the greatest possible
difference between actual log income and the best log income that could have been
achieved. Minimal regret first calculates the maximum possible regret for each σ and
all environments, and then chooses the σ that minimizes this maximum. Risk aversion
means choosing the σ that promises the highest minimum log income under any envi-
ronmental dynamics.
The numerical results clearly show that under uncertainty the optimal value of σ
rises with the degree of risk aversion. This is in line with our earlier observation about
the functional relationship between σ and expected log income: the gradient is steeper
for lower values ofσ than for higher values, whichmakes higher values ofσ the safer bet.
These observations are confirmedby the control experiments that test for sensitivity and
scalability and that use alternative implementations of the imitation mechanism.
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Table 5.5: Expected log income when a value of σ that is optimal under one environ-
mental dynamics is applied to other environmental dynamics
Environmental
dynamics that σ
is applied to
Environmental dynamics that σwas optimized for
static gradual, sudden, gradual, sudden,
low freq. low freq. high freq. high freq.
Optimal σ .005 .008 .046 .057 .123
static 1.996 1.995 1.952 1.934 1.794
gradual, low frequency 1.988 1.991 1.969 1.959 1.880
sudden, low frequency 1.117 1.250 1.412 1.406 1.331
gradual, high frequency 0.550 0.721 1.377 1.385 1.308
sudden, high frequency -0.042 0.092 0.529 0.548 0.596
Notes. Each column shows the expected log income when the diversity σ that is optimal
for one type of environmental dynamics is applied to another type of environmental
dynamics. Each row shows the expected log income when agents adapt to a specific
environmental dynamics with a value σ that is optimal for another dynamics.
Table 5.6: Optimal policy advise under uncertainty and different degrees of risk aversion
Type of
policy maker
or society
Environmental dynamics that σwas optimized for
static gradual, sudden, gradual, sudden,
low freq. low freq. high freq. high freq.
Optimal σ .005 .008 .046 .057 .123
risk seeking 1.996 1.995 1.969 1.959 1.880
risk neutral 1.122 1.210 1.448 1.446 1.382
minimal regret 0.835 0.664 0.067 0.062 0.202
risk averse -0.042 0.092 0.529 0.548 0.596
Notes. Each entry is calculated from a column of Table 5.5 and shows the value that a risk
preference assigns to a particular diversity σ. Each row shows the value that is optimal
under that risk preference in Italic type (minimum forminimal regret, maximum for the
others).
We also tested more sophisticated imitation mechanisms where either only a ran-
dom selection of 10%of all agentswould imitate per step, or where imitationwas partial,
such that a new strategy is a linear combination of the imitated strategy and the strategy
of the imitating agent (again with normally distributed errors per partial strategy). We
also made the selection process—the choice of which agent to imitate—dependend on
income instead of growth. The arrangement of optimal valuesσopt (d) is similar for each
environmental dynamics. The gradient is always steeper for small values of σ than for
large ones. Under uncertainty the optimal value of σ always increases with the degree
of risk aversion.
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5.5.3 Evolutionary dynamics
Figure 5.5–5.10 show the evolution of some key statistics during the 500 times steps of
the simulation. Figure 5.5 discusses the control systems without imitation (a static en-
vironment is used). Figure 5.6 discusses the control system with imitation and a static
environment. The remaining four figures show the four types of environmental dynam-
ics where agents imitate and where changes occur gradually and with low frequency
(Figure 5.7), gradually and with high frequency (Figure 5.8), suddenly and with low fre-
quency (Figure 5.9), and suddenly and with high frequency (Figure 5.10).
Each figure contains six statistics that describe the economic performance of the
agent population, the heterogeneity of their strategies, and the relevance of connectiv-
ity in the social network at each of the 500 time steps of the simulation. These statistics
are averaged over 10,000 simulations. Each simulation uses a different instance of the
social network and a different sequence of vectors of production coefficients. Two area
plots on top of each group of six illustrate how the production coefficients change under
the respective environmental dynamics. Each area plot shows a single different random
sequence of production coefficients. To further ease the analysis, in Figure 5.7–5.10 dot-
ted vertical lines are inserted into each area plot and each of the six statistics to show the
points in time where the transition to a new set of production coefficients starts.
All statistics react visibly to any change in the production coefficients. This is par-
ticularly interesting for those environmental dynamics where change occurs gradually,
because when a new vector of random production coefficients is introduced only the
momentum changes, not the rate of change. And yet there is a clear and strong eco-
nomic response to this change in momentum. Note that many statistics have reached
some sort of equilibrium after the 100 steps of the initialization phase.
Of the six statistics, the first four visualize the economic performance of the agents.
The first statistic shows the average efficiency (see equation 5.16) over all strategies,
allowing a direct comparison to what rational agents with perfect information would
achieve. The second statistic shows the behavior of the Gini coefficient, a measure of
how egalitarian the accumulated capital is distributed. The third statistic shows average
log income, which generally behaves as expected: after each change the income level
drops temporarily, only to grow continuously thereafter. The fourth statistic shows av-
erage log growth, which falls dramatically immediately after a change, asmost strategies
become obsolete, but peaks within no less than ten time steps after the change, indicat-
ing that the recovery process of our evolutionary economy starts almost immediately
after a change. The fifth statistic measures the variance of partial strategies within the
population and shows how the heterogeneity of strategies is affected by a change in pro-
duction coefficients. As discussed in Section 5.2.3, at equilibrium the square root of this
variance approaches the value of the diversity control parameter σ. The sixth and final
statistic measures the covariance between log income and connectivity, to emphasize
the effect of a skewed distribution of connectivity on the evolutionary process. It shows
how the correlation between log income and network connectivity rises each time that
a new change in the production coefficients is initiated. Evidently the highly connected
agents are among the first to learn and profit from the improved strategies.
When read in combinationwith statistic one through four on economic performance,
the fifth statistic on the variance of partial strategies allows us to identify the different
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phases of the adaptive evolutionary search process. After each onset of a new environ-
mental change the standard deviation of partial strategies peaks for a brief period, then
drops rapidly, and finally returns slowly to its former state. This shows that in the imme-
diate aftermath of a change those agents thatwere previouslymost successful loose their
attractive power—average efficiency is at its lowest—and that the diversity of the pool of
strategies increases significantly. This is the early phase of unstructured exploration.
As the agents evaluate new strategies, some agents are more successful than others—
average efficiency rises again—and get heavily imitated, leading to a rapid decline in
diversity. This is the second phase of structured, directed search. What is remarkable
is that during this second phase the average efficiency declines for a second time and
reaches a low point between ten to twenty time steps after the onset of the environmen-
tal change. Finally, during the last phase of exploration, the agents seem to finally settle
into the new order. Average efficiency increases again, and as more and more agents
approach the (moving) optimum, they diversify around it.
5.6 Conclusions
We have studied the general question of how different types of environmental dynam-
ics affect behavioral interaction in an evolutionary economy. For this purpose a simple
model of evolutionary formation of investment strategies through variation and selec-
tion was presented. Variation occurs when an agent replaces its own strategy by that of
another agent (imitation) in an imperfect way. Selection occurs when an agent bases
its choice to imitate another agent on some property of the other agent, here individ-
ual income growth. The evolutionary mechanism has one free parameter that controls
diversity by defining how closely agents imitate each other. This parameter has a clear
policy dimension as there are various laws and regulations that regulate how closely
agents imitate each other.
If agents in an economy with a Cobb-Douglas type production function use rela-
tive income growth rate to determine which agent to imitate, the evolutionary dynam-
ics are governed by the equilibrium growth rate of a strategy. This equilibrium growth
rate is uniquely determined by the production coefficients of the Cobb-Douglas func-
tion. Modeling environmental dynamics as dynamic changes in these production coef-
ficients enables us to study the impact of such environmental dynamics on the optimal
behavioral interactions. This is a general approach that can be applied to model tech-
nological or macroeconomic dynamics as well as environmental hazards like (climate
change induced) desertification and diseases.
We specified four different types of environmental dynamics that differ in the gradu-
alness and frequency of change. We further specified one control systemwithout imita-
tion and one control systemwith imitation and a static environment. To achieve general
results that are valid for a broad class of economies, all numerical results were based on
large number of computer simulations, each with different instances of those factors
that affect the evolutionary dynamic.
Our first research question was whether or not different values for the diversity con-
trol parameter are optimal under different environmental dynamics. We established
that for almost all tested values of this parameter and all tested environments the agents
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quickly adapt and find strategies with a positive equilibrium growth rate. We found fur-
ther that each environmental dynamics has a unique optimal diversity that maximizes
log income. This optimum increases with the frequency and rapidity of the changes.
Our second research question was whether or not different policies can be defined
for different degrees of risk aversion when the type of environmental dynamics is un-
known. Here we found that if there is uncertainty about the environmental dynamics,
the optimal value for σ increases with the degree of risk aversion. The generality of our
findingswere confirmedby control experiments that tested for scalability and sensitivity
of the economic parameters and that used alternative implementations of the imitation
mechanism.
Various types of public policies directly and indirectly affect the imitation behavior
of economic agents, the diversity of their investment strategies, and their ability to adapt
to a changing environment. Numeric simulations of stochasticmulti-agent systems can
be used to evaluate such policies even when there is uncertainty on the specific nature
of the environmental dynamics. Despite, or rather because of, their stochastic nature
they can identify the preferred policy under a particular degree of risk aversion.
Appendix 5.A Evolution with variable prices
The interested reader will be curious to know how variable prices affect the evolutionary
process. Regardless of the market structure and price formation, equation 5.2 for non-
aggregate growth per investment sector i can be extended to include a dynamic price
pi (t ),
Ki a(t )=
si a(t )Ya(t −1)
pi (t )
+ (1−δ)Ki a(t −1). (5.21)
The ratio of capital to income (equation 5.13) now converges to
lim
t→∞
Ki a(t )
Ya(t )
= lim
t→∞
si a(t )/pi (t )
γa(t )+δ
. (5.22)
The existence of this limit and the speed of convergence dependon the behavior of pi (t ).
If the price converges, the ratio of capital to income will converge as well. In that case
the growth rate at equilibrium is
γa(t )=β
∏
i
pi (t )
−pii (t )
∏
i
si a(t )
pii (t )−δ. (5.23)
That is, as long as themarket structure does not prevent the capital-income ratio to con-
verge in reasonable time, variable prices have a similar effect on the evolutionary pro-
cess as the scaling factor. Both are monotonous transformations of the growth function
that do not effect the evolutionary dynamics.
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Figure 5.5: Average time evolution of an economy without imitation (the environment
is static).
The two area plots on top show single random sequences of production coefficients.
The other statistics are averaged over 10,000 simulations. The x-axis shows the 500 time
steps while the y-axis shows the respective statistics.
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Typical area plot for a static environment
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Figure 5.6: Average time evolution of an economy with imitation and a static environ-
ment.
The two area plots on top show single random sequences of production coefficients.
The other statistics are averaged over 10,000 simulations. The x-axis shows the 500 time
steps while the y-axis shows the respective statistics. Note how most statistics have
stabilized during the first 100 steps of the initialization phase.
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Typical area plot for gradual, low freq. changes
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Figure 5.7: Average time evolution of an economy with imitation and a dynamic envi-
ronment characterized by gradual, low frequency changes.
The two area plots on top show single random sequences of production coefficients.
The other statistics are averaged over 10,000 simulations. The x-axis shows the 500 time
steps while the y-axis shows the respective statistics.
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Typical area plot for gradual, high freq.
changes
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Figure 5.8: Average time evolution of an economy with imitation and a dynamic envi-
ronment characterized by gradual, high frequency changes.
The two area plots on top show single random sequences of production coefficients.
The other statistics are averaged over 10,000 simulations. The x-axis shows the 500 time
steps while the y-axis shows the respective statistics.
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Typical area plot for sudden, low freq. changes
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Figure 5.9: Average time evolution of an economy with imitation and a dynamic envi-
ronment characterized by sudden, low frequency changes.
The two area plots on top show single random sequences of production coefficients.
The other statistics are averaged over 10,000 simulations. The x-axis shows the 500 time
steps while the y-axis shows the respective statistics.
107
Typical area plot for sudden, high freq.
changes
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Figure 5.10: Average time evolution of an economy with imitation and a dynamic envi-
ronment characterized by sudden, high frequency changes.
The two area plots on top show single random sequences of production coefficients.
The other statistics are averaged over 10,000 simulations. The x-axis shows the 500 time
steps while the y-axis shows the respective statistics.
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POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR EVOLUTION OF
BOUNDED RATIONALITY: APPLICATION TO
CLIMATE-ENERGY PROBLEMS
Abstract
We demonstrate how an evolutionary agent-based model can be used to evalu-
ate climate policies that take the heterogeneity of strategies of individual agents into
account. An essential feature of the model is that the fitness of an economic strat-
egy is determined by the relative welfare of the associated agent as compared to its
immediate neighbors in a social network. This enables the study of policies that af-
fect relative positions of individuals. We formulate two innovative climate policies,
namely prizes, altering directly relative welfare, and advertisement, which influences
the social network of interactions. The policies are illustrated using a simple model
of global warming where a resource with a negative environmental impact—fossil
energy—can be replaced by an environmentally neutral yet less cost-effective alter-
native, namely renewable energy. It is shown that the general approach enlarges the
scope of economic policy analysis.
6.1 Introduction
The analysis of the economic impact of climate change and climate policy is domi-
nated by neoclassical general equilibriumand growthmodels. Somemodels in this vein,
which have played a prominent role in the IPCC and international policy debates, are:
DICE (Nordhaus, 1991, 1994), RICE (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996), ENTICE (Popp, 2004),
CETA (Peck and Teisberg, 1993), MERGE (Manne, 1992) and FUND (Tol, 1995). Kelly and
Kolstad (1999) and van den Bergh (2004b) present brief accounts and evaluations. Al-
This chapter is also available as (Nannen and van den Bergh, 2009).
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though thesemodels have generatedmany insights, they do not represent the full range
of possible approaches nor of the questions that can be addressed. They omit certain
elements in their description of reality: out of equilibrium processes, choice between
multiple equilibria (path-dependence), structural changes in the economy due to inno-
vations, and the influence of income or welfare distribution on strategies. In addition,
the available models assume representative agents, rational behavior, perfect informa-
tion, and an aggregate production function. This approach allows for exact solutions,
but it also limits the type of policies that can be studied. For example, they cannot study
the effects of information provision, or of exemplary reward and punishment.
Here we present a model that starts from a set of alternative feasible assumptions
offered by evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dopfer, 2005; Witt, 2008)
and by agent-based computational economics (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006; Levy et al.,
2000; Epstein and Axtell, 1996). Evolutionary modeling has gained some popularity in
economics, but most studies in this vein lack a policy dimension. This holds especially
for applications of pure evolutionary game theory (Friedman, 1998). However, agent-
based models applied to economics have rarely addressed public policy issues, and if
they have done so, only in a way that does not fully exploit the policy potential offered
by an evolutionary model (Janssen and Ostrom, 2006). The present study adds a pol-
icy angle to an agent-based evolutionary approach, focusing on the opportunities that
an evolutionary system offers for policy design and analysis. This approach recognizes
evolution in the economy rather than emphasizing the use of evolutionary algorithms
to optimize non-evolutionary complex systems (e.g. Janssen et al., 2004).
The evolutionary agent-basedmodel developed here addresses policy in a setting of
global warming. The latter is endogenous to the model and depends on the source of
energy used by agents in the model. These agents may be interpreted as national or re-
gional authorities in charge of the energy policy of an independent economy. Global
warming is assumed to have a negative effect on social welfare. The overall goal at
the global level is to replace a resource with a negative impact on social welfare—fossil
energy—by a neutral alternative, namely renewable energy. On an individual level the
alternative comes with no economic advantage, and possibly even with a disadvantage,
so that there is no incentive to adopt it. A complicating factor is that there is no central
authority that can formulate and enforce a policy. Climate policies are usually based on
international agreements, and compliance by countries is voluntary.
Each agent ismodeled individually and agents are assigned only limited information
and boundedly rational capabilities. Their objective is assumed to be to reach a high
level of individual welfare. The only information available to the agents are the invest-
ment strategies and the income growth rates of their fellow agents. The agents believe
that there is a strong causal link between these two variables. Since they prefer a high
over a low income growth rate, they imitate the investment strategy of a fellow agent
when that fellow agent realizes an income growth rate that is high relative to their own
income growth rate and that of their other fellow agents. That is, they imitate an invest-
ment strategy when they believe that it causes a relatively high income growth rate. This
approach is inspired by findings on relative welfare and income comparison effect of
happiness or “subjective well-being” studies (e.g. Ferrer-í-Carbonell, 2005; Frank, 1987).
Imitation is never perfect. Small errors are introduced during the imitation process
that lead to slightly different variants of the same investment strategy. While these errors
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are necessary to maintain diversity within the pool of strategies and to allow a popula-
tion of imitating agents to find and converge on the individually optimal strategy, they
also form a hitherto unexploited opportunity for the policy maker. If the desirable vari-
ant is given a selective advantage over the undesirable variant, the first will diffuse faster
and will ultimately be used more often. For example, a policy that aims for agents to
adopt a greener investment strategy—in the sense that they invest less in fossil energy—
can do so by convincing at least some agents that the greenest variants in the current
pool of strategies lead to a relatively high income growth rate. As these strategies are
imitated, the errors guarantee that some of the new variants will be greener still. An
evolutionary policy can thus “breed” a new strategy by progressively giving a selective
advantage to the most desirable variants.
As has been extensively discussed by Wilhite (2006), agent-based simulation of eco-
nomic processes needs to give proper attention to the social network. Communica-
tion links between economic agents, individuals and institutions, are neither regular
nor random. They are the result of a development process that is steered by geographic
proximity, shared history, ethnic and religious affiliation, common economic interests,
and much else. The social networks used for this study reproduce a number of stylized
facts that are commonly found in real social networks: the small world effect (Erdo˝s and
Rényi, 1959), a high clustering coefficient (Watts and Strogatz, 1998), and a scale-free
degree distribution (Barabási and Albert, 1999). Modeling the evolution of strategies in
such complex social networks allows us to formulate economic policies that exploit the
effect of social visibility on the diffusion of a desirable strategy.
The frequency with which the strategy of an agent is imitated depends on two fac-
tors: the relative welfare of an agent, as observed from the income growth rate, and the
position of an agent in the social network. A policy that is aimed at increasing the se-
lective advantage of a particular strategy can do so in two ways, namely by changing
the relative welfare of an exemplary agent that uses such a strategy, or by changing the
position of such an agent in the social network. We formulate policies for both alter-
natives, and compare their effect to that of a standard tax on fossil energy. One policy,
prizes, increases the relative welfare of exemplary agents by awarding them a monetary
prize. The other policy, advertisement, increases the social visibility of exemplary agents
by increasing their connectivity in the social network. Policy tools that increase social
visibility include, for instance, sponsorship of industrial fairs and scientific venues, and
the production and distribution of educative material.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents the climate-
economymodel, including the evolutionary mechanisms of strategy formation and dif-
fusion, and formulates the climate policies. Section 6.3 studies the convergence behav-
ior of the resulting evolutionary process. Section 6.4 evaluates the climate policies using
numerical simulations with the climate-economymodel. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 The economicmodel
6.2.1 General features of themodel
The present economic model is formulated in order to study the effectiveness of regu-
latory public policies when economic behavior evolves through social interactions. The
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approach focuses on climate policies and energy investment strategies, but the model
can easily be adapted to other problems. Each agent controls an independent economy
with its own supply and production. The agent formulates a strategy to invest current
domestic income in different sectors. The returns for each independent economy are
then calculated from standard economic growth and production functions. Some allo-
cations give higher returns than others, and the goal of the agents is to find a strategy
that can realize a high level of individual welfare.
The present model is loosely based on the influential work of W. D. Nordhaus, who
published a series of general-equilibrium economicmodels of climate policy and global
warming, startingwith theDICEmodel (Nordhaus, 1992). From thismodel all economic
factors that were not essential to the current study were removed, in particular elements
relating to labor, technical details of global warming, and resource constraints. The rea-
son is that our model aims to be illustrative rather than to accurately replicate reality.
Moreover, simplification here allows for additional complexity in themodule describing
the evolution of strategies.
A fundamental difference between the present evolutionary agent-based approach
and the general-equilibrium approach of Nordhaus is that here agents do notmake per-
fectly rational decisions that are based on perfect knowledge. Instead, agents evolve
their strategies through random mutation and selective imitation in a social network.
Moreover, while here agents are homogeneous in terms of production functions, initial
strategies and initial income, they are heterogeneous in their placement in the social
network and the information they receive, and their strategies and income quickly di-
verge.
The numerical simulations are based on a discrete synchronous time model where
the economy and strategy of each agent are updated in parallel at fixed time intervals.
A time step is divided into two separate update operations: 1) updating the economy:
each agent invests its income according to its own investment strategy and the individ-
ual returns are calculated by standard growth and production functions; 2) updating
the strategies: all agents compare their strategies and those agent that decide to imi-
tate change their strategies simultaneously. Each policy is evaluated over a period of
400 time steps, simulating 400 quarters or 100 years, a period that is sufficiently long to
study the long-term effects of a policy on climate and welfare. As no significant finan-
cial market requires a publicly traded company to publish financial results more than
4 times a year, we consider a quarter to be the limit of feasibility to account for growth
and to review an economic strategy. Given habitual behavior and organizational rou-
tines (Nelson and Winter, 1982), most economic agents will in fact review their strategy
less often.
6.2.2 Strategies, investment, and production
All parameters of the economic model are summarized in Table 6.1. Our basic model of
energy investment consists of three investment sectors: general capital K , fossil energy
F , and renewable energy R. Here, the capital accumulation in an energy sector includes
technology, infrastructure, and licenses for production, distribution, and consumption
of a particular form of energy. Let Ya(t ) be the income of agent a at time t . Formally, the
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Table 6.1: Economic and climate variables
a,b individual agents k average number of neighbors per agent
N neighbors of an agent C clustering coefficient of the network
s investment strategy σ mutation variance of strategies
F fitness of a strategy Q income without global warming
Y net domestic income γ income growth rate
K general capital sector α Cobb-Douglas exponent
F fossil energy sector τ tax on fossil energy investments
δ capital discount rate T revenue of the fossil energy tax
R renewable energy sector c additional cost of renewable energy
G greenhouse gas level φ breakdown fraction of greenhouse gas
v scale of climatic damage ε environmental tax on income
β scaling factor E fund financed by the environmental tax
t time step
investment strategy sa(t ) of an agent can be defined as a three dimensional vector
sa(t )= [0,1]
3 ,
∑
i∈{K ,F,R}
si a(t )= 1. (6.1)
The non-negative partial strategy si a(t ) determines the fraction of the previous period’s
income Ya(t −1) that agent a invests in sector i at time t . All partial strategies are con-
strained to add up to one. The set of all possible investment strategies is a two dimen-
sional simplex (i.e., a triangular surface) embedded in a three dimensional Euclidean
space.
Invested capital is non-malleable: once invested it can not be transferred between
sectors. The accumulation of capital in each sector depends on individual investment
and the global deprecation rate δ, which is constant and equal for all sectors and all
agents. In the case of fossil energy the investment can be reduced by a regulatory tax τ
on investments in the fossil energy sector. This tax is defined as a fraction of fossil energy
investments before taxes, so that a tax of τ = 100% doubles the cost of all expenditures
on production, distribution, and consumption of fossil energy. In this way, if an agent’s
total spending on fossil energy is x = Ya(t −1)sF,a(t ), then an amount of
x
1+τ is indeed
invested, while the remaining x τ1+τ is paid as a tax. The revenue
T (t )=
τ
1+τ
∑
a
Ya(t −1)sF,a(t ) (6.2)
of this tax is recycled and distributed evenly among all agents.
To model a competitive disadvantage for renewable energy—for example through a
higher cost of technology, production, or storage—we introduce an additional cost c for
renewable energy, representing the difference between the costs of renewable and fossil
energy. In analogy to the fossil energy tax τ, we express this additional cost in percent of
the unit cost of fossil energy before taxes, i.e., renewable energy is twice as expensive as
fossil energy before taxes when c = 100%. The difference equations for non-aggregate
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growth per sector are then
∆Ka(t ) = Ya(t −1)sK ,a(t )−δKa(t −1) (6.3)
∆Fa(t ) =
Ya(t −1)sF,a(t )
1+τ
−δFa(t −1) (6.4)
∆Ra(t ) =
Ya(t −1)sR,a(t )
1+ c
−δRa(t −1). (6.5)
We proceed by first calculating the income of agent a as if there had been no global
warming, and then by accounting for global warming. We calculate Qa(t ) from the re-
turns of the individual capital sectors by a Cobb-Douglas type production function with
constant returns to scale and constant elasticity of substitution,1
Qa(t )=β
(
Ka(t )
)α (
Fa(t )+Ra(t )
)1−α, (6.6)
where β is a scaling factor. In this production function fossil energy and renewable en-
ergy are assumed to be perfect substitutes: one can completely replace the other. Gen-
eral capital and combined energy are assumed to be imperfect substitutes. Production
requires both types of input, and only a specific combination will lead to a high produc-
tion level.
Global warming is commonly defined as the increase of global mean temperature
above the pre-industrial mean, due to an increased level of atmospheric greenhouse
gases G(t ). The dynamics of the greenhouse gas effect includes many local and global
subsystems, resulting in complex and chaotic dynamics that allow for a range of possible
climate scenarios (e.g., Stainforth et al., 2005). Here we just include a simple feedback
loop that captures one of the main characteristics of greenhouse gas induced economic
damage: a long delay between action and reaction that spans several decades. We do
so by modeling the level of atmospheric greenhouse gases as a result of only two fac-
tors: cumulative fossil energy consumption by economic agents, which we assume to
be equal to the total amount of capital accumulated in the fossil energy sector, and a
natural breakdown fraction φ,
∆G(t ) =
∑
a
Fa(t )−φG(t −1). (6.7)
We assume that renewable energy does not contribute to global warming. We further
pose the relationship between economic damage, global warming, and economic dam-
age to be linear, scaled by a factor v . The net income Ya(t ) of an agent a can then be
calculated as
Ya(t ) = Qa(t ) [1− vG(t )]+
T (t −1)
|P |
. (6.8)
1Instead of including the fossil energy tax τ and the additional cost c of renewable energy in the growth
functions, they might be incorporated in the production function,
Qa (t )=β (Ka (t ))
α
(
Fa (t )
1+τ
+
Ra (t )
1+ c
)1−α
.
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where T (t − 1) are the revenues from the regulatory tax τ, distributed with one time
step delay among the |P | agents of the population. The growth rate γa(t ) of the income
of agent a is
γa(t )=
Ya(t )
Ya(t −1)
−1. (6.9)
6.2.3 Evolution of strategies
From the point of view of evolutionary modeling, agents and investment strategies are
not the same: an agent carries or maintains a strategy, but it can change its strategy
and we still consider it to be the same agent (Nowak, 2006). Because every agent has
exactly one strategy at a time, the number of active strategies is the same as the number
of agents.
To model which agents an agent can imitate we use a generic class of social net-
works that has been well studied and validated in network theory, namely those that
can be generated by a random process with preferential attachment and that have a
high clustering coefficient, see Section 4.2.3 on page 71 for details. Before the start of
each simulation a stochastic process assigns to each agent a a set of peers Na that does
not change during the course of the simulation. If agent a is a peer of agent b, then a
will consider the income growth rate and the investment strategy of b when choosing
an agent for imitation, while b will consider the income growth rate and the investment
strategy of a. On the other hand, if a and b are not peers, they will not consider each
other for the purpose of imitation.
At each time step an agent may select one of its peers in the social network and
imitate its strategy. If that happens, the strategy of the imitating agent changes, while the
strategy of the imitated agent does not. The choice of which agent to imitate is based on
relative welfare as indicated by the current growth rate of income. Note that the relation
between income Ya(t ) and growth γa(t ) is
Ya(t )= Ya(0)
t∏
i=1
[
γa(i )+1
]
. (6.10)
The imitating agent always selects the peer with the highest current income growth rate.
Only if an agent has no peer with an income growth rate higher than its own, the agent
does not revise its strategy.
If imitation were the only mechanism by which agents change their strategies, the
strategies of agents that form a connected networkmust converge on a strategy that was
present during the initial setup. However, real imitation is never without errors. Errors
are called mutations in evolutionary theory. They are fundamental to an evolutionary
process because they create and maintain the diversity on which selection can work. In
thismodel we implementmutation by adding someGaussian noise to the imitation pro-
cess. That is, when an agent imitates a strategy, it adds some random noise drawn from
a Gaussian distribution with zero mean to each partial strategy. This causes small mu-
tations along each partial strategy to be more likely than large ones. The exact formula
by which agent a imitates and then mutates the strategy of agent b is
sa(t )= sb(t −1)+N(0,σ), (6.11)
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where N(0,σ) denotes a normally distributed three dimensional random vector with
zero mean and standard deviation σ per dimension. Because partial investment strate-
gies have to sum to one, we have to enforce N(0,σ)= 0, for example by orthogonal pro-
jection on the simplex, resulting in the loss of one degree of freedom. The error term
is further constraint to leave all partial strategies positive. Needless to say that we do
not imply that our boundedly rational agents engage consciously in such mathematical
exercises. Subjectively they merely allocate their income such that none is left.
In order to measure the impact of an individual agent on the evolution of strategies
at the population level, we need to introduce the concept of fitness. In analogy with
biology, where fitness usually measures an individual’s capability to reproduce, we de-
fine the fitness of an economic agent as the frequency with which it is imitated. In the
model that has been presented so far, the frequency with which agent a is imitated is
fully determined by the income growth rate of a and its first and second degree neigh-
bors. Further degrees do not matter. First degree neighbors are relevant because only
direct neighbors consider a for imitation. Second degree neighbors are relevant as they
are the agents that a competes with. Agent a will only be imitated by agent b if a has a
higher income growth rate than b and all other neighbors of b (who are second degree
neighbors of a).
This functional relationship can be expressed by a fitness function. Let {Nb ∪b} be
the set consisting of agent b and its peers, i.e., those agentswithwhich agent b compares
its income growth rate. Let γmax
Nb∪b
(t ) be the income growth rate of the fastest growing
agent in this set at time t ,
γmaxNb∪b
(t )= argmax
c∈{Nb∪b}
γc (t ). (6.12)
Then the fitness Fa(t ) of agent a at time t is
Fa(t )=
∑
b∈Na
{
1 if γa(t )= γmaxNb∪b
(t ),
0 otherwise.
(6.13)
Or, in set notation:
Fa(t )=
∣∣{b|b ∈Na ∧γa(t )= γmaxNb∪b(t )}∣∣. (6.14)
In this function the fitness of an agent is bounded by the number of its neighbors.
An agent a1 who has just one neighbor and has the highest income growth rate among
the neighbors of that neighbor has a fitness of one, whereas an agent a10 who has ten
other neighbors and whose income growth rate is highest among the neighbors of just
two of them has a fitness of two, even if in absolute terms a1 has a much higher income
growth rate than a10. We see that the principal factors that determine the fitness of an
agent are relative welfare as indicated by the current growth rate of income as well as the
number of agents it communicates with. This gives us two different means by which a
policy can regulate the evolution of economic strategies: either by changing the income
growth rate of some agents, depending on the desirability of their current strategies, or
by changing their connectivity in the social network, again depending on the desirability
of their current strategies.
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6.2.4 Policy goals and formulation
The goal of the policies that are being studied here is to let the economic agents reach
a high social welfare. Assuming that fossil fuel consumption has a negative economic
impact because of the associated global warming, a successful policy has to reduce con-
sumption in fossil fuels but without considerably reducing social welfare, such that the
social costs of implementing the policy do not outweight the social benefits from a re-
duction in global warming.
We will study three policies, starting with a tax τ on fossil energy investments. This
is the first best policy under traditionally assumed conditions (rational agents, perfect
markets), and we study it here in the context of imperfect information and bounded
rationality. It is a regulatory and not a revenue raising tax and is defined as a fixed per-
centage on all investments in fossil energy, cf. equation 6.2, 6.4, and 6.8. We compare
this standard policy with two novel policies that take advantage of the evolutionary pro-
cess by increasing the fitness of those agents that invest a larger fraction of their income
in renewable energy. These policies increase the fitness of an agent either by increasing
its income growth rate, or by increasing its visibility in the social network. The rationale
is that, if we increase the fitness of agents that use certain strategies, these strategies will
be employed more frequently.
Under the first policy, agents pay a tax that is proportional to their investment in
fossil fuel. This taxmakes investment in fossil energy economically less attractive. How-
ever, since the incentive not to comply with this policy is also proportional to their in-
vestment in fossil fuel, the effect of this policy depends much on the existence of a cen-
tral authority that can enforce it. The second policy studied here, prizes, increases the
fitness of agents that invest a larger fraction of their income in renewable energy by
awarding them a monetary prize, financed by a global tax that is payed by all agents.
That is, it is not important who pays the tax, as long as someone pays it, for example
those agents that are most affected by global warming. This does not entirely solve the
problem of compliance, but makes it less acute. The third policy, advertisement, in-
creases the fitness of agents that invest a higher fraction of their income in renewable
energy by increasing their social visibility, i.e. their connectivity in the social network.
No compliance is required.
The prizes policy gives a monetary prize to those agents who invest the largest frac-
tion of income in renewable energy, increasing their relative welfare, and with that their
fitness. This prize is financed by an environmental tax ε on production Qa(t ). Since
this is a revenue raising tax to finance the policy and not a regulatory tax that depends
on individual behavior, it has the same level for each agent. Let E (t ) be the size of the
environmental fund at time t :
E (t )=
∑
a
Qa(t ) [1− vG(t )]ε. (6.15)
At each time step, the q agents that invest the highest fraction of their income in re-
newable energy are each awarded an equal share E (t −1)/q , such that under the prizes
policy the net income becomes
Ya(t )=Qa(t ) [1− vG(t )] [1−ε]+
{
E (t −1)/q if a is awarded a prize,
0 otherwise.
(6.16)
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Table 6.2: Free policy parameters
Fossil energy tax τ tax on fossil energy investments
Prizes q number of agents that receive a prize
ε tax on income to finance the prize
Advertisement q number of agents that are advertised
p probability that an agent is reached by advertisement
(the simulations use a fixed value of p = .25)
To give an example: if the income tax ε is 1%, and 10 out of 200 agents are selected
to receive a prize, then under the assumption that their income does not deviate sig-
nificantly from the average income, it is raised by about 20%. If the majority of agents
receive a prize, the tax to finance the prizes is in effect a selective punishment of those
agents that invest relatively much in fossil fuels.
The advertisement policy increases the social visibility of those agents that invest the
largest fraction of their income in the renewable energy sector, increasing the number
of agents that consider the advertised agents when deciding whom to imitate. At each
time step the q agents that invest the largest fraction of their income in renewables are
selected to be advertised. The advertised agents are temporarily added to the group
of neighbors of some other agents, so that these other agents consider the advertised
agents when deciding whom to imitate. Advertisement does not oblige an agent to con-
sider an advertised agent. Instead, its success rate depends on the resources invested
in the campaign. For simplicity we assume that whether agent a considers the adver-
tised agent b for imitation is an independent random event for each a, b and t and has
probability p. We ignore the cost of advertisement and assume a success rate of just
p = .25.
To give an example, let the average number of neighbors per agent before advertise-
ment be k = 10 and let q = 8 agents be selected for advertisement. On average, each
agent can now choose between k + q ∗ p = 10+ 8∗ .25 = 12 neighbors when deciding
whom to imitate. If an agent imitates, chances are one in six that it imitates the strategy
of an advertised agent, provided that the income of the advertised agents does not de-
viate significantly from that of the other agents. The free parameters of each policy are
listed in Table 6.2.
6.2.5 Model calibration
The free parameters of the economicmodel are calibrated such that global warming has
a significant negative welfare effect, emphasizing the need for policies. The calibrated
values of all free economic parameters are summarized in Table 6.3. A fixed number 200
of agents is used in all simulations; this is approximately the number of independent
states and a rough approximation of the number of agents with an independent energy
policy. The quarterly capital discount rate is δ = .01. The exponent of general capital
in the production function is α= .9, and the exponent of the combined energy sector is
1−α= .1. In this way income is highest when 90% of an agent’s capital is in the general
sector and 10% in the two energy sectors. The scaling factorβ of the production function
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Table 6.3: Calibrated parameter values of the economic model
k network connectivity 10 C clustering coefficient .66
σ mutation variance .02 α Cobb-Douglas exponent .9
δ capital discount rate .01 φ breakdown of greenhouse gases .01
β scaling factor .021 v scale of climatic damage .00007
is calibrated such that the calibrated economic model without climate damage has an
economic growth rate of about 2% per annum. The breakdown fractionφ of greenhouse
gas and the sensitivity v to global warming are calibrated such that without any climate
policy the greenhouse gas emissions reduce the per annum growth rate by an order of
magnitude over the 100 years of the simulation, consistent with the studies reported
in Section 6.1. For the social network we use an average connectivity of k = 10. In a
population of 200 agents this value results in a highly connected network—the average
distance between any two agents in the network is 2.7—while maintaining the overall
qualities of a complex network.
The mutation variance σ is the only free parameter that regulates the evolutionary
mechanism. Small values of σ slow down the discovery of a good strategy. Large values
prevent convergence. A good value of σ lies somewhere in between. Figure 6.1 shows
how the average income of the agents depends on σ. The x-axis shows different values
for σ. The y-axis shows the average income that a population of 200 agents realize after
400 time steps. Each measurement point in the graph is averaged over 100 simulations.
The initial strategy of each agent is chosen at random. There are no taxes, global warm-
ing has no effect, and the additional cost of renewable energy is c = 100%. Under these
conditions the optimal strategy that maximizes the income growth rate of an individual
agent is 〈sK , sF , sR〉 = 〈.9, .1,0〉. The graph shows that average income is maximized for
a value of approximately σ ≈ .02, and for this reason we use a value of σ = .02 in the
remainder of this study.
In order to avoid any dependency of the simulation results on initial conditions, the
numeric simulations are divided into an initialization phase and a main experimental
phase. During the initialization phase certain parameters of the evolutionary economy
will converge regardless of the initial conditions, contributing to the general validity of
the numerical results. The initialization effect is visualized in Figure 6.2, which shows
how the average investment strategy converges on an equilibrium. 800 time steps are
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Figure 6.1: Effect of the mutation variance on economic performance
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Figure 6.2: Convergence of the average investment strategy
shown. Initial strategies are chosen at random from the two dimensional simplex, and
so at t = 1 the average strategy is 〈sK , sF , sR〉 = 〈1/3,1/3,1/3〉. The average strategy at t = 800
is 〈.9, .09, .01〉. Results are averaged over 10,000 simulations.
Note that while it takes the agents only about a dozen time steps to learn to invest
some 90% of their investments in general capital, they need about 200 time steps to
become sufficiently sensitive to the difference in cost between the two energy sectors
and to differentiate their energy investments. From t = 200 to t = 400 the convergence
on the final strategy can be seen to follow a damped oscillation pattern. The full effect
of a policy can only be established if it is introduced after the system without policy has
reached equilibrium. It takes 400 time steps for the systemwithout a policy to converge,
and so we base the numeric evaluation of climate policies on simulations that consist of
an initialization phase of 400 time steps during which no policies are applied, followed
by a main experimental phase of 400 time steps during which policies are applied and
evaluated. In particular, the tax τ on fossil energy investments and the environmental
tax ε are always zero up until t = 400. Only from t = 401 they take the value assigned to
them by the respective policy.
6.3 The evolutionary dynamics
6.3.1 Derivation of the growth function
An important prerequisite for regulating an evolutionary system is to understand its dy-
namics. Here we are primarily interested in what strategy the agents will converge on.
With regard to global warming we are further interested in whether the evolutionary
agents can converge on a globally optimal strategy, rather than on individually optimal
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strategies.
While the fitness function describes how the imitation of a strategy (the genotype)
depends on welfare as indicated by the income growth rate (the phenotype), the growth
function describes how a strategy determines the income growth rate of the agent that
carries it. The growth function calculates the economic utility of a strategy as the equi-
librium growth rate to which the income growth rate of an agent converges if it holds
on to that particular strategy. Derivation of the growth function is essential for an un-
derstanding of the evolutionary dynamics. We will base it on an analysis of the ratio of
sector specific capital to income.
To start with, equation 6.4 and 6.5 can be combined to express the difference equa-
tion of a combined energy sector E = F +R,
∆Ea(t ) = Ya(t −1)
(
sF,a(t )
1+τ
+
sR,a(t )
1+ c
)
− δEa(t −1), (6.17)
where the combined energy investment strategy of an agent is sF,a(t )+ sR,a(t ) = 1−
sK ,a(t ). Let ra(t ) be the fraction of 1−sK ,a(t ) that is invested in fossil energy, and 1−ra(t )
the fraction that is invested in renewable energy,
ra(t )=
sF,a(t )
1− sK ,a(t )
. (6.18)
This enables us to rewrite equation 6.17 as
∆Ea(t ) = Ya(t −1)
[
1− sK ,a(t )
]
f (ra , t ) − δEa(t −1), (6.19)
where f (ra , t ) stands for
f (ra , t ) =
ra(t )
1+τ
+
1− ra(t )
1+ c
. (6.20)
We collapse the scaling factor and the economic effect of global warming into a single
factor ζ(t ),
ζ(t )=β [1− vG(t )] . (6.21)
Next we combine the calculation of income (equation 6.8) with the production function
(equation 6.6) and simplify it by ignoring the additive term T (t−1)
|P |
, which is identical for
all agents,
Ya(t )= ζ(t )Ka(t )
α Ea(t )
1−α. (6.22)
We now use equation 6.3 and 6.9 to calculate the difference equation of the ratio of gen-
eral capital to income as
Ka(t )
Ya(t )
=
Ya(t −1) sK ,a(t ) + (1−δ)Ka(t −1)
(γa(t )+1) Ya(t −1)
=
sK ,a(t )
γa(t )+1
+
1−δ
γa(t )+1
Ka(t −1)
Ya(t −1)
.
(6.23)
This dynamic equation is of the form
x(t )= a+bx(t −1), (6.24)
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which under the condition 0≤b<1 converges monotonically to its unique stable equi-
librium at
lim
t→∞
x(t )=a/(1−b). (6.25)
In a model without global warming this condition is normally fulfilled: investment is
always non-negative and sector specific capital cannot decrease faster than δ. Excessive
economic damage caused by globalwarming, vG(t ), does theoretically allow forγa≤−δ.
However, the social and political ramifications of such a catastrophic decline go beyond
the scope of this model. Hence, with the restriction that this model only covers the case
γa>−δ, and considering that 0<δ≤1, we have the required constraint for convergence
0≤
1−δ
γa(t )+1
< 1. (6.26)
We conclude that the ratio of general capital to income converges to
lim
t→∞
Ka(t )
Ya(t )
= lim
t→∞
sK ,a(t )
γa(t )+1
/
(
1−
1−δ
γa(t )+1
)
= lim
t→∞
sK ,a(t )
γa(t )+δ
.
(6.27)
Equation 6.27 describes a unique stable equilibrium towhich the ratio of general capital
to income converges monotonically. A similar result can be obtained for the energy
sector:
lim
t→∞
Ea(t )
Ya(t )
= lim
t→∞
[
1− sK ,a(t )
]
f (ra , t )
γa(t )+δ
. (6.28)
Ignoring the limit notation we combine equation 6.27 and 6.28 with equation 6.22 to
calculate income at equilibrium as
Ya(t )= ζ(t )
(
Ya(t −1) sK ,a(t )
γa(t )+δ
)α (Ya(t −1)[1− sK ,a(t )] f (ra , t )
γa(t )+δ
)1−α
= ζ(t )
Ya(t −1)
γa(t )+δ
sK ,a(t )
α
[
1− sK ,a(t )
]1−α
f (ra , t )
1−α.
(6.29)
Solving for γa(t ) yields the growth function
γa(t )= ζ(t ) sK ,a(t )
α
[
1− sK ,a(t )
]1−α
f (ra , t )
1−α
− δ. (6.30)
6.3.2 Convergence behavior
We can now address the question whether evolutionary agents can be expected to con-
verge on the globally rather than on the individually optimal strategy. In equation 6.27
and 6.28 neither the rate of convergence nor the equilibrium itself depend on the value
of ζ(t ). In equation 6.30 we find that ζ(t ) is a multiplicative factor that does not change
the relative order of the equilibriumgrowth rate of individual strategies. Since the fitness
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Figure 6.3: Growth effect of investment in general capital. The production coefficient is
α= .9.
of an agent depends on the order of income growth rates, the fitness function is invari-
ant under such amonotonous transformation. In other words, ζ(t ) does not change the
likelihood of a particular strategy to be imitated. This means that global warming has
no effect on the evolutionary process: agents must not be expected to show any type
of behavioral response to the economic effects of global warming and are not likely to
choose the globally over the individually best strategy.
To answer the question of which strategy the agents will converge on, the growth
function of equation 6.30 can be decomposed into a term that describes the effect of in-
come allocation to general capital on growth, and a term that describes the growth effect
of the allocation of the remaining income over the two energy sectors. The dependency
of the equilibrium growth rate on the general capital allocation as seen in equation 6.30
is given by the term
sK ,a(t )
α
[
1− sK ,a(t )
]1−α , (6.31)
which depends exclusively on the constant production coefficient α. This term is max-
imized for sKa(t ) = α, which implies that the optimal allocation to the combined en-
ergy sector is sFa(t )+ sRa(t ) = 1−α. As can be seen in Figure 6.3, the growth effect is
a concave function of sKa(t ) with an extended region around the maximum that has a
gradient close to zero.
The effect of ra(t ) on the income growth rate is via f (ra , t )1−α which, from equa-
tion 6.20, is
f (ra , t )
1−α
=
(
ra(t )
1+τ
+
1− ra(t )
1+ c
)1−α
. (6.32)
Figure 6.4 shows that this function is flat when τ = c and otherwise concave. For τ > c
the term is maximized when ra(t )= 0, and for τ< c it is maximized when ra(t )= 1. For
a given value of ra(t ) the curvature increases with |τ− c|. For a given value of |τ− c| the
curvature increases with the distance to the maximum. Unlike term 6.31, the curvature
at themaximum is not zero. Maximizing this type of growth function poses no challenge
to a (collective) learning mechanism. It has a single global optimum, no local optima,
and a distinct slope that increases with distance to the optimum. Even the simplest of
hill climbing algorithms can find and approach this optimum. Learning mechanisms
will differ mostly in the speed of convergence.
124 6. Policy Instruments for Evolution of Bounded Rationality
p
o
li
cy
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.9
1
 
 
additional cost  c=0%
additional cost  c=100%
additional cost  c=200%
fraction of energy allocation invested in fossil energy, ra (t )
g
ro
w
th
eff
ec
t
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.9
1
 
 
emission tax ε=0%
emission tax ε=100%
emission tax ε=200%
fraction of energy allocation invested in fossil energy, ra (t )
Figure 6.4: Growth effect of different investment allocations. The production coefficient
is α= .9 and the total energy allocation is 1− sK ,a(t )= .1. In the upper graph the tax on
fossil energy investments is τ = 0. In the lower graph the additional cost of renewable
energy is c = 100%.
Regarding the speed with which our evolutionary agents converge on the optimum
strategy, we must bear in mind that evolutionary agents will only converge on the indi-
vidually optimum strategy if there is sufficient selection pressure. Figure 6.2 shows that
the speed of convergence gradually decreases as the optimum strategy is approached.
The previous discussion has shown that the slope of the growth functionmonotonically
decreases as themaximum is approached. This apparent correlation between the speed
of convergence and the slope of the growth function can be explained from the fact that
the actual income growth rate of an agent only approximates the equilibrium growth
rate of its strategy. Due to this inaccuracy, the selective advantage of an investment
strategy over a variant with lower equilibrium growth rate diminishes as the difference
in equilibrium growth rates decreases. So as the slope of the growth function decreases
around the optimum, the selection pressure among variants decreases as well, with the
important consequence that the evolutionary economy potentially never converges and
never reaches equilibrium.
6.4 Policy analysis
6.4.1 Experimental setup
We use numerical simulations to determine how sensitive the three policies of Sec-
tion 6.2.4 are to a particular choice of values for their free parameters (cf. Table 6.2), and
how sensitive they are to a particular choice of value for the cost of renewable energy.
We measure this sensitivity with regard to how effective each policy is in regulating the
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Figure 6.5: Evolution of the calibrated economy
economic behavior in an evolutionary economy, which in this model means to reduce
global warming and increase social welfare.
To reduce the variance of the simulation results, we replicate each simulation 1,000
times for each tested level of free parameters and cost of renewable energy. In order
to obtain results that are valid for the general class of scale-free social networks with a
high clustering coefficient, each replication uses a different random instance of such a
network, so that the results are valid for our general class of social networks but do not
depend on a specific choice of network. Also, at the start of each replication the agents
are initialized with random strategies that converge during the initialization phase of
400 time steps. During the following 400 time steps, the main experimental phase, the
policy is applied. We report the average value at time t = 800 of three key statistics:
global temperature, average income, and average income growth rate. We also report
the average energy allocation at t = 800.
Figure 6.5 shows the evolution of the three key statistics when no policy is applied,
for an additional cost of renewable energy c = 0% and c = 100%. These are the two sys-
tems against which the policies are evaluated. For each policy and for each parameter
scan, the graph will include the same statistic for a system without policy.
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6.4.2 Evaluating the first best policy, a tax on fossil energy investment
When fossil energy and renewable energy are perfect substitutes, investment in themore
cost-effective energy sector generates a higher incomegrowth rate for an investing agent.
A rational agent is expected to use the strategy with the highest equilibrium growth rate
and to invest exclusively in themore cost efficient energy sector, even if the difference is
very small: if τ< c, a rational agent invests only in fossil energy. If τ> c, it invests only in
renewable energy. If τ= c, it is indifferent between the two energy sectors. This does not
hold for evolutionary agents, which converge on a strategy only if there is sufficient se-
lection pressure. When the cost difference between fossil and renewable energy is small,
the resulting difference in the equilibrium income growth rate is also small. Since the
actual income growth rate only approximates the equilibrium growth rate to a certain
degree, small difference in equilibrium growth rate are harder to detect than large ones.
Figure 6.6 shows the economic effect at t = 800 of different levels of a tax on fos-
sil energy investment. Here the additional cost of renewable energy is c = 100%. The
average energy allocation is a smooth function of the cost difference of the two energy
sectors, and hence of the slope of equation 6.32. The curves can best be described as two
symmetric sigmoids that cross each other at about τ= 125%. In other words, the evolu-
tionary agents are indifferent between the two energy sectors at a tax level of τ= 125%.
For a rational agent as described above, we would observe two step functions that cross
each other at the point where both energy sectors carry the same cost, i.e., τ = 100%.
Figure 6.7 allows for a similar observation for different levels of the cost of renewable
energy when the tax is τ = 100%. Here the two curves (approximate sigmoids) of the
energy allocation cross each other at a tax level of c = 80%. Again, for a rational agent as
described above, we would observe two step functions that cross each other when the
additional cost of renewable energy is equal to the tax, i.e., at c = 100%.
That the observed crossover points deviate significantly from the point τ = c where
rational agents are indifferent is due to a particular type of lock-in ormemory effect of an
evolutionary system. During the initialization phase no policy is applied and due to its
selective advantage the agents converge on a strategy that allocates energy investments
to fossil energy. During the main experimental phase a tax on fossil energy investment
changes the selective advantage in favor of renewable energy. As the agents move to-
wards the new optimum, the slope of the growth function decreases to the point that the
selection pressure becomes insignificant. For all practical purposes, the convergence
comes to a halt somewhere between the old and the new optimum.
In both Figure 6.6 and 6.7 the increase in global temperature generally reflects the
investment in fossil energy, and this increase is in turn reflected in the average income
growth rate and the average income. All statistics changemonotonically as a function of
τ− c. The higher the tax on fossil energy investment, the lower the global temperature
and the higher the average income growth rate and the average income.
6.4.3 Evaluating the prizes policy
In a model of rational expectations, a prize that is awarded only to selected agents in-
troduces complex social dynamics that can be highly sensitive to initial conditions or,
worse, intractable (Challet et al., 2005). In this evolutionary model, agents do not make
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Figure 6.6: Effect of a tax on fossil energy investment for different tax levels, at t = 800.
The additional cost of renewable energy is c = 100%.
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Figure 6.7: Effect of a tax on fossil energy investment for different levels of cost of re-
newable energy, at t = 800. The tax on fossil energy investment is τ= 100%. Results are
averaged over 1,000 simulations for every cost increment of 10 percent points.
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choices in anticipation of a prize. Instead, they choose to imitate an agent after a prize is
given, based on relative welfare. The evolutionary impact of a prize is a simple function
of its effect on the relative welfare.
Figure 6.8 shows how the economic impact of a prize varies with the number q of
rewarded individuals. Here the income tax that finances the prize is ε= 1% and the ad-
ditional cost of renewable energy is c = 100%. When q = 3 agents are rewarded, both
the average investment in fossil fuel and the global temperature are minimized, and av-
erage growth and income are maximized. For values of 10 ≤ q ≤ 50 the agents weakly
prefer renewable energy, and for all values of q ≤ 160 a significant improvement in in-
come growth rate and income can be observed, compared to the system without poli-
cies. Very high values of q have no positive economic effect, and we conclude that the
evolutionary system is not showing the same positive response to selective punishment
as it shows to selective reward.
Figure 6.9 shows the policy effect for different levels of income tax, for an additional
cost of renewable energy c = 100% and q = 3 rewarded agents. Investments in renew-
able energy increase monotonically as the tax increases, and the global temperature de-
creases. The positive welfare effect however peaks at a tax of 3% and declines for higher
tax levels. Figure 6.10 shows how the policy effect varies with the cost of renewable en-
ergy, for q = 3 rewarded agents and an environmental tax on income ε = 1%. With the
chosen parameters the policy proves to be effective for an additional cost of renewable
energy of up to 100%. While the global temperature and the average income growth rate
are positively affected even by higher cost levels, average income approaches that of the
system without policy.
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Figure 6.8: Effect of the prizes policy for different numbers of promoted agents, at t =
800. The additional cost of renewable energy is c = 100%. The environmental tax on
income is ε= 1%
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Figure 6.9: Effect of the prizes policy for different levels of the environmental tax on
income, at t = 800. The additional cost of renewable energy is c = 100%, the number of
promoted agents is q = 3.
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Figure 6.10: Effect of the advertisement policy for different levels of cost of renewable
energy, at t = 800. The number of promoted agents is q = 3, the environmental tax on
income is ε= 1%.
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6.4.4 Evaluating the advertisement policy
The social effect of advertisement can not be understood correctly without the concept
of evolutionary fitness. No money is being transferred and there is no increase in infor-
mation. All that is changed is the number of other agents that consider an advertised
agent for imitation.
Figure 6.11 shows how the economic impact of advertisement varies with the num-
ber q of advertised agents. The additional cost of renewable energy is c = 0%. A broad
range of values for the number q of advertised agents proves to be effective, peaking in
the region of ten to forty agents, and decreasing slowly as the maximum of q = 200 is
approached, at which point the network is fully connected. Figure 6.12 shows how the
effect of the advertisement policy varies with the cost of renewable energy. The number
of advertised agents is q = 10. The policy proves to be effective only up to an additional
cost of renewable energy of 1%. Beyond this point global temperature and average in-
come approach the levels without policy, and the income growth rate becomes even
lower thanwithout policy. In other words, advertisement is only effective when the slope
of the growth function is small (cf. equation 6.32) and the selection pressure to invest in
the more cost efficient fossil energy sector is negligible.
6.5 Conclusions
An agent-based simulation of an economic process facilitates the study of climate poli-
cies under conditions that are difficult if not impossible to study in equilibrium type of
models with representative and rational agents. The agent-based approach describes
agents that are heterogeneous in their strategies and assets and reflect bounded ra-
tionality. This allows for the implementation and study of selective policies that treat
agents differently depending on their behavior. The particular form of the agent-based
model employed here is an evolutionarymodel of strategy formation in a social network.
The approach was applied tomodel investment choices by individual agents in gen-
eral, fossil energy, and renewable energy capital, as part of a simple economic model
with global warming feedback. Use of fossil energy is the individually optimal strategy,
but causes global warming and a decline in social welfare that calls for a climate policy.
As there is no central authority to enforce a climate policy, compliance is a problem. A
social-evolutionary module describes selective imitation and random mutation of in-
vestment strategies. The probability that an agent is imitated depends on relative wel-
fare and social connectivity, with relative welfare measured by the relative growth rate
of individual income in the individual’s (peer) network.
How an investment strategy translates into relative welfare as indicated by the in-
come growth rate is described by a growth function. In this economic model the growth
function is a concave function with a single optimum, in principle an easy optimiza-
tion problem for any type of learning algorithm. However, as the strategies converge on
the optimum, selection pressure decreases, the convergence process slows down, and
the evolutionary economy potentially never reaches equilibrium. The growth function
shows further that global warming has no effect on relative welfare, and the evolution-
ary agents therefore can not be expected to choose the globally over the individually
optimal strategy.
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Figure 6.11: Effect of the advertisement policy for different numbers of promoted agents,
at t = 800. The additional cost of renewable energy is c = 0%.
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Figure 6.12: Effect of policy 3 for different levels of cost of renewable energy, at t = 800.
The number of promoted agents is q = 10.
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Two selective policies were formulated that take heterogeneity of the strategies and
of the social connectivity of individual agents into account. They influence the evolu-
tionary formation of strategies by increasing the probability of desirable strategies to be
imitated. Numerical simulations compared both policies with that of a standard regula-
tory tax on fossil energy investment, measuring how effective each policy is in reducing
global warming and increasing social welfare. One selective policy, prizes, regulates rel-
ative welfare positions and causes agents with a desirable strategy to be ranked higher
by their neighbors. The other selective policy, advertisement, regulates social visibility
so that agents with a desirable strategy are seen bymore agents. With regard to effective-
ness, the regulatory tax on fossil energy investment depends on the compliance of the
big polluters. Prizes depends on the compliance of at least some agents that pay into the
environmental fund, for example those agents that suffer most from global warming.
Advertisement does not depend on enforcement.
Both prizes and the tax on fossil energy investment were found to be effective over a
wide range of values for the additional cost of renewable energy, with a gradual decrease
in effectiveness as this cost increases. Numerical evaluation of the tax on fossil energy
investment has shown that due to lock-in, the tax level at which evolutionary agents
are indifferent between the two energy investment sectors is significantly higher than
the tax level at which their costs are equal. This can be seen to reflect a tax on a lock-in
externality. Prizes have shown that an evolutionary system is far less responsive to selec-
tive punishment than to a prize. Advertisement only works well when the cost difference
between the two energy sectors is very small and the selection pressure to invest in fossil
energy is very low.
The evolution of economic strategies and the dynamics of global warming are far
more complex than expressed here, but one may expect that selective policies have the
same qualitative effect. The effect of prizes is similar to that of a regulatory tax on fossil
energy investment, but depends less on the compliance of the big polluters. When the
costs of fossil and renewable energy are nearly equal, economic fairs and conferences,
scholarships, awards for outstanding contributions, and publication of informativema-
terial represent relatively inexpensive policy tools that do not depend on an enforcing
authority and that can have a significant effect on combating global warming.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This doctoral thesis combines methods from several scientific disciplines in order to
allow for an evolutionary agent-based policy analysis in dynamic environments. We
started with a fundamental study on how to build a simple and robust model of eco-
nomic evolution. We evaluated an array of conventional evolutionary algorithms for
their simplicity and robustness and proceeded to build a simple evolutionary mecha-
nism where economic behavior evolves by imitation in a social network. We then used
such a model in numeric agent-based simulations to investigate the evolutionary pro-
cess under different environmental dynamics. Finally, we have formulated and evalu-
ated environmental policies that explicitly take the evolution of economic behavior into
account.
In order to build an objectively simple evolutionary mechanism, we introduced and
evaluated a numerical method, Relevance Estimation and Value Calibration. It mea-
sures the minimum amount of information that is needed to tune an evolutionary al-
gorithm such that it reaches a desired level of performance, and how this performance
depends on the correct tuning of individual algorithm parameters. In order to do so it
uses probability distributions over parameter values during the tuning process. Proba-
bility distributions are well suited tomeasure information. Themethod can in principle
be applied to fields other than evolutionary computing.
We applied the method to an array of conventional evolutionary algorithms, and
found that the need for tuning is distributed in a highly skewed way over the different
algorithm components. Typically the tuning of the mutation operators—which main-
tain diversity—has the highest impact on algorithm performance. This general result
was confirmed for models of economic evolution, in simulations where the agents have
to adapt under the complex dynamics of climatic and technological change. The same
simulations also revealed that when extra detail is added to an evolutionarymodel, tun-
ing of the model becomes less effective, and the capability of the agents to adapt is re-
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duced. This is a further argument to keep the model of imitation as simple as possible.
We proceeded to build a simple evolutionarymechanismwith only one free parame-
ter for the diversity of strategies, and studied the welfare effect of changing this parame-
ter under different environmental dynamics. The dynamics were defined with regard to
two widely recognized and easily measurable aspects of environmental change, namely
how gradual and how frequent it occurs. Extensive numeric simulations identified the
level of diversity that leads to a welfare distribution which is socially optimal in terms
of constant relative risk aversion. This optimum level is different for different environ-
mental dynamics, and based on our simulations we formulated policy advise on the
socially optimal level of diversity when the environmental dynamics are unknown. It
emerged that in general, a higher degree of risk aversion calls for a higher degree of di-
versity. When the precise nature of the environmental dynamics is known, optimizing
the diversity to the particular dynamics allows for a significant increase in social welfare.
This possibility to improve social welfare by optimizing social imitation to a particular
environmental dynamics or to a particular degree of risk aversion constitutes a new op-
portunity for public intervention that has not previously been recognized.
Finally we applied our methods to a simple model of global warming where the pol-
icy maker wants to encourage the agents to replace fossil energy, which has a negative
environmental impact, by renewable energy, which is environmentally neutral yet less
cost-efficient. Numerical evaluation of a regulatory tax on investments in fossil energy
revealed that due to lock in, the tax level for which the evolutionary agents are indif-
ferent between the two technologies differs significantly from what can be concluded
from a model with rational and representative agents. As a consequence, the level of
such a regulatory tax has to be significantly higher if agents are to be convinced to aban-
don fossil fuels for good. We designed and evaluated two novel public policies—prizes
and advertisement—that selectively increase the probability of environmentally friendly
strategies to be imitated. Both policies are easier to enforce than a regulatory tax, which
depends on whether the worst offenders can be persuaded to comply—a difficult task if
they have to pay the highest tax. With prizes, policy enforcement has shifted to finding
enough donors that finance a prize for the best behaving agent. Numerical evaluation
showed that the effect of prizes on welfare and global warming is similar to that of a reg-
ulatory tax. Advertisement proved to work well only when the cost difference between
fossil and renewable energy is small, but has the unique advantage that it does not de-
pend on a central authority to enforce it.
We conclude that amodel of economic evolution can be designed that is simple and
robust in an objectiveway, and that the simple evolutionarymechanismof such amodel
is sufficient to allow a community of agents to adapt well to different environmental
dynamics, even when their rational capabilities are bounded and their information is
limited. Despite the inherent randomness of a simulated evolutionary process, robust
results can be obtained that are valid over a large number of different environmental
and social conditions, pointing to their general validity outside the tested conditions.
Suchmodels do not only lead to different predictions with regard to established pol-
icy tools like a regulatory tax, but they open the door for new policy instruments that
regulate the selective advantage of economic behavior.
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SYMBOLS
Symbol Meaning Chapter
a, b individual economic agents 4–6
α production coefficient of the Cobb-Douglas production function 4, 6
β scaling factor of the production function 5, 6
C consumption 4
c additional cost of renewable energy 6
D distribution over parameter values 2, 3
d dynamics that change the production function 5
δ rate of deprecation for capital and technology 4–6
E energy investment sector 6
ε revenue tax on income to fund climate policy 6
E net effect of a strategy on growth; 5
fund financed by the environmental tax 6
F capital accumulation in the fossil energy sector 4, 6
F fitness of a strategy/agent 6
f P [agent mutates its strategy] 4
φ breakdown fraction of greenhouse gases 6
G level of atmospheric greenhouse gases 6
g P [agent imitates] 4
γ income growth rate of an agent 5, 6
h Shannon entropy of a distribution; 2, 3
threshold rank of imitated peers 4
i index of a capital sector 4–6
K capital accumulated in an investment sector 4–6
k number of parameters; 2
k number of peers of an agent in the social network 4–6
L technology 4
m number of parameter vectors that form the REVAC table; 2
number of renewable energy sectors 4
N neighbors of an agent in the social network 4–6
n number of parameter values that define a distribution; 2
number of capital sectors 4, 5
P population of economic agents 4–6
p price of investment; 5
probability that an agent is reached by advertisement 6
pi production coefficient of the Cobb-Douglas production function 5
139
Q income without global warming 6
q number of agents that receive a prize or are advertised 6
R capital accumulation in the renewable energy sector 4, 6
r rank of a strategy in a group of peers 4
ρ f threshold rank for mutation 4
ρg threshold rank for imitation 4
s investment strategy of an agent 4–6
σ variance of themutation operator or diversity control parameter 4–6
t unit of time (usually financial quarter) in the discrete timemodel 4–6
τ regulatory tax on investments in fossil energy 6
v sensitivity of economic growth toG 6
W welfare of a population 4
w amount of smoothing applied to a distribution; 2
imitation weight 4
~x vector of parameter values 2
Y income of an agent 4–6
z learning rate 4
ζ factor that combines severalmonotonous transformations of the
production function
6
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EVOLUTIONAIRE AGENT-GEBASEERDE
BELEIDSANALYSE IN
VERANDERLIJKE OMGEVINGEN
SAMENVATTING
Dit proefschrift combineert methoden uit de economie en de kunstmatige intelligentie
om economisch beleid voor veranderlijke omgevingen te ontwerpen en te evalueren.
We beginnen met een studie naar hoe een eenvoudig en robuust model van econo-
mische evolutie kan worden ontworpen. We bestuderen een reeks bestaande evolu-
tionaire algoritmen en gebruiken de afgeleide inzichten om een eenvoudig evolutionair
model te ontwerpen ter beschrijving van economisch gedrag dat evolueert door middel
van imitatie in een sociaal netwerk. En we gebruiken dit model in numerieke simulaties
om het evolutionaire proces onder verschillende omgevingsdynamieken te bestuderen.
Voorbeelden van dynamische omgevingen zijn technologische verandering, macroeco-
nomische fluctuaties, en trends in natuurlijk millieu en hulpbronnen. In een toepassing
op klimaatverandering formuleren en toetsen we millieubeleid dat expliciet rekening
houdt met de evolutie van economisch gedrag.
Om een evolutionair model te ontwerpen dat objectief eenvoudig is introduceren en
toetsen we een nieuwe numerieke methode, genaamd Relevance Estimation and Value
Calibration (REVAC). De methode meet hoeveel informatie minimaal nodig is om een
evolutionair algoritme op een beoogde prestatie af te stemmen, en hoe het bereiken van
de beoogde prestatie afhangt van het afstemmen van de verschillende parameters van
het algoritme. Hiervoor maken we bij het afstemmen gebruik van kansverdelingen over
parameterwaardes. Kansverdelingen zijn uitermate geschikt om informatie te meten.
De methode kan in principe ook voor andere dan evolutionaire algoritmen worden ge-
bruikt.
Toepasing vandezemethode op een reeks bestaande evolutionaire algoritmenmaakt
duidelijk dat niet alle onderdelen van een algoritme even invloedrijk zijn: vaak heeft de
afstemming van de mutatie-operator—die de verscheidenheid garandeert—de meeste
invloed op de prestatie van het algoritme. Dit algemene resultaat word bevestigd voor
economische evolutie, in simulaties waar de agenten geconfronteerd worden met kli-
maatverandering en technologische verandering. Dezelfde simulaties tonen tevens aan
dat indien extra detail wordt toegevoegd aan een evolutionair model, het model minder
goed kan worden afgestemd, waardoor het vermogen van de agenten om zich aan te
passen afneemt. Dit is een goede reden om eenmodel van imitatiegedrag zo eenvoudig
mogelijk te houden.
Vervolgens ontwerpen we een eenvoudig evolutionair model met slechts één vrije
parameter voor de verscheidenheid van strategieën, waarbij we de invloed van deze
parameter op welvaart onder verschillende omgevingsdynamieken onderzoeken. Deze
dynamieken worden gedefinieerd ten opzichte van twee breed geaccepteerde en een-
voudig herkenbare kenmerken van economische verandering, namelijk hoe gelijkmatig
149
en hoe regelmatig verandering op treedt. Uitgebreide numerieke simulaties maken dui-
delijk hoeveel verscheidenheid nodig is om een verdeling van welvaart te bereiken die
optimaal is voor de samenleving, bezien vanuit een constante relatieve risicoaversie. Dit
optimum verschilt per omgevingsdynamiek.
Via simulaties leiden we inzichten over beleid af alsmede over de sociaal optimale
verscheidenheid wanneer de omgevingsdynamiek onbekend is. Het blijkt dat in het al-
gemeen een sterkere mate van risicoaversie om meer diversiteit vraagt. Wanneer de
aard van de omgevingsdynamiek echter bekend is dan zal de optimale diversiteit een
aanzienlijk hogerewelvaartmogelijkmaken. Demogelijkheid omwelvaart te verbeteren
door het imitatie gedrag te optimalizeren op een bepaalde omgevingsdynamiek of, als
deze niet bekend is, een bepaalde risicoaversie, biedt nieuwe perspectieven voor beleid
die niet eerder zijn erkend.
Voorts wordt de methode toegepast op een eenvoudig model van klimaatverander-
ingwaar de beleidsmaker de agentenwilmotiveren om fossiele brandstoffen in te ruilen
voor vernieuwbare energie. Die is weliswaar millieuvriendelijker, maar ook duurder.
Numerieke evaluatie van een regulerende belasting op fossiele energie laat zien dat het
belastingsniveau waar evolutionaire agenten geen onderscheid maken tussen de twee
vormen van energie aanzienlijk hoger is dan wat een model met rationele en represen-
tatieve agenten voorspelt. Als men imiterende agenten wil stimuleren om fossiele ener-
gie te verlaten danmoet de regulerende belasting dus ook aanzienlijk hoger zijn danwat
door de rationele keuzetheorie wordt voorspeld.
We ontwikkelen en toetsen twee nieuwe beleidsinstrumenten—beloningen of pre-
mies voor goed gedrag en advertentie van voorbeeldig gedrag—die de waarschijnlijk-
heid dat millieuvriendelijk gedrag wordt geïmiteerd selectief verhogen. Beide instru-
menten zijn eenvoudiger te realizeren dan een regulerende belasting, die vereist dat
de grootste vervuilers meedoen—hetgeen politiek en sociaal veel weerstand oproept
aangezien deze ook het meeste moeten betalen. Met beloningenmoet de beleidsmaker
wel donors vinden die de kosten van de beloning voor het meest millieuvriendelijke
gedrag bekostigen. Dat kunnen bijvoorbeeld diegenen zijn die het meest de millieu-
schade voelen. Numerieke evaluatie toont aan dat het effect van beloningen opwelvaart
en klimaat vergelijkbaar is met het effect van een regulerende belasting. Advertentie
van voorbeeldig gedrag blijkt slechts effectief waneer het prijsverschil tussen fossiele en
vernieuwbare energie klein is. Het unieke voordeel van advertentie is dat het geen cen-
trale autoriteit vereist die het af kan dwingen.
We concluderen dat het mogelijk is om eenmodel van economische evolutie te ont-
werpen dat op een objectieve manier eenvoudig en robuust is. Het eenvoudige evolu-
tionaire mechanisme van een dergelijk model is voldoende om een groep agenten te
laten adapteren aan verschillende omgevingsdynamieken, ook als hun rationele vaar-
digheden beperkt zijn en zeweinig informatie hebben. Ondanks de onvoorspelbaarheid
van een gesimuleerd evolutionair proces kunnen robuuste resultatenwordenbereikt die
geldig zijn voor een groot aantal getoetse factoren, een aanduiding dat ze ook buiten het
domain van de getoetste factoren geldig zijn.
De ontwikkelde modellen leiden niet alleen tot andere voorspellingen voor gang-
baar beleid zoals een regulerende belasting, maar ze openen ook een deur naar nieuwe
beleidsinstrumenten die het selectieve voordeel van economisch gedrag reguleren.
